Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut; May 24, 1983; Connecticut; State Supreme Court
The plaintiff sought damages and an injunction against the defendants for interfering with a pent road in East Haddam, which provided access to the plaintiff's Mount Tom lot, located on land owned by Rajón Realty Corporation, of which Raymond Schmitt is the owner. The trial court awarded the plaintiff one dollar in damages and issued an injunction based on jury findings. The defendants appealed, arguing: 1) insufficient evidence to support the existence of a prescriptive easement; 2) the court improperly defined the easement's bounds despite the jury's failure to do so; and 3) an inconsistent verdict where the jury ruled against both defendants on a count aimed at only one. The plaintiff cross-appealed due to the jury not ruling in its favor on an alternative claim. The court found no errors in the appeal, rendering the cross-appeal moot. The land's title history indicated a pent highway was established in 1773, with several deeds referencing it. In 1935, a right of way was granted to Yetta Klar to facilitate obtaining a mortgage on the Mount Tom lot, although previous land transfers limited the effectiveness of this right. The pent road, extending about half a mile and bordered by the Mount Tom lot, was unpaved but identifiable, with numerous witnesses attesting to its use for over fifty years for recreational activities. David Klar testified to using the road for dairy farming since 1933, and the road was utilized for hauling wood in the 1940s. A lock was placed on the gate to the road in the 1950s, but access was still available to the Klar family.
David Klar did not request a key for a locked gate and ceased using it, opting instead to access the pent road through a narrow opening. His use of the pent road was primarily on foot after the gate was locked, though he drove a vehicle on two occasions after breaking the chain, once in 1949 and once in the 1950s. Approximately ten years prior to the trial, Raymond Schmitt bulldozed the lower part of the pent road, making it impassable by vehicle. The jury found that Klar Crest Realty, Inc. and its predecessors did not acquire a right to use the pentway by deed or conveyance, but did establish an open, visible, continuous, and uninterrupted use of the pathway under a claim of right for fifteen years, leading to a verdict of one dollar against both defendants.
The defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a prescriptive easement, particularly regarding the 'claim of right' requirement under General Statutes 47-37. For a prescriptive easement to be established, the use must be open, continuous, and under a claim of right, without recognition of the servient owner’s rights. The defendants contended that the general public's use of the pent road implied permission, which negated individual claims. However, the court found that the Klar family's use was sufficiently distinct from public use, as it was tied to their operation of a dairy farm from 1933 to 1949 and later for access to their property. Furthermore, a right of way granted to Yetta Klar by Elsie Johnson indicated a claim of right, despite potential ineffectiveness regarding parts of the road previously transferred.
An ineffective or invalid grant does not negate the adverse character of its use but highlights that it was made under a claim of right, as established in case law. The court recognized that such ineffective grants can support a finding of adverse use or possession. In this case, sufficient evidence supported the establishment of a prescriptive easement. The defendants' argument that the jury's failure to determine the easement's boundaries invalidated their verdict was rejected, as the plaintiff sought both damages and injunctive relief, allowing the court to submit the issue of the right to use the road to the jury while retaining equitable issues for itself. The jury's inquiries were limited to the right to use the road, not its dimensions, and no requests for additional questions were made. The trial court's determination of the easement's width was backed by evidence, including an aerial map and witness estimates. The defendants also contended that the second count of the complaint, which addressed a prescriptive easement against the corporate defendant only, was inconsistent with the first count that claimed a grant against both defendants. However, the jury's response indicated that no grant had been proven, thus resolving the first count in favor of both defendants. Consequently, the individual defendant's liability was only asserted under that count, rendering the verdict against him unwarranted, while the verdict against the corporate defendant for the prescriptive easement was upheld.
The trial court issued an injunction against both the individual and corporate defendants, preventing interference with the plaintiff's use of the pent road, based on a verdict that awarded nominal damages. However, an injunction requires proof of illegal acts performed or threatened, necessitating a modification of the judgment. The judgment against the individual defendant, Raymond Schmitt, was found to be erroneous and was set aside, with the case remanded for entry of judgment in his favor. The judgment against the corporate defendant was upheld. The plaintiff conceded that if no error was found, the cross-appeal need not be addressed. The record does not clarify whether the pent road was entirely on the land conveyed to the Neptune Twine and Cord Company. General Statutes Section 47-37 states that a right-of-way or easement cannot be acquired through adverse use unless it has been uninterrupted for fifteen years. Additionally, Practice Book Section 308 allows cases with both legal and equitable issues to be claimed for a jury list, with the stipulation that legal issues are tried by a jury unless otherwise ordered by the court. Equitable issues require court orders for jury trials, as per Practice Book Section 307. The plaintiff's request for ten interrogatories was revised by the court into two questions determined by the jury. Since neither party sought separate court determination of factual issues, this request is seen as an application for jury trial under Practice Book 307. The decision memorandum, dated November 26, 1980, was filed after the jury verdict on October 7, 1980, but was not included in the printed record, which lacked details about the easement's width.
