Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; January 28, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
On February 26, 2004, the Seventh Circuit Court addressed a remand from the Supreme Court concerning the National Organization for Women (NOW) and two abortion clinics' class action against the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) and its affiliates for alleged extortion under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs claimed the defendants engaged in a pattern of extortion, supported by evidence presented during a seven-week trial, which included hundreds of acts allegedly committed by the defendants. A jury found the defendants guilty of multiple violations, including 21 counts of federal extortion (Hobbs Act), 25 counts of state extortion, and violations of the Travel Act. The trial resulted in damages awarded to the clinics and a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from blockading, trespassing, or engaging in violent acts at the clinics. The defendants appealed various trial-related issues and the injunction, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects.
Defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was granted on two of three questions presented in Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. The Court's inquiries focused on: (1) whether the Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that injunctive relief is available in private civil actions for treble damages under RICO, despite conflicting Ninth Circuit interpretations; and (2) whether the Hobbs Act criminalizes political protests obstructing access to businesses, defined as extortion when involving the wrongful use of force or fear. The Supreme Court concluded that petitioners did not commit extortion as defined by the Hobbs Act, which undermined the jury's finding of RICO violations. Consequently, the Court reversed the lower court's injunction without addressing the availability of private injunctive relief under RICO. On remand, the parties submitted Statements of Position regarding whether the remaining predicate acts of violence could support the injunction, with plaintiffs arguing that the Supreme Court did not rule on these acts. Defendants contended that the Hobbs Act does not consider physical violence as independent of extortion. The court remanded the issue to the district court for further examination, as it had not been fully briefed or considered previously.
An order limiting the grant of certiorari does not bar jurisdiction, as established in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. The Supreme Court adheres to Rule 14.1(a), which limits consideration to questions presented in the certiorari petition. The Court generally avoids deciding issues beyond those explicitly stated, leading to the conclusion that it did not imply that four jury-found acts or threats of physical violence were insufficient to support an injunction. The Court's opinion in NOW II does not address these acts, and the parties only mentioned them briefly in footnotes, making it inappropriate to assume the Court found them inadequate without explicit discussion. Consequently, the matter is remanded to the district court to evaluate whether these four acts support the nationwide injunction. The district court may need to interpret the Hobbs Act's language regarding physical violence and its relationship to robbery or extortion. Additionally, the court may determine that the interpretation of the Hobbs Act is irrelevant if it finds the acts insufficient to support the injunction. The February 26 order indicates that a specific question remains unresolved concerning the sufficiency of the four acts for a narrower injunction, which is best remanded to the district court for resolution.
Petitions for rehearing challenge two aspects of the prior decision: the identification of an unresolved issue in the case and the implicit resolution concerning the Hobbs Act's statutory interpretation. The court maintains that the specific issue remains open and has neither implicitly nor explicitly ruled on the Hobbs Act due to considerations of judicial economy. The Supreme Court did not address the four acts of physical violence in question, leading to uncertainty about whether these acts justify any injunction and whether they were sufficiently defined for injunctive relief. The plaintiffs cannot seek damages related to these acts as they had the opportunity during the initial trial. The district court is tasked with determining whether a tailored injunction is appropriate based on existing records, without reopening the case. If the court finds that injunctive relief is warranted, it must then address the more complex legal question of whether the Hobbs Act's language regarding acts of violence can serve as an independent predicate act under RICO.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) allows for two interpretations regarding the prohibition of violence in relation to obstructing commerce through robbery or extortion. The "two-way" interpretation suggests that it forbids violence solely in the context of robbery and extortion. Alternatively, the "three-way" interpretation posits that it also encompasses violence aimed at obstructing or affecting commerce outside of robbery or extortion. The text can support both interpretations without significant grammatical strain, and there is no existing case law clarifying which interpretation is favored. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue but has emphasized a holistic approach to statutory interpretation.
In "Stirone v. United States," the Supreme Court characterized the Hobbs Act as broadly designed to punish interference with interstate commerce through extortion, robbery, or physical violence, suggesting these are three distinct predicate acts. However, subsequent cases did not definitively resolve whether physical violence is a distinct predicate act. The Ninth Circuit's "United States v. Yankowski" adopted the two-way reading without resolving this distinction.
Defendants in their rehearing petition reference language from the Supreme Court's "NOW II" decision, arguing it supports the two-way interpretation. However, the cited passage provides only a tenuous connection and primarily discusses the historical context of the Hobbs Act, noting Congress modeled it on New York Penal Code provisions that differentiate between extortion and coercion. The Court's observations about the omission of coercion are seen as significant for interpreting the extortion provision, but do not conclusively favor either interpretation.
The Court recognized the overlap between coercion and extortion, noting that extortion inherently involves coercive conduct to obtain property. However, it emphasized a clear distinction between the two crimes, indicating that Congress was aware of this difference. The Court, referencing McNally v. United States, stated that harsher interpretations of criminal statutes should only be applied when Congress has explicitly provided such language. Consequently, the Court asserted that any significant expansion of the law's definition should originate from Congress rather than judicial interpretation.
The discussion centered on whether extortion could be interpreted to include coercive acts that obstruct women's access to abortion clinics. While the New York Penal Code defines coercion to include threats of violence, the Court concluded that Congress did not include "coercion" as a separate basis for liability under the Hobbs Act. The Court did not address whether the conduct in question could be viewed as violence affecting interstate commerce, nor did it analyze relevant case law that could provide context for such an interpretation.
Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have interpreted the Hobbs Act as establishing only robbery and extortion as predicate acts under RICO. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Yankowski clarified that violent acts must relate specifically to violations of the Hobbs Act, rejecting a broader interpretation that would encompass general law violations. The court determined that violent actions must be aimed at interfering with commerce through extortion or robbery to constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act.
The court referenced the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, which laid the groundwork for the Hobbs Act, outlining that actions such as extortion, obtaining property through extortion, committing violence in furtherance of extortion, or conspiring related to these acts can lead to imprisonment or fines. The Sixth Circuit's decisions in Yankowski and Franks aligned with this interpretation, despite the government's argument that the Hobbs Act outlines three independent predicate acts. Although the government may still advocate for this view in criminal prosecutions, uncertainty remains without input from the Solicitor General. The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, identified two essential elements for a Hobbs Act conviction: interference with interstate commerce and a crime involving robbery, extortion, or violence, suggesting alignment with the government's position.
Defendants argued for a two-way interpretation of the Act based on the rule of lenity, fearing that a three-way interpretation could classify traditional state-law offenses as Hobbs Act violations, leading to excessive federal penalties. They contended this broad interpretation could pose constitutional issues under the Commerce Clause. However, the court found such predictions exaggerated, noting the Hobbs Act's jurisdictional element limits its application to actions that affect commerce. The court concluded that the matter revolves around statutory interpretation, indicating that the outcome would not likely result in severe consequences.
Plaintiffs contend that the plain text of the Hobbs Act (1951) supports their interpretation, which aligns with Professor Bradley's assertion that the Act prohibits violence or threats used to obstruct commerce via robbery or extortion. They argue that this interpretation is flawed, as both robbery and extortion inherently involve violence or the threat thereof. The clauses regarding robbery and extortion also encompass attempts and conspiracies, rendering the "physical violence" clause redundant if it only pertains to acts already covered by robbery or extortion definitions.
The definitions of "robbery" and "extortion" in 1951(b) include acts of physical violence, which suggests that any understanding of the Act must consider its entirety to avoid making parts of it meaningless. Plaintiffs assert that individuals committing violence in connection with robbery or extortion would typically be found guilty of those offenses or conspiracies to commit them. Defendants have struggled to identify scenarios where the "physical violence" clause could apply without overlapping with robbery or extortion definitions. They provide examples, such as a subordinate enforcer acting independently, but argue that such cases would still fall under conspiracy provisions. Overall, it is unlikely that Congress intended the "violence" language to address rare hypothetical situations.
The interpretation of the Hobbs Act presents a complex issue, where legislative history is considered alongside the plain language of the statute. While defendants argue that legislative history should prevail over the statutory text, many judges maintain it should only clarify ambiguous language or address absurd results. The plaintiffs' interpretation does not yield absurd results and is favored over the defendants' approach, which could render part of the statute meaningless. Legislative history indicates Congress was focused on the impact of robbery and extortion on interstate commerce, without negating the plaintiffs' three-way interpretation during the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code. Although the revisions were primarily stylistic, substantive changes could have occurred unintentionally.
The court believes it is imprudent to resolve the statutory interpretation issue at this stage of the litigation, as it may not be necessary for the case's resolution. The complexity of the issue warrants comprehensive briefing and participation from all parties, including the United States, particularly given the implications for the Hobbs Act and RICO. The court prefers a cautious "wait-and-see" approach rather than revisiting the matter at the conclusion of a lengthy litigation process.
Furthermore, the remand does not authorize the plaintiffs to restart litigation. They have lost their attempt for a nationwide injunction regarding 117 acts deemed not extortion under the Hobbs Act and RICO. A nationwide injunction based on the remaining four acts of violence would likely be considered an abuse of discretion, as injunctive relief must correspond to the actual violations identified. Moreover, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act has been in effect for an additional five years, necessitating a potential reassessment of its impact. Lastly, it is too late for plaintiffs to seek further damages for issues that were not raised during the original trial.
The critical issue is whether an injunction is warranted to address four acts of physical violence identified by the jury, not covered by the Supreme Court's prior ruling. The resolution seeks to conclude the litigation fairly for both parties. The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings aligned with this opinion. Circuit Judges Manion and Kanney dissent from the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court previously held in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc. that all predicate acts supporting the jury's RICO violation finding must be reversed, which implies that the injunction must also be vacated. However, the appellate panel found that four predicate acts of violence remained valid. The dissenting opinion argues that the Supreme Court's ruling should be strictly interpreted, asserting that those acts cannot constitute an independent Hobbs Act violation. The case's extensive procedural history includes a seven-week trial where the jury determined multiple violations under RICO and awarded damages to the National Women’s Health Organizations, followed by an injunction against certain protest actions, which the defendants subsequently appealed. The Supreme Court's certiorari addressed whether the defendants committed extortion under the Hobbs Act and if private litigants could seek injunctive relief under RICO.
The Supreme Court examined whether the defendants committed extortion under the Hobbs Act, concluding that extortion requires the obtaining or seeking of property, which the defendants did not do. Consequently, the Court found no basis for extortion claims under the Hobbs Act or state law extortion statutes, as both required the defendants to have attempted to obtain property from the respondents. With the failure of the extortion claims, the Court also determined that related violations of the Travel Act were invalid, as they were predicated on the alleged extortionate conduct. The Court reversed the judgment of RICO violation, stating that without valid predicate acts, the injunction issued by the District Court must also be vacated. Although the Supreme Court's ruling left open other issues, including the relevance of four predicate acts of violence, it emphasized that all predicate acts associated with the RICO violation must be reversed, negating any further claims based on those acts. The panel’s decision to remand for reconsideration of the violence predicate acts contradicts the Supreme Court's clear findings and unnecessarily prolongs the case. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari on the issue of private litigants' entitlement to injunctive relief in civil RICO actions but found it unnecessary to address this due to the lack of an underlying RICO violation.
The viability of the claims regarding four threats or acts of violence is critical because, if upheld, they would indicate an "underlying RICO violation," necessitating the Supreme Court's consideration of private litigants' ability to seek injunctive relief under RICO. However, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that there was no underlying RICO violation, making further consideration unnecessary. The panel’s remand order, suggesting the possibility of an underlying RICO violation, contradicts the Supreme Court's ruling. Additionally, while the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari for the state law extortion or Travel Act claims, it evaluated their validity as they relied on the resolution of the extortion claims. The claims under the Travel Act and attempts to violate it were deemed invalid as they were contingent on extortion, which was found not to have occurred. Consequently, the state extortion claims and conspiracy claims were fundamentally flawed, as the defendants did not attempt to obtain the plaintiffs' property. The viability of the four predicate acts of violence is similarly dependent on the status of the extortion claims. Since extortion was not established, these acts cannot substantiate the RICO verdict. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the violence claims, it was unnecessary as the plaintiffs did not argue that these acts independently supported the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court's mandate to reverse all predicate acts supporting the jury's RICO finding stands firm, and any claims regarding procedural errors should have been pursued through a rehearing request. Therefore, the argument that the four predicate acts of violence constitute a violation of the Hobbs Act lacks legal foundation.
The Hobbs Act prohibits actions that obstruct, delay, or affect commerce through robbery, extortion, or threats of physical violence specifically in furtherance of those acts. The plaintiffs' argument misinterprets the Act, as it does not criminalize general threats of violence but rather requires that such threats be connected to robbery or extortion. The Supreme Court found that the facts did not support a claim of extortion, and the plaintiffs did not assert robbery, thus indicating no violation of the Hobbs Act. Consequently, the remaining alleged acts cannot support a RICO verdict. A panel discussion introduced a debate about the interpretation of the Hobbs Act, suggesting two interpretations—one permitting only robbery and extortion, and another including a third category of physical violence. However, the panel emphasized that the text of the Act does not support the three-way interpretation; physical violence must be linked to robbery or extortion to constitute a violation. The court is urged to clarify this legal question rather than leave it for the lower court to decide. Although the Supreme Court’s remand is unusual for en banc review, it is the procedural option available to the defendants.
Remanding the case to the district court is deemed unnecessary due to the age of the case and the lack of relevance of four acts of violence from nearly twenty years ago, which occurred prior to the enactment of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act. The Supreme Court's decision indicates that no extortion occurred, negating the possibility of a Hobbs Act violation. If the district court finds an injunction appropriate upon remand, it will face a choice between two legal options, likely leading to an appeal that this court could have resolved earlier if en banc consideration had occurred.
Additionally, the plaintiffs acknowledge that their claims are based on the Hobbs Act and not state law. Further proceedings are unnecessary since the existing record does not establish that the four acts of violence involved interstate commerce, a requisite for a Hobbs Act violation. The jury did not separately determine the impact of each act on interstate commerce, as their findings only confirmed that at least one act affected it without specifying which. Consequently, the current record indicates that no Hobbs Act violation exists. The dissenting opinion criticizes the denial of en banc rehearing, emphasizing the waste of judicial resources in remanding the case.
