Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; September 6, 1988; Connecticut; State Supreme Court
An appeal was filed regarding the granting of Grover Payton’s habeas corpus application, which claimed illegal confinement due to the incorrect calculation of his effective release date on two concurrent sentences of two and one-half years each. Payton argued he was entitled to a 113-day reduction for presentence confinement, as per General Statutes 18-98d and 53a-38(b), but the respondent commissioner of correction credited him with only 76 days. Payton asserted this miscalculation violated his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Connecticut Constitution. The habeas court agreed with Payton, ruling the respondent had misinterpreted the statutes, and ordered a recalculation to include the full 113 days. However, the respondent’s appeal to the Appellate Court claimed the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutes and that denying Payton the credit did not constitute a violation of his constitutional rights. Upon review, the court concluded the respondent had correctly interpreted the statutes, ruled that Payton’s constitutional rights were not violated, and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to deny the habeas petition. The document details Payton’s arrest and charges, the timeline of his confinement and bail postings, and how the respondent calculated his release dates based on jail time and good conduct credits.
The petitioner seeks jail time credit for 113 days of presentence confinement in Docket No. CR 6-262088 to be applied to his sentence in Docket No. CR 6-263741. However, this request is denied. General Statutes 18-98d (a) stipulates that individuals confined due to inability to post bail earn a sentence reduction equal to their presentence confinement days, but each day can only be counted once towards reducing any subsequent sentences. Previous rulings in Breen v. Warden and Houston v. Warden established that jail time credits from one offense cannot be transferred to another. The statute’s language remains unchanged in its current form, which does not allow for the transferability of jail time credits. Although 18-98d merges provisions from earlier statutes and includes a provision prohibiting the double counting of presentence confinement days, it does not alter the prohibition against transferring credits between different offenses. The ruling in Mancinone v. Warden allowed for simultaneous credit accumulation for different charges but did not address the transferability of credits accrued for one offense to a different offense, reinforcing the original conclusions in prior cases.
The legislative history of statute 18-98d does not indicate it was specifically enacted in response to the ruling in Mancinone v. Warden. The merger of statutes 18-97 and 18-98 has resulted in a single jail time credit for presentence confinements, addressing inequities from the concurrent application of the two prior statutes. There is no indication that 18-98d was intended to respond to prior cases (Houston v. Warden and Breen v. Warden) regarding the nontransferability of jail time credits between sentences. The legislature has not authorized the transfer of jail time credits accrued from one offense to another upon conviction.
While 18-98d pertains to sentence calculations, it does not specifically address concurrent sentences, which are governed by General Statutes 53a-38 (b). This statute states that when sentences run concurrently, they merge and are satisfied by the longest term. In this case, the respondent determined that the sentence in Docket No. CR 6-263741 was the longer term, concluding it would be satisfied on April 4, 1989. The respondent's determination aligns with the statutes.
Additionally, the application of 18-98d and 53a-38 (b) does not violate the petitioner's right to equal protection. Courts must carefully examine constitutional challenges and sustain laws unless their invalidity is clearly established. An equal protection analysis must first determine if the legislative classification is inherently suspect or affects a fundamental right. The denial of jail time credit impacts the petitioner’s liberty, necessitating justification by a compelling state interest. The compelling interest here is to prevent the transfer of jail time credits between different offenses, which would allow the petitioner to serve a sentence for one offense before being charged with another.
The interpretation of General Statutes 18-98d and 53a-38(b) establishes that a petitioner cannot "bank" jail time credits to reduce future criminal sentences after being released on bail. It is emphasized that a petitioner should not believe that time served will count toward any subsequent sentences for crimes committed after their release. This principle is founded on public policy aimed at discouraging criminal behavior by preventing individuals from viewing extra time served as a "line of credit" against future penalties. Consequently, the court determined that the policies underlying these statutes serve a compelling state interest in maintaining public safety and discouraging crime. The original judgment was found to contain errors, leading to its reversal and a directive to deny the petition. The statutes provide that individuals confined pre-sentence are entitled to credit for time served, but this credit applies solely under specific conditions. Additionally, 53a-38(b) outlines how multiple sentences are to be calculated. The ruling aligns with the constitutional principles of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Connecticut's constitution guarantees that no individual shall be forced to testify against themselves nor deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process. Additionally, it ensures equal protection under the law, prohibiting discrimination based on religion, race, color, ancestry, or national origin. General Statutes § 54-96 allows the state to appeal superior court decisions in criminal cases, with the presiding judge's permission. The petitioner has completed their sentence, raising the question of whether the appeal issues are moot. However, it is determined that they are not moot because the erroneous 113-day credit affects the petitioner's liberty and that of other inmates under concurrent sentences. General Statutes § 18-98d(b) outlines good conduct reductions in sentences for inmates who follow facility rules, while § 18-97 provides credit for days spent in custody toward fines or sentences. Furthermore, § 18-98 entitles individuals denied bail to have their sentence reduced by the number of days spent in a community correctional center prior to imprisonment. The term "mittimus" refers to the court order directing confinement. Although the petitioner alleges a due process violation, their arguments are not distinct from those regarding equal protection, which are therefore the focus of consideration.
