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State v. Aparo
Citations: 223 Conn. 384; 614 A.2d 401; 1992 Conn. LEXIS 266Docket: 14443
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; August 11, 1992; Connecticut; State Supreme Court
The principal issue in the appeal is whether double jeopardy and collateral estoppel bar the state from retrying Karin Aparo on a conspiracy to commit murder charge after she was acquitted of being an accessory to murder. Aparo was charged with two counts: accessory to murder and conspiracy to commit murder. She was acquitted of the accessory charge, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the conspiracy charge, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial. The state intends to retry her on the conspiracy charge, prompting Aparo to file a motion to dismiss all charges. The trial court denied this motion, leading to an interlocutory appeal, which was transferred to a higher court. Aparo raised three claims on appeal: (1) that double jeopardy precludes retrial since six jurors voted for acquittal; (2) that collateral estoppel bars retrial because the jury impliedly found she did not intend for her mother to be killed; and (3) that collateral estoppel requires the exclusion of certain evidence, leaving insufficient admissible evidence for a retrial. The court rejected the first two claims and accepted the third claim in part. Aparo argued that, since she received six votes for acquittal on the conspiracy charge, she is protected from retrial by double jeopardy principles, which aim to prevent multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Aparo had previously requested a jury of twelve for the murder charge and six for the conspiracy charge, but her motion was denied. The jury vote on the conspiracy charge was seven to five in favor of acquittal. The defendant argues that the trial court erred by not allowing her a jury of six for the conspiracy charge, asserting that the factual elements of this charge were already resolved in her favor by six jurors, the same number required for a retrial. Connecticut law mandates that criminal trials generally utilize a jury of six unless otherwise specified, and a jury must consist of twelve members for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment unless the defendant consents to a smaller jury. The court concludes that if the defendant had preferred a six-member jury, she could have opted for it. The court rejects speculation that a six-member jury would have included the jurors who previously voted for acquittal, noting that the jury's vote was nonunanimous and therefore holds no legal relevance. The defendant also claims that collateral estoppel bars the state from retrying her for conspiracy, arguing that a retrial would allow the state to relitigate issues resolved in her favor during the first trial. The court clarifies that retrial after a jury deadlock does not violate double jeopardy protections. Collateral estoppel, linked to the double jeopardy clause, prevents relitigation of factual issues that have been conclusively determined in a previous trial. The court outlines two ways collateral estoppel can apply: it can bar the prosecution from arguing facts established in a prior case or completely prevent a subsequent prosecution if a fact determined in the initial trial is essential to the new charge. The court emphasizes that the burden is on the defendant to prove that the issue she seeks to bar was necessarily resolved in her favor in the prior trial. An acquittal for conspiracy may prevent the government from introducing evidence necessary to convict the defendant on a substantive offense in a retrial, if the first jury determined an ultimate fact in the defendant's favor. The principle of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is to be applied realistically, considering the overall circumstances of prior proceedings rather than with strict technicality. This was illustrated in the case of State v. Hope, where the defendant was acquitted of conspiracy to commit murder, and thus could not be prosecuted for aiding and abetting murder, as the jury had determined the defendant lacked the specific intent to kill, a necessary element in the latter charge. The current defendant argues that similar issues that would need to be proven at a retrial were resolved in her favor in the first trial. The core question is whether the precedent set in Ashe v. Swenson applies when a jury acquits on one count of a multicount indictment but does not reach a verdict on another count. Ashe established that an ultimate fact determined by a valid judgment cannot be litigated again. However, the ongoing jeopardy from the first trial complicates the application of collateral estoppel, raising the issue of whether the retrial constitutes a "future lawsuit." While the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed this, lower courts have generally agreed that collateral estoppel bars relitigating factual issues favorably determined by a partial verdict. In this legal analysis, the court affirms the complexity of jury verdicts in criminal cases, noting that juries can issue inconsistent verdicts without undermining their integrity. The jury's role reflects the community's conscience, allowing for acquittals that may conflict with the law and facts, particularly in cases where a unanimous decision is necessary. However, the court warns against permitting different juries to reach contradictory conclusions on the same issue, as this could violate the double jeopardy clause by subjecting defendants to multiple risks of conviction. The court proceeds to assess the evidence that led to the defendant's acquittal of aiding in her mother’s murder while leaving unresolved the conspiracy charge. Testimonies from both the defendant and Dennis Coleman are highlighted, showcasing contradictory accounts regarding their discussions about the murder. Coleman claims that the defendant had urged him to kill her mother and that they had devised a plan together, while the defendant denies any such request or knowledge of the murder plan. Coleman's testimony includes details of their relationship and prior discussions about killing the mother, including a failed plan where the defendant would signal Coleman to carry out the act. Support for Coleman's assertions is found in a letter from the defendant, which hints at their discussions about promises and intentions related to the murder. During a visit to the Aparo home, the defendant informed Coleman of her intention to put sleeping pills in a sandwich for her mother, Joyce Aparo, which Coleman did not attempt to prevent. After Joyce took a bite, she rejected the sandwich due to bad relish. Correspondence between Coleman and the defendant revealed their dark intentions, with Coleman expressing his willingness to make sacrifices for her, while the defendant asserted her commitment to their plan, stating it was a priority. She later expressed doubts about their ability to harm her mother, acknowledging that they could never go through with it. Their relationship continued almost daily until spring 1987, when the defendant began spending weekends with her violin teacher, Albert Markov, and developed feelings for his son, Alex. After suggesting they stop communication for a month, the defendant eventually revealed to Coleman that she had been intimate with Alex but claimed their relationship had become platonic. Following a trip to Woodstock with Alex, conversations about killing Joyce Aparo resumed. The defendant expressed her frustrations about being forced to stay with her mother and planned a trip with her family. In two emotionally charged conversations, she insisted that her mother needed to be killed before the trip. They discussed methods of murder, including suffocation and strangulation, and devised a detailed plan wherein Coleman would carry out the act while the defendant would manage the aftermath. However, Coleman ultimately backed out of the plan. On August 4, shortly before the planned murder, the defendant contacted Coleman, initially expressing frustration over a delayed execution of their plan but later requesting him to care for her cats while she would be away. They agreed to proceed with the murder of her mother on August 5. During a prior cat-feeding visit, Coleman left a note indicating his intent to carry out the murder. The defendant later instructed Coleman to kill her mother that night instead of the next day, stating she wanted to avoid being home during the act. She insisted that the body be left in a location where it could be discovered to ensure her access to the victim's life insurance. At 1 a.m. on August 5, Coleman, aided by two friends, carried out the murder, strangling Joyce Aparo and disposing of her body in Massachusetts. Coleman’s account was corroborated by friends of the defendant, who testified about her admissions regarding the murder plot. One friend detailed the defendant’s discussion of multiple murder methods and her post-murder plans, while another recalled the defendant's disbelief in Coleman’s seriousness during their earlier conversations about murder. Further evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt included a phone conversation she had on the day of the murder and comments about receiving a life insurance payout. The defendant also concealed evidence and misled police about her knowledge of the crime, maintaining a relationship with Coleman after his arrest. In her defense, she denied any involvement in the murder plot, claiming her diary entries referred to plans to elope with Coleman rather than a murder conspiracy. The defendant acknowledged a prior discussion with Coleman about killing her mother, triggered by her mother threatening to end her relationship with Coleman. During this conversation, Coleman suggested that the defendant could kill her mother and claim self-defense, which she rejected. He then proposed to do it himself, suggesting a plan involving the defendant signaling him with flickering lights, although this idea was later dismissed as irrational. Following a subsequent incident where her mother inadvertently flicked the lights, the defendant expressed fear and took precautions by locking the door and closing the curtains. The defendant admitted to crushing her mother’s Fiorinal tablets and placing them in her mother’s sandwich, claiming her intention was to calm her mother rather than to kill her. Her relationship with her mother improved after she began seeing Alex Markov in May 1987, while her relationship with Coleman deteriorated. She misled Coleman about her feelings regarding a trip to Binghamton, wanting to avoid making him jealous of her time with Markov. In an August 4 conversation, the defendant clarified that she did not discuss killing her mother but informed Coleman that her mother had returned home, which ended his responsibility to feed the cats. Coleman expressed anger towards her mother, wishing harm upon her. The defendant presented evidence of physical and emotional abuse from her mother, supported by witness testimonies and reports from the Department of Children and Youth Services and Norwalk Hospital, which had treated her after a suicide attempt at age twelve. Expert testimonies from psychiatrists John Cegalis and Walter Borden indicated that the defendant’s behavior and expressions of wishing her mother dead were consistent with an abused child suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and that her ongoing relationship with Coleman, despite his actions, was typical for someone in her situation. Cegalis expressed conflicting emotions about her mother, suggesting it was understandable to want to protect the last significant person in her life. Evidence indicated that Coleman independently sought to end Cegalis’s relationship with Markov, which was encouraged by Joyce Aparo. During cross-examination, Coleman revealed feelings of jealousy and depression regarding Cegalis’s relationships. He recounted a conversation in July 1987 where he threatened self-harm if Cegalis had been involved with Markov sexually, and he became distressed upon discovering photographs of them together. He previously claimed self-defense in the situation concerning Joyce Aparo. The defendant challenged the trial court's refusal to dismiss the conspiracy charge based on collateral estoppel, asserting that the jury’s acquittal on the accessory to murder charge implied a lack of intent to kill her mother. To acquit her of accessory to murder, the jury would need to find either no intent to kill or no solicitation of the murder. Conversely, for a conspiracy conviction, the prosecution must prove an agreement among conspirators to commit a crime, alongside an overt act and intent to engage in criminal conduct. The ruling clarified that aiding Coleman by merely indicating the victim's availability does not necessarily negate intent for conspiracy. The court emphasized that accessory liability requires proof of dual intent, highlighting that one must intentionally aid another in committing a crime rather than simply aiding an innocent act. The defendant admitted to telling Coleman that her mother was home on the night of the murder; however, the jury could reasonably infer that she did not intend for this information to facilitate her mother’s death. The defendant explained that she mentioned her mother's presence to indicate that Coleman no longer needed to feed the cats. Coleman testified that during their initial conversation on August 4, the defendant either stated her mother was home alone or would be returning home, while planning for her mother to be killed the following night. By that time, the information about her mother being home alone would have been outdated for committing the crime. In a subsequent conversation, the defendant changed her request for Coleman to kill her mother that same night, suggesting that if the jury accepted Coleman’s testimony, they might conclude that the defendant was unaware her statement would aid in the murder. This situation was likened to the defendant giving Coleman a key months prior, which she claimed was not intended to assist him in the murder. The jury had grounds to disbelieve parts of Coleman’s testimony due to inconsistencies and potential biases, such as jealousy and a desire to reduce his prison sentence. They could have chosen to accept only parts of his account that were corroborated by other witnesses, DuBois and Smith, who confirmed the defendant discussed the murder with Coleman shortly before it occurred but did not testify that she explicitly requested him to kill her mother. The legal standard established in State v. Wakefield indicates that mere knowledge of a crime is insufficient for accessory liability without intentional encouragement or aid. Therefore, the jury's reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant solicited or intentionally aided Coleman does not preclude the possibility of a conspiracy to commit murder. Consequently, the principle of collateral estoppel does not prevent the state from retrying the defendant for conspiracy. The defendant argues for the exclusion of much evidence from a retrial based on collateral estoppel, asserting that her acquittal on the accessory to murder charge indicates that the jury discredited all state evidence concerning her actions and mindset from July 14 to August 5, 1987. She contends that only conversations from the summer of 1986 should be admissible, citing General Statutes § 46b-121, which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Juvenile Matters of the Family Division over individuals under sixteen. The trial court, however, rejected these collateral estoppel claims, stating that the acquittal does not imply that the jury disbelieved all evidence related to her conduct after she turned sixteen. The court maintained that the state could present witnesses, including Dennis Coleman, in the second trial. It clarified that collateral estoppel applies only when an ultimate fact has been definitively determined in favor of a defendant in a prior trial, requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the specific issue at stake was conclusively resolved in her favor in the earlier proceedings. The state argues that the case of Dowling v. United States establishes that a prior acquittal does not prevent the use of evidence from an earlier trial. In Dowling, the defendant was acquitted of robbery A and subsequently tried for robbery B, which occurred at a different time and place. The prosecution introduced evidence from robbery A to establish Dowling's identity in robbery B, despite the acquittal. The court ruled that this did not violate double jeopardy because the prior acquittal did not resolve an ultimate issue relevant to the current trial. The court emphasized that under the applicable evidentiary rules, evidence of similar acts by the defendant is admissible if the jury can reasonably conclude that such acts occurred and that the defendant was involved. The court found that the prosecution did not need to prove Dowling's involvement in robbery A beyond a reasonable doubt for it to be admissible in the second trial, making collateral estoppel inapplicable. Further, the decision hinges on whether the prosecution can rely on the same evidence or theory from the previous trial while also introducing alternative evidence for the jury's consideration. The distinction between ultimate facts and predicate facts is critical; evidence of predicate facts does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and is not barred by collateral estoppel. If evidence from a previous acquittal serves to illuminate other, unlitigated facts, it may be permissible in a subsequent trial. However, there is a risk that a jury may convict based solely on conduct previously deemed insufficiently proven, which creates a potential for wrongful conviction. Collateral estoppel serves to safeguard against this risk. Collateral estoppel principles dictate that evidence related to crimes for which the defendant has previously been acquitted, and about which the prior jury had reasonable doubt, should be excluded if it could establish an element of a charged offense and potentially serve as a basis for conviction. In the current case, some evidence that could implicate the defendant as an accessory to murder also suggests a conspiracy with another individual, Coleman. Unlike the precedent set in Dowling, where prior crime evidence did not establish essential elements, the current situation reflects that the jury's acquittal on the accessory charge indicates their rejection of some critical evidence related to conspiracy, such as agreement and intent to kill. Specifically, Coleman testified that the defendant instructed him to kill her mother. The jury's prior acquittal implies they found insufficient evidence to support this claim. Thus, the state cannot present this testimony in a subsequent trial, as it would contradict the earlier jury's reasonable doubt. The trial court must reassess its decision regarding evidence exclusion based on whether the jury harbored reasonable doubt about any fact that, if proven, would establish a conspiracy charge. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's conclusion, remanding the case for further proceedings aligned with these principles. A person is guilty of murder if they intentionally cause the death of another or induce a suicide through force, duress, or deception. An affirmative defense exists if the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance with a reasonable explanation, evaluated from the defendant's perspective. However, this defense does not apply to first-degree manslaughter or other crimes. Evidence of mental illness is admissible to assess intent in murder cases. Murder is classified as a class A felony unless it qualifies as a capital felony. Criminal liability extends to those who assist or encourage another in committing a crime, treating them as principal offenders. Conspiracy occurs when a person intends for a crime to be committed and agrees with others to achieve that goal, with at least one participant taking an overt act. A defense against conspiracy charges is available if the conspirator successfully renounces their criminal intent after conspiring. Claims of double jeopardy can allow appeals prior to final judgment. In a related case, the jury was instructed that evidence of a separate incident could only be considered for intent, not as a substitute for the charged acts. The defendant argued that the jury instruction blurred the line between accessory and conspiracy laws, suggesting that acquittal on one implied acquittal on the other. However, the court maintained that the instruction clearly delineated the defendant's intent to assist in the murder from the act of conspiring with another. The prosecution must prove three elements for conviction: the defendant's intent to kill, their solicitation or aid in the murder, and their intent to assist the co-perpetrator in the murder. The court's instruction properly distinguished these elements, despite the defendant's claims. The jury was instructed incorrectly, as they were not informed that their decision on one question would resolve the other. The court mandated that if the State failed to prove any elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be found not guilty. Despite this error, it did not diminish the State's burden to prove accessorial acts or allow the jury to replace those acts with a conspiracy. The sufficiency of evidence for a conspiracy conviction was not addressed in the arguments and remains undecided for potential retrial. The principle of collateral estoppel would not apply in cases allowing retrials; hence, evidence could not be reused. The court reaffirmed that the rule allowing the exclusion of evidence post-acquittal remains valid. It is noted that juries struggle to separate determinative evidence from merely supportive evidence, making it challenging to follow limiting instructions. Past cases indicate that limiting instructions are often inadequate when jurors are exposed to compelling but inadmissible evidence. The State argued that the jury might have accepted certain testimonies but determined the defendant's verbal actions did not meet the accessorial liability required for a murder conviction, despite the majority of accessorial acts being verbal in nature, leading to a conclusion that could only arise from ignoring the instructions.