State v. Perez

Citations: 218 Conn. 714; 591 A.2d 119; 1991 Conn. LEXIS 236Docket: 13944

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; May 14, 1991; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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The appeal centers on whether a fourteen-year-old juvenile, arrested for murder, can waive his Miranda rights without being specifically warned about the potential transfer of his case from juvenile to adult court. The defendant, convicted of murder following a conditional nolo contendere plea, argues that the trial court should have suppressed his confession due to an inability to make an informed waiver without explicit warning of facing adult charges, and contends that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent considering the circumstances.

On May 30, 1988, the defendant was arrested for a murder that occurred three days prior. Initially processed under juvenile law, his case was later transferred to the regular criminal docket after a probable cause finding. Despite moving to suppress his confession from the arrest, the trial court denied this motion. The defendant was calm during his arrest and transport, and while waiting for his mother, was provided food, water, and bathroom access. Upon her arrival, Detective Kozlowsky informed her of the need for her presence during the rights advisement and interrogation. Both the defendant and his mother demonstrated proficiency in English, and the detective ensured they understood their rights before beginning questioning. The court ultimately upheld the conviction and the denial of the motion to suppress.

Jeanette Perez witnessed the defendant complete a form detailing his identifying information, including date, name, age, last school attended, and education level, affirming his ability to read and write by responding 'yes' to related questions. Officer Kozlowsky read the defendant's rights aloud, confirming his understanding, after which the defendant initialed five warnings and signed the form at 8:35 p.m., with Perez and Kozlowsky as witnesses. Following this, the defendant confessed to the shooting in a four-page typewritten statement, acknowledging it was made voluntarily, without coercion, and that he understood his rights. The confession process started at 9 p.m. and concluded at 10 p.m. 

Prior to signing the statement, Officer Kwett advised the defendant and Perez to disclose any external influences related to the shooting and informed them of the case's transition to adult court. After discussing with Perez, the defendant confirmed he had nothing to add to his statement. Upon returning, Kozlowsky instructed the defendant to review and sign the statement, which he did, while remaining calm and collected throughout the procedure. There was no indication from the defendant that he wished to stop the questioning or seek legal counsel. Testimony from James Fulton, the defendant's juvenile probation officer, confirmed that the defendant had previously been informed of his rights multiple times, and both he and Perez understood these rights during those advisements.

The defendant had not previously faced a case transitioning from juvenile court to the criminal docket but had been placed in the custody of the commissioner of children and youth services at Long Lane School. Fulton, the defendant's advisor, warned him multiple times about the risks of serious delinquent behavior, specifically that it could lead to adult court and harsher penalties. The trial court determined that Fulton had adequately informed the defendant about the potential consequences of his actions, and that the defendant had been fully advised of his Miranda rights, waiving them in an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary manner. Consequently, the court denied the motion to suppress the confession.

On appeal, the defendant contended that he could not have made a proper waiver of his rights due to a lack of understanding of the potential consequences, particularly that his murder confession would lead to prosecution in adult court with adult penalties. The court found this claim unpersuasive, noting that while the defendant referenced both federal and state constitutional protections against self-incrimination, he failed to provide an independent analysis of the Connecticut Constitution's relevant provisions. The court emphasized its consistent refusal to consider state constitutional claims without such analysis, citing previous case law. The defendant sought to adopt a principle from a New Hampshire case, which asserted that a juvenile's waiver of rights must include warnings about adult trial consequences. However, the court declined this approach, stating that the New Hampshire ruling was based on its own constitutional provisions and did not meet the necessary criteria for adoption in Connecticut without independent analysis.

The defendant argues that the Fifth Amendment requires juveniles to be informed of potential adult criminal prosecution to voluntarily waive their right against self-incrimination. This claim is rejected, referencing the Supreme Court case Fare v. Michael C., which determined that a juvenile's request for a probation officer does not automatically invoke Fifth Amendment rights. The court emphasized that a totality-of-the-circumstances test is constitutionally required to assess juvenile confessions, considering factors such as age, experience, education, and understanding of rights. This test allows flexibility in evaluating whether a juvenile's waiver was voluntary without imposing rigid requirements on law enforcement. The court asserts that while special care is necessary when assessing a child’s confession or waiver, there is no justification for adopting a strict rule that requires juveniles to be informed about potential adult prosecution. The approach should remain adaptable, ensuring that the nuances of each case are considered, particularly concerning the juvenile's belief regarding the consequences of their waiver.

Establishing a juvenile's waiver of rights requires meeting a 'heavy burden,' as highlighted in In re B.M.H. and In re Manuel R. Courts apply a totality of the circumstances test to assess the voluntariness of juvenile confessions, rejecting the notion that a lack of information about potential adult prosecution automatically renders a confession involuntary. Numerous case precedents support this approach, emphasizing that the juvenile's prior experiences with the juvenile system do not uniformly mislead them regarding the waiver of rights, particularly distinguishing between repeat offenders and first-time offenders.

The totality of the circumstances test considers various factors, including the juvenile’s age, education, background, intelligence, and capacity to understand their rights and the consequences of waiving them. Additional considerations include prior experiences with law enforcement, language proficiency, emotional state, and any mental health issues. The court meticulously reviews the record to ensure that the finding of voluntariness is backed by substantial evidence and that the waiver is established by a preponderance of the evidence.

The court upheld the finding of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of rights by the defendant. Key points include the defendant's familiarity with police procedures and Miranda warnings due to an extensive juvenile record, and his age of fourteen, which is close to the upper limit for juvenile treatment. Despite limited formal education, he was proficient in English and showed no signs of intoxication or mental impairment during the process. His calm demeanor and the clarity of his initials and signatures on the waiver and confession indicated understanding. The police followed proper procedures, including warning him of his rights in the presence of his mother. There was no evidence suggesting he was misled by prior juvenile system interactions, and he was specifically warned that the case would be transferred to adult court before signing the statement. The court affirmed the judgment, with other justices concurring. Relevant statutes were referenced, including General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) 46b-127(1) regarding the transfer of juvenile cases to adult court, and the definitions and defenses related to murder and nolo contendere pleas. The 1991 amendment to 46b-127 was noted as irrelevant to this appeal.

General Statutes Sec. 54-46a mandates that individuals charged with crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment must undergo a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause unless they are indicted by a grand jury before May 26, 1983, or they waive this right. Preliminary hearings must occur within sixty days of filing, unless extended for good cause. The rules of evidence apply, but expert witness reports are admissible, and no motions to suppress or for discovery are allowed. The accused has the right to counsel, can participate in the hearing, cross-examine witnesses, and request a transcript at their expense. If the court finds probable cause, the prosecution continues; if not, the accused may still face future prosecution for the same offense.

Additionally, General Statutes Sec. 51-199(b) states that appeals from convictions for serious felonies go directly to the supreme court. During the hearing, the defendant was informed of his rights, including the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present. He signed a waiver stating he understood his rights and chose to be interviewed without an attorney, asserting his decision was made freely and voluntarily.

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article First, Section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution both protect individuals from being compelled to testify against themselves. The legal precedent set in State v. Benoit is questioned regarding its constitutional validity in New Hampshire, particularly after the court's decision in State v. Dandurant, which did not follow Benoit due to a statute that negated the need for the simplified warnings established in Benoit. This raises the issue of whether a statute can override a constitutional principle. However, the court is not necessarily obligated to declare any resultant waiver invalid solely based on this circumstance. In the context of juvenile legal proceedings, the court has previously stated that a child's waiver of counsel must be informed by comprehensive knowledge of their legal rights and the nature of the proceedings. This principle, however, is not directly applicable to the waiver of the right to counsel during custodial interrogations as defined by Miranda v. Arizona.