Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; August 2, 1988; Connecticut; State Supreme Court
The central issue is whether an administrative agency can revoke a physician's license in Connecticut after the license has expired due to lapse before revocation proceedings began. Dr. P. Gary Stern appeals the trial court's ruling that upheld the Connecticut medical examining board's decision to revoke his medical license. The facts are undisputed: from late 1979 to early 1980, Dr. Stern faced multiple investigations for professional misconduct, including excessive prescription of controlled substances and inadequate record-keeping. He surrendered his Connecticut controlled substance registration and forfeited his staff privileges at Mount Sinai Hospital. By January 31, 1980, his medical license expired, and he did not seek renewal. Unsuccessful settlement negotiations occurred in mid-1980, leading to his voluntary surrender of the license and his relocation to Florida. In the summer of 1981, the board informed his attorney that charges were forthcoming. Dr. Stern's attorney questioned the board's authority to proceed against someone without a valid license. In November 1983, a statement of charges detailing allegations of improper prescribing and sexual misconduct was filed against him. A notice for a hearing was issued, and although Dr. Stern hired new counsel in Florida, the hearing proceeded on November 30, 1983, despite a request for a continuance. His attorney raised a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction and laches, rather than renewing the request for a continuance.
The board reserved its decision on the motion and the department subsequently presented eight witnesses to substantiate its charges against the plaintiff, who did not testify or call any defense witnesses. The hearing concluded without objection, and the board found most charges proven, except for eight counts related to two female patients who did not testify. The board denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that his license surrender was intended to evade disciplinary action, thus not binding. It did not consider the impact of the license's expiration on its jurisdiction and rejected the defense of laches, stating the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the department's delay in filing charges.
In his administrative appeal to the Superior Court, the plaintiff did not contest the findings of misconduct but claimed the board lacked jurisdiction to revoke a license that had expired or been voluntarily surrendered before charges were filed. Additionally, he argued that the board's actions were barred by laches and violated his due process rights due to insufficient notice of the hearing. The trial court denied the appeal on all grounds. On further appeal, the plaintiff renewed his jurisdictional and due process claims, but the court concluded that the board lacked jurisdiction to revoke the plaintiff's license and did not address the due process claim.
The jurisdictional issue stemmed from two statutes related to the board’s disciplinary authority. The plaintiff argued that he was not a 'physician' under the board's jurisdiction due to the expiration of his license before the charges. Conversely, the board contended that jurisdiction exists if alleged misconduct occurred during licensure, regardless of the license's status at the time of filing. The court's role was to determine if the board could revoke a license that had expired before formal proceedings began. It emphasized that an administrative agency must act strictly within its statutory authority, noting the board possesses no inherent power and any sanction without a grant of authority is void.
Sanctions imposed within legal limits can only be challenged for abuse of discretion, as established in Paley v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board. The board's authority is derived from statutes 19a-17, 20-8a, and 20-13c, which permit license revocation without explicitly addressing the current issue. These statutes must be reconciled for a coherent interpretation aligned with legislative intent. Statute 19a-173(a)(1) grants the board the power to revoke a practitioner’s license, although 'practitioner' lacks a specific definition, indicating a broad application across various professional boards. The statute outlines the limits of disciplinary jurisdiction for health services boards.
Statute 20-8a operationalizes 19a-17 for the medical profession, detailing the board's responsibilities, including adjudicating complaints and imposing sanctions, without expanding or limiting existing powers. Statute 20-13c specifies grounds for revoking a physician's license, established in 1976 to create a distinct regulatory framework for physicians, separate from prior general provisions.
Ultimately, the board lacked jurisdiction to revoke the plaintiff's license due to the narrow scope of the department’s request for relief, which only sought license revocation. In civil cases, specific articulation of relief is essential, and in administrative contexts, it also establishes the tribunal's jurisdiction. Unlike the Superior Court's general jurisdiction, an administrative body's authority must be explicitly demonstrated through the notice of hearing and statement of charges.
The existence of an employee-employer relationship is a crucial jurisdictional fact required for pursuing workers' compensation claims, as established in Castro v. Viera. Similarly, the death of a decedent is essential for administering an estate in probate, as noted in Ruick v. Twarkins. These cases highlight that certain jurisdictional facts are fundamental for tribunals of limited authority to exercise their power and adjudicate matters. In the current case, the licensure status of the plaintiff at the start of proceedings was the critical jurisdictional fact. The board's authority to act is contingent upon proving that the respondent is a 'physician' under General Statutes 20-13c, defined as a person licensed under chapter 370.
The department's statement of charges lacked any intention to pursue options under 19a-17 for censure or civil penalties and only sought license revocation, which limited the board's jurisdiction and led to the case being subject to dismissal. This mirrors similar rulings in other states, such as In re Fienberg and In re De Lucia, where jurisdiction was found lacking when the accused no longer held office. Although the board could potentially impose nonlicensure sanctions on the plaintiff, the narrow prayer for relief precluded this issue from being addressed. The conclusion that the board could not revoke an expired license does not diminish its authority to protect the public from unfit practitioners. Moreover, the board is empowered to deny relicensure based on past complaints or disciplinary actions against a former licensee, as mandated by its regulations.
No license can be issued if there is an unresolved complaint against the applicant with the Department of Health Services, and the department has discretion to deny relicensure if the applicant does not meet established standards. The department possesses broad investigatory authority to gather evidence of misconduct concerning former licensees who apply for relicensure. This authority is supported by General Statutes 19a-14 (a)(11), which applies to all individuals subject to regulation or licensing, including former licensees facing complaints. The judgment in this case is overturned, and the matter is remanded for the appeal to be upheld. Additionally, General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) 19a-88 (b) mandates annual registration for licensed physicians, with licenses voided if not renewed within ninety days. The case concludes that the license expired by operation of law, making the impact of a surrendered license on the board's jurisdiction unnecessary to consider. The legal implications of a physician's unilateral surrender of a license remain unclear, with precedent indicating that such surrender may not be permissible during pending disciplinary actions. Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled that licensees cannot surrender their licenses to evade agency jurisdiction amidst disciplinary proceedings.
No statute in Connecticut explicitly allows or prohibits a physician from voluntarily surrendering their license, highlighting a notable absence of legislative guidance. This is contrasted with the clear provision that a physician’s license automatically terminates if a timely renewal is not requested. Connecticut General Statutes outline disciplinary actions that can be taken by various boards and commissions, which may include revocation of a practitioner's license upon establishing good cause.
The Connecticut Medical Examining Board, established within the Department of Health Services, comprises nine members appointed by the governor, including four practicing physicians, one full-time faculty member from The University of Connecticut School of Medicine, one chief of staff from a general-care hospital, and three public members. Professional board members must not hold positions in professional societies at the time of appointment and must be in good standing as practitioners. The governor is responsible for filling vacancies, and board members are not compensated but reimbursed for necessary expenses. The board is required to meet quarterly and can hold special meetings as needed.
Members who miss three consecutive meetings or fail to attend at least fifty percent of all meetings in a calendar year will be considered to have resigned. The board is responsible for recording minutes of all meetings and members facing disciplinary proceedings cannot participate in board affairs. The board has the authority to hear and resolve issues related to the suspension or revocation of medical licenses, adjudicate complaints against practitioners, and impose sanctions as necessary. According to General Statutes Sec. 20-13c, the board can restrict, suspend, or revoke a physician’s license if it determines that the physician cannot practice safely or effectively due to specific reasons, including: physical illness or loss of motor skills; emotional disorders or mental illness; substance abuse; negligent conduct in medical practice; illegal use or distribution of controlled substances; misrepresentation in license matters; or violations of relevant regulations.
