Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; August 7, 1990; Connecticut; State Supreme Court
The central issue in the appeal is whether the city of Norwich can abolish the existing town and city housing authorities and transfer their assets and liabilities to a newly established Norwich Housing Authority. The plaintiffs, the city of Norwich and the Norwich Housing Authority, initiated a declaratory judgment action against the town housing authority, city housing authority, their members, and the state department of housing, seeking clarification on the legality of the city's actions. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, affirming the city’s power to proceed with the consolidation.
Historically, separate housing authorities were created in the 1940s for the town and city of Norwich. Following the 1951 consolidation of the town and city, both housing authorities continued to operate independently, administering various state and federal housing programs. In 1988, the Norwich city council adopted ordinance 1155, establishing a unified Norwich Housing Authority and abolishing the previous authorities effective December 31, 1988. The town and city housing authorities, advised by their counsel, have not recognized the ordinance or resolution's legality and have continued their operations unchanged. The plaintiffs contended that the general statutes regarding housing authorities indicate they are meant to be local public bodies, which, under Norwich's charter, allows for their consolidation. The Connecticut legislature has not enacted any law specifically addressing the consolidation or abolition of the existing housing authorities.
Defendants argued that housing authorities, established by state statute, can only be created, consolidated, or abolished through legislative action. The trial court analyzed relevant state statutes and the Norwich charter, concluding that the city acted within its authority. General Statutes 8-40 allows municipalities to create housing authorities if they declare a need. The court interpreted this as a legislative delegation of power to municipalities. Additionally, General Statutes 7-193(b) from the Home Rule Act affirms that municipalities can establish necessary departments and alter their organization unless prohibited by law. The trial court emphasized that local concerns should be addressed by local governance, advocating for a flexible interpretation of home rule to encourage local initiative. It determined that housing authority matters fall under local jurisdiction, supported by the Norwich charter, which grants the city broad powers to manage its affairs and create additional agencies. The court found no prohibitions against Norwich’s alterations to its agencies and asserted that Norwich should maintain a single housing authority. Consequently, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, with the appellate review focused on adhering to legislative intent as reflected in the statutes.
When a statute's language is clear, it reflects the legislature's intent without needing further interpretation. In cases of ambiguity, courts examine the statute's wording, legislative history, and the purposes it serves. This case requires a broader analysis regarding the Home Rule Act of 1957, specifically whether to adopt a strict or expansive interpretation of home rule statutes. The Home Rule Act aims to relieve the General Assembly from managing local legislation and empowers municipalities to create their own charters, which override existing laws. This act allows municipalities to manage local issues independently, based on the belief that local governments understand their needs better than the state does.
The parties dispute whether a housing authority is a local or state agency, which impacts its ability to be abolished or consolidated. The defendants contend that the housing authority is a state entity, thus only subject to legislative action for termination. They argue that housing authorities operate as separate corporations rather than municipal agencies, citing precedents that classify them as state corporate agencies. This distinction is critical for determining whether Norwich possesses the authority to consolidate its housing authorities under existing statutes and its charter.
The case examines the standing of the plaintiff to contest a housing authority's contract for insurance, concluding that the authority's mismanagement does not affect city taxes since it is not a city agency. The discussion references the case Housing Authority v. Dorsey, which describes a housing authority as a public corporation created by a municipality, exercising delegated sovereign powers under General Statutes 8-40 through 8-81. The defendants assert that a housing authority is distinct from municipal entities, highlighting several powers it possesses, including the ability to sue, execute contracts, manage housing projects, and exercise eminent domain, as well as state privileges like tax exemption.
The defendants argue that General Statutes 8-40 fundamentally differs from enabling acts like 8-1 and 8-1a, claiming that the phrase "there is created" indicates the state solely established the housing authority. The court refutes this, asserting that while 8-40 mentions "creation," it is contingent upon municipal action to declare a housing authority's necessity, rendering it an enabling act. The court emphasizes that housing authorities possess characteristics of both local and state authority, indicating that neither state nor local action solely governs their existence or dissolution. The analysis then shifts to evaluating the city's actions based on general municipal powers, legislative intent, and the Norwich Charter.
A municipality, as a state creation, possesses only powers expressly granted by the state or necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. To determine if the municipality can adopt ordinance 1155, one must identify statutory authority rather than look for prohibitions. The city and town of Norwich were authorized to establish housing authorities under the predecessor of statute 8-40, and the principle that the power to create also includes the power to abolish is well established. The case of Madison v. Kimberley affirmed that the power to enact ordinances implies the power to repeal them, indicating that once a zoning commission is established, it may also be rescinded. Consequently, Norwich had the authority to dissolve existing housing authorities and subsequently create a new Norwich Housing Authority, as supported by General Statutes 7-193(b), which permits municipalities to have officers and agencies necessary for their responsibilities. The trial court found no constitutional or statutory barrier to Norwich's agency alterations, thereby legitimizing the adoption of ordinance 1155. The town charter, as the fundamental law of the municipality, grants specific powers and serves as an enabling act. It allows Norwich to enact ordinances for powers expressly granted and implied powers, as well as manage its affairs unless expressly prohibited by state law. The city council is empowered to enact ordinances for the exercise and modification of these powers.
The court affirms that the general statutes and the Norwich charter empower the city of Norwich to dissolve the town and city housing authorities and merge their functions into the Norwich Housing Authority. The other justices concur with this judgment. The opinion relies on General Statutes 8-40, noting that language differences between this statute and its predecessor are not significant for their analysis. The state department of housing is not involved in this appeal. The defendant town housing authority's motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming lack of jurisdiction by the trial court, is deemed insubstantial and is denied. Additionally, the trial court referenced Janice Griffith’s article on home rule legislation in Connecticut, which provides a thorough background on the subject. The plaintiffs raised an alternative argument regarding the General Assembly's authority to grant powers for the consolidation and abolition of the housing authorities, referencing article tenth, section 1 of the Connecticut Constitution. However, the court does not address this issue due to the resolution of the main case.
