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Alicia Aguilar De Polanco v. U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft

Citations: 398 F.3d 199; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2172; 2005 WL 317558Docket: 02-4034

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; February 9, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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Alicia Aguilar de Polanco, a native of El Salvador, entered the U.S. illegally in 1985. She faced deportation proceedings after failing to attend her final hearing, resulting in an in absentia deportation order in 1990. In 1991, she was granted Temporary Protected Status, which allowed her to reapply for asylum due to a class action settlement from the case American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, while remaining subject to potential deportation. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was enacted, limiting discretionary relief from deportation and establishing a "stop time rule" that halted the accrual of physical presence time necessary for certain relief upon the issuance of an Order to Show Cause. Polanco sought judicial review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision that denied her motion to reopen her deportation proceedings, arguing that the LIFE Act Amendments' eligibility distinction violated the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection component. The court found her arguments unpersuasive.

Time towards the physical presence requirement for suspension of deportation ceases to accrue upon the issuance of a "Notice to Appear" or an "Order to Show Cause," as clarified by IIRIRA § 309(c)(5) and amended by NACARA. This change rendered aliens, such as Polanco, ineligible for suspension of deportation if they received an Order to Show Cause before accumulating seven years of physical presence. In response to the adverse effects of IIRIRA, Congress enacted NACARA in 1997, allowing most ABC class members to apply for suspension of deportation under pre-IIRIRA rules and permitting a single motion to reopen deportation proceedings within a specified timeframe.

Polanco engaged counsel three months before the NACARA motion deadline, but her motion was filed over a year late, leading the Immigration Judge to deny it as untimely. Polanco appealed this decision to the BIA. During the appeal, the LIFE Act Amendments were enacted, which extended NACARA § 203 relief eligibility to previously ineligible aliens and allowed them to reopen their deportation proceedings within a designated time frame. However, Polanco's attorney mistakenly interpreted the reopening provision, leading to additional arguments presented to the BIA, which ultimately dismissed her appeal, citing her lack of statutory eligibility for reopening and the untimeliness of her original NACARA motion.

Polanco subsequently filed a timely petition for review. The LIFE Act Amendments aimed to broaden NACARA's benefits to specific aliens previously ineligible due to INA § 241(a)(5), which reinstates prior deportation orders for those who reentered the country while under such orders. The Amendments allowed for § 203 relief determinations without regard to INA § 241(a)(5) and authorized eligible aliens to file a single motion to reopen their immigration proceedings within a set timeframe.

Polanco is ineligible for reopening her deportation proceedings under the LIFE Act Amendments and has abandoned any statutory arguments regarding this on appeal. Instead, she claims that the distinction made by the Amendments—between those eligible to reopen and those not—is irrational and violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, the court finds this argument unconvincing. It acknowledges that aliens in deportation proceedings are entitled to Equal Protection guarantees, referencing past cases that have questioned classifications lacking rational justification. Yet, it also establishes that any rational justification suffices to uphold such classifications.

The court asserts that the differentiation made by the LIFE Act Amendments is justifiable, as only aliens who previously lacked the opportunity to reopen for NACARA § 203 relief can seek reopening under the LIFE Act Amendments. This aims to prevent duplicative opportunities for relief, a decision well within Congress's authority to shape immigration law. Ultimately, the court concludes that the classification does not violate the Equal Protection clause, affirming the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision and denying Polanco's petition for review. Additional notes clarify the evolution of immigration proceedings terminology and procedural changes over time, as well as the legal context surrounding NACARA and the LIFE Act Amendments.