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State v. Scully
Citations: 195 Conn. 668; 490 A.2d 984; 1985 Conn. LEXIS 752Docket: 11711; 11712
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; April 16, 1985; Connecticut; State Supreme Court
The state has appealed the trial court's decision to grant the defendants’ motions for suppression and return of property seized by state police. The central issue is whether the officers could constitutionally conduct a warrantless investigatory stop of the defendants in their vehicle. The court concluded they could not, affirming the trial court's suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the charges. On October 10, 1981, a Ku Klux Klan rally occurred in Windham, coinciding with a counterdemonstration organized by the International Committee Against Racism (InCAR). Defendants James Scully and Alexander Taylor, residents of Willimantic, were observed by Trooper Bernard DePrimo, who was conducting surveillance in plain clothes from an unmarked vehicle. DePrimo initially saw the defendants while parked during an InCAR demonstration, noting Taylor taking a photograph of him. Approximately fifteen minutes later, after picking up his partner, DePrimo noticed the defendants' car behind him while stopped at a traffic light. He observed them making gestures, which he characterized as non-obscene. DePrimo then exited his vehicle intending to arrest the defendants for breach of the peace, without informing them they were under arrest. Upon approaching the defendants’ car, he noticed a gun butt and a steel bar inside. He ordered the defendants to pull into a nearby convenience store parking lot, where he and his partner conducted a search, uncovering shotgun shells and rifle ammunition on the defendants. The subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a shotgun, a rifle, chains, additional ammunition, and other items. Defendants faced charges for breach of the peace and possession of a dangerous weapon. They moved to suppress evidence, claiming it was illegally seized. During a suppression hearing, the trial court, based on the sole witness DePrimo, found the arrest lacked probable cause, rendering the evidence "fruit of the poisonous tree." The court also concluded that even if the search were lawful, the seized items did not qualify as dangerous weapons. DePrimo's testimony was deemed not credible. Following the state’s request, the court dismissed the charges with prejudice to facilitate an appeal. On appeal, the state did not argue that there was probable cause for the arrest or that the stop was conducted under neutral criteria. Instead, the state contended that the trooper's actions were justified as an investigative stop. The court disagreed, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment and relevant state constitutional protections require an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity before such stops. The court reiterated that a mere hunch is insufficient for an investigatory stop and reviewed the circumstances of the case. Officers were monitoring Klan activities and had concerns over potential violence, but there was no evidence that the defendants were engaged in any criminal behavior at the time of their stop. Defendants photographed DePrimo in plain clothes while he was in his unmarked car and later made non-obscene hand gestures towards him while stopped in traffic. These actions were not deemed to interfere with police duties and did not constitute criminal behavior or a breach of peace under General Statutes § 53a-181, as concluded by the trial court. DePrimo's claims regarding prior encounters with one of the defendants did not establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio. The items observed by troopers did not qualify as 'dangerous weapons' under General Statutes § 29-38, as unloaded rifles and shotguns are not categorized as deadly weapons per se. No evidence supported the characterization of the seized items as 'dangerous instruments' under § 53a-3 (7) since there was no indication of use or threat of use. The trial court noted the defendants behaved respectfully during the interaction, and the items in their vehicle, such as a walkie-talkie and chains, were ordinary possessions. Thus, the arrests lacked constitutional justification, and the desire to maintain police presence could not override Fourth Amendment protections. The judgment emphasized the need to uphold constitutional safeguards against law enforcement overreach. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, the court found no error in the proceedings. The opinion, with concurrences from Justices Aspell and Brennan, noted that the record lacked information on the ages of the two defendants. The case involved anti-Klan demonstrations conducted by InCAR in Scotland and Meriden, Connecticut, during 1980 and 1981. Trooper DePrimo testified at a suppression hearing about an incident during a July 1981 rally, where defendant Scully, known as an anti-Klan activist, allegedly incited crowd hostility against DePrimo, resulting in stones being thrown at the police car. No arrests were made during this incident. During surveillance, DePrimo and a partner were photographing the rally, and the vehicles' direction could lead to multiple locations associated with the rally. The defense argued that the defendants, residents of Willimantic, might have simply been returning home. The state did not claim that the defendants resisted arrest or were abusive, with DePrimo describing them as cooperative. Connecticut law defines breach of peace as a class B misdemeanor, encompassing behaviors intended to cause inconvenience or alarm, including fighting, threatening behavior, and using offensive language in public. Additionally, General Statutes § 29-38 addresses the illegal possession of weapons in vehicles, stating that having an unpermitted weapon can lead to significant fines and imprisonment, with the presence of such a weapon serving as prima facie evidence of a violation. The statute defines "weapon" broadly, including firearms and various knives. The trial court determined that Trooper DePrimo's testimony regarding his fear of the defendants was not credible and that their gestures were neither threatening nor obscene. Consequently, the court found no credible evidence supporting the intent or conduct necessary for a lawful arrest for Breach of Peace, deeming the arrest illegal. This illegality rendered the subsequent car search illegal under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine. The decision was based on protections under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and also independently grounded in Article First § 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. Relevant case law, including Mapp v. Ohio and Terry v. Ohio, was cited to illustrate the standards for lawful investigatory stops. General Statutes § 53-206 (a) outlines the restrictions on carrying various weapons without a permit, detailing penalties for violations and the conditions under which permits may be issued, including the necessity for a background check and fingerprinting. Weapons found on individuals convicted of violations are subject to forfeiture. Officers responsible for maintaining public peace and individuals lawfully transporting household goods are exempt from specific weapon-related provisions. Additionally, individuals carrying weapons to and from repair locations are also exempt, provided their actions are peaceful. According to § 53-205, it is prohibited to carry loaded firearms, including shotguns and rifles, in vehicles or snowmobiles. General Statutes § 53a-3 (6) defines 'deadly weapon' as any weapon capable of discharging a shot but excludes certain sections, meaning unloaded firearms in vehicles are not inherently classified as 'deadly weapons.' This ensures that lawful firearm possession, such as for hunting, is not penalized under these provisions. Conversely, § 53a-3 (7) defines 'dangerous instrument' as any item capable of causing serious injury or death, which includes vehicles, without the same exemptions as § 53a-3 (6). The excerpt references Brown v. Texas, highlighting that mere presence in a high-crime area does not justify investigatory stops without reasonable suspicion of specific misconduct.