In the case before the Eleventh Circuit, Chabad Chayil, Inc. (Plaintiff-Appellant) appealed a decision by the Southern District of Florida, which dismissed its claims against the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (MDCPS) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for violations of its constitutional rights. This lawsuit arose after MDCPS barred Chabad from using its facilities following a 2019 investigation prompted by an anonymous complaint alleging that MDCPS officials improperly facilitated Chabad's access to school properties without charging fees.
Chabad operated the Community Hebrew Afterschool Program (CHAP) from 2008 until its cessation in 2019, serving around 200 students. Initially, Chabad was guided by MDCPS officials on how to apply for facility use and received annual fee waivers, unaware that these waivers depended on offering services for free. The OIG's investigation began around 2017, based on claims suggesting that Chabad’s relationship with certain school board members influenced its access to school facilities.
The district court's dismissal of Chabad's claims was affirmed by the appellate court, indicating that the legal arguments presented did not warrant a reversal of the lower court's decision.
The organization, Chabad, has been accused of fraudulently completing paperwork to avoid fees for using Miami-Dade County Public Schools (MDCPS) facilities. An investigation by the Office of Inspector General (OIG), which Chabad cooperated with, led to a Draft Report in June 2019, to which Chabad responded in July. The OIG published its Final Report in September 2019, which Chabad claims is legally and factually inaccurate and biased. Chabad disputes several allegations by the OIG, including misrepresentations on Temporary Use Agreements (TUAs), pressure on MDCPS staff for approvals, circumvention of the application process for afterschool programs, lack of state licensing for CHAP, and failure to perform required background checks.
During the OIG investigation, MDCPS allowed Chabad to continue using school facilities for free. However, just before the 2019-20 school year, MDCPS informed Chabad it could not use the facilities based on the Draft Report. Chabad objected to this decision, citing prior assurances from MDCPS Superintendent Alberto Carvalho about finding a solution. Ultimately, after the Final Report, MDCPS denied Chabad’s reservation requests, stating the findings of misrepresentation justified their decision.
Chabad filed claims against MDCPS for violating the First Amendment's Free Expression Clause, various provisions of the Florida Constitution, and Florida state law. Additionally, claims were brought against both MDCPS and OIG under Section 1983 for violations of Chabad’s First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, equal protection rights, and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chabad sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all federal constitutional claims against MDCPS, concluding that Chabad did not sufficiently demonstrate that any relevant School Board officials had final policymaking authority necessary for liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services. Similarly, the Section 1983 Free Exercise claim against OIG was dismissed for failure to show an official OIG policy or custom that would render it liable for the alleged constitutional violations.
The district court dismissed Chabad’s Equal Protection and Due Process claims, denying its request to amend the complaint on the grounds of procedural deficiencies and lack of substantive support. Following the dismissal of federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, leading to the closure of the case. The appeal process then commenced.
In reviewing the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the standard is de novo, treating allegations in the complaint as true while favoring the plaintiff. The denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. For Chabad's claims against the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (MDCPS), liability under Section 1983 requires proof that an unconstitutional action was executed via an officially adopted policy or custom. Chabad does not assert that MDCPS has a formal policy or widespread practice of violations but claims that a single decision by Superintendent Carvalho to deny facility usage infringed upon its constitutional rights.
To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff can identify an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a municipal official with final policymaking authority. Chabad contends that Superintendent Carvalho’s decision qualifies as an unconstitutional municipal policy. However, the complaint only claims Carvalho had managerial responsibility under Florida law without sufficiently demonstrating that he possessed final policymaking authority regarding school-facility usage. Consequently, the assertion lacks the necessary legal grounding to support Chabad's claims.
The Monell issue is governed by a clear standard indicating that a municipal official lacks final policymaking authority when their decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review. In this case, the dispute centers around whether Superintendent Carvalho had “unreviewable” authority over school property, a claim made by Chabad without supporting evidence from Florida law. The law indicates that any authority a school superintendent has concerning property is subject to meaningful review by the school board, which is recognized as the policy-making body of the school district. Statutory provisions, including Fla. Stat. § 1001.51, support the interpretation that the superintendent acts as an agent of the school board, which retains ultimate authority. Historical case law reinforces this view, demonstrating that actions taken by a superintendent without board approval can be voided. Additionally, the statutes emphasize that the superintendent must collaborate with the school board, further indicating that final policymaking authority resides with the board, not the superintendent. This is reinforced by multiple sections within Chapter 1001 of the Florida Statutes, making it clear that the school board is ultimately responsible for the direction and control of the school district's policies.
Section 1001.49 emphasizes the superintendent's role in making recommendations to the school board, which retains ultimate authority over school-district policy and property management as outlined in §§ 1001.42 and 1001.43. The superintendent executes policies adopted by the board but is subject to the board's review and ability to reverse decisions. As a result, the school board holds the "final policymaking authority" as required under Monell. The district court concluded that Chabad did not provide sufficient facts to establish that the superintendent's actions fell within his policymaking authority, leading to the affirmation of the dismissal of Chabad’s Section 1983 claims against MDCPS.
Chabad also brought Section 1983 claims against the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for violations of free exercise of religion, equal protection, and procedural due process. The district court dismissed the Free Exercise claim due to a lack of allegations connecting any violation to an OIG custom or policy. The Equal Protection claim was dismissed for failing to identify valid comparators treated differently. The Due Process claim was dismissed because Chabad did not adequately allege concrete harm or establish the OIG's responsibility for any harm claimed. The court correctly considered the OIG’s Draft and Final Reports, as they were central to Chabad's claims and undisputed. The district court's reliance on these documents was appropriate, confirming that the OIG’s investigation was prompted by an anonymous complaint about Chabad. Overall, the court upheld the dismissal of Chabad’s claims against the OIG.
Chabad's Free Exercise claim against the Office of Inspector General (OIG) fails because it does not demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violations arose from an official policy or a longstanding custom of the OIG, nor from a final policymaker's decision. Chabad argues that the OIG took unconstitutional actions during its investigation, alleging bias against Chabad Chayil's religious teachings and pressure on witnesses to assert that the teachings violated policy, despite the absence of any basis for such claims. However, the district court found these allegations insufficient to establish an official policy or custom that would incur liability. Furthermore, Chabad's appeal introducing the Final Report as evidence of First Amendment violations is dismissed as it was not raised in the original complaint, and no specific violations related to the report are articulated.
Chabad's Equal Protection claim, asserting that the OIG targeted it for investigation due to its religious nature while other organizations received fee waivers, also lacks merit. Chabad's claim falls under the "class of one" theory, which requires that it demonstrate intentional differential treatment compared to similarly situated entities without any rational basis for such treatment. The court emphasizes the need for precise comparisons, indicating that the entities must be nearly identical in all relevant aspects to support the claim.
A plaintiff must demonstrate that both they and any comparators are similarly situated regarding factors relevant to an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker, as established in Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc. Chabad's argument on appeal that the complexity of the governmental decision-making process impacts the similarity requirement is unsupported by legal authority and is not considered, as issues raised for the first time on appeal are disregarded. The district court noted that Chabad's investigation by the OIG was prompted by an anonymous complaint regarding improper fee waivers. Chabad did not claim that its comparators faced similar complaints, which differentiates them and undermines the argument that they were similarly situated. Consequently, Chabad failed to establish that its comparators were sufficiently similar, leading to the dismissal of its Equal Protection claim against the OIG.
Regarding the Due Process claim, Chabad asserted that the OIG infringed upon its liberty interest in reputation by not providing adequate response opportunities and by including defamatory statements in the Final Report. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that injury to reputation alone does not constitute a deprivation of liberty or property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. To succeed in a due process claim based on reputational harm, Chabad must meet the "stigma-plus" test, which requires showing defamation coupled with a violation of a more tangible interest. Furthermore, a valid deprivation of a property interest necessitates a legitimate entitlement recognized under state law, not merely an abstract expectation. Chabad's reliance on Marrero v. City of Hialeah and related cases is misplaced, as the current court has explicitly disavowed that precedent. Overall, Chabad's arguments for its Due Process claim are unconvincing.
Section 1983 does not categorize every tort by a state official as a constitutional violation. Specifically, damages to a plaintiff's business reputation can only be claimed if they result from government actions that significantly impact constitutionally recognized rights. Chabad claimed two protected property interests: an informal agreement for using MDCPS facilities during an OIG investigation and the right for its applications to be considered by MDCPS. However, these claims do not establish recognized property rights under state law, as Chabad lacked a signed, written agreement for facility use and no legal basis exists for a right to application consideration by a school board. Chabad failed to demonstrate the “stigma plus” requirement needed for its claim. Furthermore, even if stigma plus a concrete harm was established, Chabad could not prove that the OIG's actions caused the harm, as the OIG's role is limited to conducting investigations and does not include the authority to grant or deny facility usage—that authority rests with MDCPS. The district court correctly dismissed Chabad’s Due Process claim. Chabad's request to amend its complaint was procedurally improper, as it was embedded within its opposition to motions to dismiss. Therefore, the district court acted within its discretion to deny this request. Consequently, the dismissal of all Section 1983 claims against MDCPS and OIG is affirmed without leave to amend.
