Gloria Dean Eunice Aldridge Richard F. Aldridge Dorothy Cook Dwight Cook Carolyn Sue Delaney Debra Dove James Dove Carolyn Durst Jo Ann Killmon Charles Killmon Sharena Montaigne Doug Montaigne Deborah Redman Carolyn Ridenour Irvin Ridenour Melissa Robin Phyllis Stewart Charles Stewart Rose Wolf Carolyn Talghader v. Pilgrim's Pride Corporation Gilmer Industries, Incorporated

Citations: 395 F.3d 471; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1272Docket: 04-1054

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; January 25, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

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A personal injury lawsuit was initiated by employees of Pilgrim's Pride Corporation in the federal district court in Virginia, alleging toxic gas exposure at a poultry processing plant. After a year, the court granted a voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). The plaintiffs later refiled in West Virginia state court, invoking the state's savings statute, W. Va. Code 55-2-18. The defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss, claiming the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred since the savings statute did not apply. The federal district court agreed, ruling the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and this decision was affirmed on appeal. The plaintiffs had initially sought a voluntary dismissal to accommodate additional potential plaintiffs and to secure competent co-counsel, arguing the need to refile in state court was critical due to concerns about the statute of limitations expiring in federal court, where dismissals without prejudice do not extend the limitations period.

The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss without requiring them to refile their suit in federal court. The defendants appealed this decision, which was affirmed by an unpublished per curiam opinion. Subsequently, the same plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court, asserting the same personal injury claims. The defendants removed the case to the Northern District of West Virginia based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sought to remand the case, while defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing the statute of limitations had expired and that West Virginia's savings statute did not apply due to the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of their prior Virginia suit. 

The magistrate judge recommended dismissal, concluding the savings statute was inapplicable. Plaintiffs objected, claiming the Virginia suit's dismissal was not voluntary due to a mistake by their counsel regarding the savings statute. The district court rejected this assertion, stating it was unsupported by West Virginia law, and confirmed that the dismissal was indeed voluntary. As a result, the court dismissed the case with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed.

The defendants’ statute of limitations argument was deemed an affirmative defense, which could be raised through a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if apparent on the complaint's face. The appellate court clarified that it could treat the dismissal as a motion for summary judgment since both parties had the opportunity to present evidence. The appellate review was conducted de novo, focusing on whether any genuine issues of material fact existed and whether the district court erred in applying the law.

West Virginia substantive law applies to this case, establishing a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions per W.Va. Code 55-2-12. The plaintiffs’ causes of action accrued by July 28, 2000, coinciding with the filing of an amended complaint in a related Virginia lawsuit, thus the limitations period expired by July 28, 2002. The plaintiffs filed their action in West Virginia on December 18, 2002, which is beyond the limitations period unless the West Virginia savings statute extends it. 

The plaintiffs argue for the application of the savings statute version from August 11, 2000, which allowed a new action to be filed within one year after dismissal for reasons that do not preclude a new suit. They contend that their attorney’s accidental misinterpretation of West Virginia law demonstrates a lack of intent to voluntarily abandon their prior lawsuit, which is crucial under West Virginia law. 

The plaintiffs reference Crawford v. Hatcher, where the court noted that mistakes or inadvertence by counsel should not penalize the plaintiffs, contrasting this with cases of abandonment where the client participates in the decision. The Crawford case highlighted that voluntary dismissals take the case out of the savings statute's protection, but emphasized that mere negligence or inadvertence should not be equated with abandonment. The court concluded that while the plaintiff showed some lack of diligence, it did not indicate an intention to abandon the original action against the defendant.

Plaintiffs intentionally dismissed their Virginia suit, with no evidence of inadvertence, lack of diligence, or neglect. West Virginia case law does not support their claim for the application of the savings statute, which is intended for involuntary dismissals resulting from the plaintiff's mistake or the court's error. Previous rulings indicate that voluntary dismissals cannot toll the statute of limitations. Notably, cases such as Crawford and Ryan demonstrate that the savings statute applies only when dismissal arises from errors or inaction, not voluntary actions by the plaintiff. The plaintiffs' counsel misinterpreted West Virginia law but this does not negate their intentional dismissal. They actively filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the defendants' appeal, reinforcing their volitional choice. Established precedent confirms that a dismissal resulting from the plaintiff's voluntary action or equivalent conduct does not toll the statute of limitations. In this instance, the dismissal was neither inadvertent nor the result of a court error, solidifying that plaintiffs' own actions led to the dismissal, thereby barring subsequent claims.

Plaintiffs assert that no court, including the Fourth Circuit, the West Virginia district court, or the West Virginia Supreme Court, has addressed whether the inadvertence of plaintiffs' counsel can negate the intention to abandon a case necessary for a voluntary dismissal. This claim is incorrect. The West Virginia district court's findings indicate that the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of their Virginia action demonstrates abandonment, regardless of their counsel's intent to pursue claims in other jurisdictions. The court further concluded that the error by plaintiffs' counsel does not negate the abandonment of the Virginia action. Consequently, the misinterpretation of West Virginia's savings statute by plaintiffs’ counsel does not affect the voluntary dismissal, and thus the statute does not apply to the plaintiffs' current action. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Additionally, the plaintiffs have similar lawsuits pending in Delaware and Virginia and have acknowledged the diversity of citizenship, not contesting federal jurisdiction. Amendments to the statute clarify that only involuntary dismissals allow for refiling, reinforcing that the savings statute does not apply to voluntary dismissals, which is supported by West Virginia case law. The plaintiffs’ actions clearly indicate a deliberate decision to abandon their Virginia suit, and their counsel's misunderstanding does not alter this intent.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred under West Virginia Code § 55-2-12b due to the complaint being filed over two years after the relevant accident. Voluntarily dismissed actions do not benefit from West Virginia's savings statute, as established in Carroll Hardwood Lumber Company v. Stephenson. If a dismissal results from an erroneous trial court ruling, the cause of action may be saved for one year post-dismissal under § 55-2-18. However, if the dismissal was voluntary or equivalent to a voluntary act by the plaintiff, the statute of limitations is not tolled, making any subsequent action barred if initiated after the limitations period.

In this case, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs' dismissal of their Virginia suit was unintentional or due to court error. The plaintiffs' misunderstanding of the savings statute does not negate the voluntary nature of the dismissal. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs' actions indicated a clear abandonment of their Virginia suit, irrespective of their intentions to pursue claims in other jurisdictions. The court affirmed that the misinterpretation by plaintiffs' counsel does not affect the voluntary dismissal, and as a result, West Virginia's savings statute does not apply. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed. 

Additionally, it is noted that the plaintiffs have filed similar lawsuits in Delaware and Virginia and acknowledged the federal court's jurisdiction over this dispute. An amendment to the statute effective July 2001 clarified conditions under which a party may refile, but it did not change the principle that the savings statute does not apply to voluntarily dismissed cases.