Paige v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission

Citations: 235 Conn. 448; 668 A.2d 340; 1995 Conn. LEXIS 392Docket: 15092

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; November 21, 1995; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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The appeal centers on whether trees and wildlife qualify as "natural resources" under General Statutes 22a-19 (a) and (b), irrespective of their economic value. In July 1991, Fairfield University submitted an application to subdivide a 13.41-acre wooded site into forty lots and sought a special permit for excavation and filling. Plaintiffs Anthony J. Paige and Candace D. Paige, adjacent property owners, intervened, claiming that the development would harm the environment, particularly through the clear-cutting of trees, leading to pollution and destruction of public trust in air, water, wildlife, and natural resources. The town's commission approved the application with conditions but did not address whether natural resources were implicated or if alternative plans were needed. The plaintiffs appealed, asserting the commission acted unlawfully by neglecting to consider the environmental impact of the development. The trial court ruled that trees and wildlife are not considered natural resources under 22a-19 (a), thus the commission was not required to comply with 22a-19 (b). This conclusion was based on a precedent involving agricultural land, and the trial court indicated that recognizing trees and wildlife as natural resources could impose burdensome requirements on subdivision applications statewide. As a result, the plaintiffs’ appeal was dismissed without the trial court assessing the commission's consideration of environmental concerns. The plaintiffs subsequently sought certification for appeal, and the Appellate Court determined that, under 22a-19 (a), a "natural resource" must possess economic value. The term was construed based on legislative intent, as it was not explicitly defined in the statutes.

The court adopted a narrow definition of "natural resources" from Black’s Law Dictionary, defining it as materials in their native state with economic value, including timberland, oil and gas, and ore deposits. The definition also encompassed economic value derived from tourism and research. The Appellate Court found no evidence that the trees and wildlife in the subdivision area had economic value, noting the absence of endangered or rare species and the lack of productive use for the property. Consequently, the court ruled that the trees and wildlife did not qualify as natural resources under General Statutes 22a-19 (a), leading to the conclusion that 22a-19 (b), which mandates consideration of feasible alternatives to subdivision projects, was inapplicable. The Supreme Court of Connecticut disagreed with the Appellate Court's focus on economic value, asserting that trees and wildlife are inherently natural resources regardless of their economic worth. The case was remanded for the trial court to assess the commission's application of 22a-19. The court emphasized the need to define "natural resources" in line with legislative intent, using statutory construction principles to interpret the law consistently and meaningfully, recognizing the legislature's purpose in enacting laws.

Plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court's restrictive definition of "natural resources" contradicts the Environmental Protection Act (General Statutes 22a-1 et seq.) and relevant Connecticut regulations. The court agrees that the legislature has generally defined natural resources broadly, emphasizing values beyond mere economic products. The Environmental Protection Act underscores the importance of conserving natural resources, recognizing them as finite and valuable, and promoting harmony with nature. Additionally, General Statutes 22a-36 highlights the potential negative impacts of destroying natural resources on environmental quality and recreational values. Connecticut's regulations further clarify natural resources to include air, water, land, wildlife, and plants, aligning with legislative definitions that incorporate diverse ecological elements. Specific statutes, such as General Statutes 22a-6a(a) and 22a-342, illustrate that natural resources encompass a wide range of ecological components, and there is no indication from the legislature that these definitions should vary across different statutes. The Appellate Court’s narrow interpretation conflicts with both the legislative intent and the comprehensive policy framework established within the Environmental Protection Act.

In statutory interpretation, general terms are understood to include items of the same general nature as those specifically mentioned, following the principle of ejusdem generis. For instance, air, while lacking traditional economic value since it cannot be bought or sold, is considered a natural resource. Thus, under Connecticut's environmental legislation (22a-19), general terms are interpreted to encompass resources without economic value. Legislative intent is analyzed in light of the context surrounding the law's enactment, noting that other states, including Michigan, Massachusetts, and California, have similar environmental protection laws. The Michigan statute notably served as a model for Connecticut's law, using the phrase "air, water and other natural resources." 

The Michigan Supreme Court articulated that while the legislature set standards for environmental quality, it intentionally refrained from detailing every potential environmental issue, thus empowering the courts to define the standard through common law. This broad interpretation was affirmed in cases such as Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Assn. v. Dion, where existing plant and animal life was classified as natural resources. The restrictive view limiting natural resources to those with economic value is not supported by Connecticut's legislative history, which emphasizes a public trust in natural resources and provides remedies against unreasonable pollution. Connecticut's commitment to environmental protection is reflected in its high ranking among states, with legislative discussions highlighting the expansion of public access to legal recourse against pollution affecting communal resources.

The excerpt emphasizes the definition and preservation of public natural resources, asserting that significant aspects of the environment are inherently valuable and should not be subject to personal ownership. It argues that recent legislation aims to guarantee and protect these environmental rights for the public, countering the Appellate Court's interpretation that only economically valuable resources are protected. 

The legislative history indicates a commitment to progressive environmental laws, illustrated by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, which promotes environmental quality and coexistence between humanity and nature. Additionally, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act establishes liability for environmental damage without imposing an economic value test on natural resources, which are broadly defined to include land, water, and wildlife.

The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act further supports this broad interpretation by defining natural resources without economic value considerations. Other states, such as Massachusetts and Michigan, also reflect similar legislative intent in their definitions and management of natural resources. The excerpt concludes that the absence of an economic value requirement in Connecticut's environmental statutes aligns with the overarching goal of preserving the environment for present and future generations, reinforcing that the economic value test is not supported by the legislative text or history.

Requiring a party to demonstrate the economic value of state resources under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-19(a) contradicts state and federal environmental policies and undermines the statute's intended purpose. Legislative history and statutory intent should guide interpretations, emphasizing that § 22a-19 aims to protect the environment from unreasonable adverse impacts rather than merely obstructing development. Concerns regarding burdens on residential and commercial development due to the rejection of the economic value test are acknowledged but deemed unfounded. The statute's reasonableness standard is not expected to lead to an overwhelming number of citizen interventions or necessitate alternative plans for every subdivision application. Consideration of alternatives is mandated only if there is a reasonable likelihood of significant pollution or resource degradation. The defendants' reliance on prior case law, particularly Red Hill Coalition, is misplaced, as it addressed prime agricultural land—an altered category of land—and is not applicable to the natural resources at issue in this case. The commission's decision failed to address essential factors regarding the nature of trees and wildlife as natural resources and the potential impacts of the proposed development on these resources.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs' claims regarding the commission's failure to consider the environmental impacts of a proposed development and potential alternatives should be dismissed, citing the imposition of twenty conditions by the commission as evidence of its consideration of these issues. Plaintiffs argue that these conditions do not support the defendants' position. Case law mandates that trial courts, when reviewing decisions from planning and zoning authorities, must examine the record to ascertain the basis for those decisions. In Parks v. Planning, Zoning Commission, it was established that a lack of stated reasons for a commission's decision complicates appellate review, necessitating a thorough record search to find a justification. The court must uphold a commission's decision if any reason found in the record relates to the community's general welfare. In this case, the trial court erred by incorrectly concluding that trees and wildlife are not protected natural resources under General Statutes 22a-19, thereby failing to properly assess whether the commission considered the environmental impacts and alternatives as required. Consequently, the Appellate Court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings to ensure the trial court reviews the record to determine if the commission adequately addressed the issues specified in 22a-19 (a) and (b). The opinion is supported by the concurring justices. General Statutes 22a-19 allows various entities to intervene in administrative or judicial proceedings regarding actions that could unreasonably harm the state's natural resources.

In administrative and licensing proceedings, agencies must evaluate potential unreasonable pollution or harm to public trust resources such as air and water. Approval is contingent upon the absence of feasible alternatives that meet public health, safety, and welfare standards. Specifically for this appeal, three key conditions are outlined:

1. A buffer zone of at least 20 feet must be established along the northern property lines of Lots 1-12 and the eastern property lines of certain lots along North Benson Road, ensuring a dense visual screen. Deeds for these lots must include provisions to meet this buffer requirement, subject to Commission approval of a draft deed.
   
2. A landscaping plan must accompany the deed restriction, detailing existing and proposed trees and plantings, including berming, to achieve adequate visual screening, which also requires Commission approval.

3. A tree removal plan must be submitted for Commission approval before any site work begins, indicating which trees will be removed or preserved. The plan must also include protection measures for trees to be maintained during construction.

Furthermore, any aggrieved party may appeal a board's decision to the superior court within 15 days of the published notice, following specific service and return procedures. The interpretation of statutes by the enforcing agency is generally afforded significant deference by the courts.