Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Tucker

Citations: 192 Conn. 1; 469 A.2d 778; 1984 Conn. LEXIS 496Docket: 10723; 10724; 10725

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; January 3, 1984; Connecticut; State Supreme Court

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An appeal was filed by Stanley V. Tucker challenging a civil contempt order for violating a rent receivership during mortgage foreclosure proceedings initiated by Hartford Federal Savings and Loan Association. The trial court had appointed a rent receiver after a hearing, but Tucker continued to collect rents, leading to the contempt ruling. The appeal raised numerous issues, but many were deemed collateral and not properly before the court, particularly the challenge to the constitutionality of the rent receiver's appointment, which is considered an interlocutory order and not appealable until a final judgment is made. The court emphasized that its review of the contempt judgment is limited to jurisdictional questions, such as the court's authority to impose punishment and whether the acts constituted contempt. The appeal does not allow for a collateral attack on the underlying order's validity or constitutionality. Unlike a previous case, Papa v. New Haven Federation of Teachers, where a temporary labor injunction was at stake, the current case provides a framework for Tucker to raise his constitutional claims in the final foreclosure judgment. Ultimately, the court reiterated the principle that injunctions must be obeyed regardless of perceived errors until they are overturned in the proper procedural context.

The defendant's constitutional challenge to the receivership does not qualify as a collateral attack simply because it questions the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. The defendant acknowledges the trial court's ability to hear the constitutional challenge, affirming that the court had subject matter jurisdiction. The order appointing the rent receiver was not immediately appealable, rendering the defendant's request for a stay of the receivership during the appeal invalid, as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue such a stay. Consequently, the court cannot review the trial court’s refusal to enforce the automatic stay under Practice Book § 3065 or the denial of the defendant's motion to terminate payments to the rent receiver, as these matters are interlocutory and can only be reviewed after a final judgment of foreclosure.

The issues currently under consideration relate solely to the order of civil contempt against the defendant, who argues that the order was erroneous for several reasons: (1) the receivership was purportedly stayed by his appeal from foreclosure judgments; (2) the trial judge should have recused himself; (3) the trial court improperly set a $5000 appeal bond; (4) the contempt motion was improperly served; and (5) the contempt order incorrectly calculated the amount of withheld rental payments. Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn, but the court finds no error.

The defendant's main jurisdictional argument states he could not be held in contempt on May 12, 1980, while appealing the foreclosure judgments contesting the receivership's validity. Although the appeal predates the contempt proceedings, the court clarifies that there is no automatic stay of the receivership during the appeal process. The automatic stay provisions of Practice Book § 3065 specifically apply to actions enforcing or carrying out the judgment, and a receivership does not fall under this definition.

Receivership serves to preserve and protect property during litigation, where funds are held by the court rather than the mortgagor or foreclosing mortgagee. This arrangement resembles a prejudgment order, remaining enforceable during appeals unless stayed by the judge. The trial court retained jurisdiction to enforce the receivership amid the appeal of the foreclosure. The defendant's claim of error regarding contempt due to a motion to disqualify the judge lacks merit; an adverse ruling alone does not indicate bias. The denial of disqualification is an interlocutory order but can be appealed alongside a final contempt order. The defendant also contests the trial court's power to set a $5000 appeal bond, arguing it should be $500, but this claim requires a motion for review, which was not timely filed. Lastly, the defendant asserts procedural flaws regarding contempt citations based on statutory service requirements, but the court determined these statutes pertain to complaints, not to contempt in receivership proceedings.

The defendant argues that the contempt citation is invalid due to receiving only one copy despite three foreclosure actions, claiming a violation of § 52-57, which requires service of a true and attested copy. However, since the foreclosure actions had been consolidated for appeal at the defendant's request, any service deviation is considered a technical issue. Without evidence that this argument was raised in the trial court, it is deemed waived, as established in General Dynamics Corporation v. Groton. Additionally, the defendant contends that the contempt order exceeded jurisdiction by penalizing him for receiving rental payments prior to the appointment of a rent receiver. This claim lacks sufficient substantiation, as the defendant did not reference specific parts of the record to support his assertion, which is necessary for challenging a trial court's decision. The court cannot take judicial notice of unspecified exhibits, making it unable to rule on this claim as presented. Ultimately, the court finds no error in the proceedings, with concurrence from other judges.