M. Dematteo Construction Co. v. City of New London

Citations: 236 Conn. 710; 674 A.2d 845; 1996 Conn. LEXIS 106Docket: 15150

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; April 23, 1996; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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In the tax appeal case, the central issue is whether the trial court had the authority to award costs to M. DeMatteo Construction Company for fees incurred in preparing an appraisal report after the court reduced the assessed value of the company's property. The company challenged the city's property assessment of $11,136,500, asserting it was overvalued. After introducing testimony from appraiser Arthur Estrada, who valued the property at $9,500,000, the trial court determined the fair market value to be $10,668,858.

Following the favorable ruling, the plaintiff submitted a bill of costs, including a $12,000 fee for Estrada's report. The trial court disallowed this expense, stating it was not a taxable cost under General Statutes 12-117a or 52-260 (f). The plaintiff appealed, arguing that it should be reimbursed for reasonable appraisal fees related to its successful appeal, citing the broad authority of 12-117a for taxing costs in favor of the prevailing party and the specific provisions of 52-260 (f) regarding appraiser fees for trial testimony.

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the disallowance of the appraisal fee based on the statutory interpretation of taxable costs.

The plaintiff argues that fees for an appraisal report should be considered taxable costs under statute 52-260 (f), despite its specific reference only to fees for expert trial testimony. The court, however, finds this argument unconvincing. Guided by established principles of statutory construction, the court seeks to understand the legislature's intent through the statute's language, legislative history, and its relationship to other laws. It concludes, consistent with common law, that parties typically bear their own litigation expenses unless explicitly stated otherwise by statute. The court affirms the trial court's ruling that appraisal report fees are not taxable under 12-117a or 52-260 (f), as 12-117a does not mention appraisal fees, and the legislative history does not support the notion that such fees were intended to be recoverable. The court notes that when the legislature intends to allow recovery of appraisal fees, it does so explicitly in the statute. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim these costs under the cited provisions.

General Statutes 8-133 mandates that if a redevelopment agency undervalues property taken by eminent domain, the court must award reasonable appraisal fees to the property owner. Similar provisions exist in General Statutes 12-161a for municipalities collecting delinquent personal property taxes, 12-193 for foreclosure actions, 13a-76 for undervaluation by the transportation commissioner, 16-266 for challenges to natural gas pipeline compensation, and 48-17b for inverse condemnation actions. The statutes indicate that appraisal fees should be awarded or taxed to specific parties under certain conditions.

The principle of statutory construction is applied, stating that the omission of a provision in a related statute signifies a different legislative intent. The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of existing statutes and their implications. Consequently, the legislature did not intend for appraisal report fees to be included as taxable costs under General Statutes 12-117a or 52-260(f), which only covers costs related to expert testimony at trial.

The plaintiff's argument for recovering appraisal costs based on public policy considerations is dismissed due to a lack of supporting evidence. While acknowledging potential discouragement for taxpayers to file appeals, the court asserts that it cannot rectify statutory omissions based on assumed intentions, particularly when such omissions appear intentional.

The remedy for the issues described lies with the General Assembly, not the court, as established in previous case law (Bailey v. Mars, State v. Nelson, United Aircraft Corp. v. Fusari). The judgment in the case is affirmed, with concurrence from other justices. On June 30, 1993, M. DeMatteo Construction Company transferred its property to DeMatteo Management, Inc., which is now recognized as a plaintiff alongside the original company. 

General Statutes 12-117a outlines the process for appealing decisions made by boards of tax review regarding property assessments for specific assessment years (1989-1994). Aggrieved parties, including lessees bound to pay real property taxes, may appeal to the superior court within two months of the board's action. Such appeals are prioritized for hearing unless good cause is shown otherwise. The court has the authority to grant equitable relief and may impose double or triple costs if the application lacks probable cause. If the assessment is reduced, the applicant is entitled to a refund of overpaid taxes, including interest and costs, or may opt for a tax credit. The court may enter judgment for the applicant against the municipality for any overpayment.

Additionally, General Statutes 52-260(f) mandates that when practitioners of healing arts or real estate appraisers provide expert testimony, the court will determine a reasonable fee, which will be included in the costs. The plaintiff's request for reimbursement of a $2,100 fee related to trial testimony was allowed by the trial court, and this decision remains unchallenged by the defendant. The language of 12-117a mirrors that of an earlier statute (12-118) concerning cost awards for successful property valuation challenges, with no legislative history indicating the right to recover appraisal fees in tax appeals.