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Evel Knievel Krystal Knievel v. Espn, a Subsidiary of Walt Disney, Inc.
Citations: 393 F.3d 1068; 3 A.L.R. 6th 733; 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1097; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 45; 2005 WL 14882Docket: 02-36120
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; January 4, 2005; Federal Appellate Court
Evel Knievel and his wife, Krystal, filed a defamation lawsuit against ESPN after the network published a photograph of them from the 2001 Action Sports and Music Awards, accompanied by a caption suggesting Evel was soliciting prostitution and implying Krystal was a prostitute. The case was initially brought in state court but was removed to federal court by ESPN, which sought dismissal based on failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted ESPN's motion, ruling that the photograph and caption were not defamatory as a matter of law. Evel Knievel, known as a legendary motorcycle stuntman with a career beginning in 1965, had amassed immense fame and recognition for his daring performances and contributions to extreme sports. He maintained a positive reputation in his community and was involved in humanitarian efforts, including anti-drug advocacy. The court affirmed the dismissal, upholding ESPN’s position regarding the non-defamatory nature of the content in question. ESPN published a photograph of Evel Knievel and his wife on its EXPN.com website, specifically in the 'Green Carpet Gallery' section, which showcases celebrities from the Action Sports and Music Awards. The gallery features a series of 17 celebrity photographs, with captions that often use casual and figurative language. The photograph of the Knievels includes a caption suggesting Evel Knievel is “never too old to be a pimp.” The Knievels claim this publication portrays Evel in a negative light, accusing him of "immoral and improper behavior," which led to public disgrace and harmed his reputation, causing former clients to distance themselves from him. ESPN moved to dismiss the Knievels' defamation claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the First Amendment protects them, as the caption would not reasonably be interpreted as a literal accusation of criminal behavior. The district court agreed, citing the website’s intended younger audience and the informal language used. The Knievels' subsequent motion to alter the judgment was denied, leading them to appeal. They assert that the Montana Constitution guarantees them a jury trial for their defamation claim and contend that the district court erred in dismissing the case. The appellate court will review the dismissal de novo, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and considering them favorably toward the Knievels. They will also review the district court's interpretation of Montana law and its conclusion on the defamatory nature of the statement de novo. Montana law does not guarantee the Knievels a jury trial in their libel case. Although the Montana Constitution allows for jury determination in libel or slander suits, the Montana Supreme Court has clarified that judges can dismiss defamation claims when there are no factual disputes warranting a jury's involvement. In prior rulings, the court established that it is within judicial authority to decide if a statement has a defamatory meaning and that cases lacking essential elements of a defamation claim are matters for the court, not a jury. The Knievels’ assertion of a constitutional right to a jury trial is unsupported by existing case law. Furthermore, even if Montana law provided for a jury trial, federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as established by the Erie doctrine. This principle dictates that state laws cannot override federal procedural authority, allowing federal courts to decide cases based on legal standards rather than submitting them to a jury when no factual disputes exist. The court addresses the issue of whether a photograph and its accompanying caption are defamatory. It emphasizes that states must tread carefully when imposing liability for speech, as doing so can conflict with First Amendment protections. Courts are tasked with ensuring that defamation judgments do not infringe upon free expression rights. The Knievels, in their case against ESPN, must demonstrate that the photograph and caption are "reasonably capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning" and that they are not simply protected commentary under the First Amendment. The court reiterates that it can resolve whether a statement is actionable defamation as a matter of law. When assessing if a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning, it must be viewed from the perspective of the average reader and within its context. An example provided is from a case where a statement about a poet was deemed non-defamatory when considered as a reflection of the poet's feelings rather than a literal claim. In this instance, while the term "pimp" could be interpreted as defamatory in isolation, the court agrees that, in context, it loses that meaning. It concludes that the term was not used as a criminal accusation and may have been intended as a compliment. Ultimately, even if the photograph and caption could be seen as having a defamatory meaning, they are not actionable due to First Amendment protections. The First Amendment protects statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as factual assertions about an individual, as established in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. Courts recognize that exaggeration and non-literal commentary are essential to social discourse, ensuring that public debate remains vibrant and expressive. To assess whether a statement is a factual assertion, a court examines the totality of circumstances, including the broader context of the work, the specific content of the statements, and the audience's reasonable expectations. Context is critical, and in some cases, it can decisively influence the outcome. For example, in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, the Supreme Court ruled that terms perceived as criminal accusations were protected speech because the context indicated they were not meant as factual claims. The Court highlighted that such statements could be seen as rhetorical hyperbole rather than actual allegations, emphasizing that the nature of language and context significantly affect interpretation. An attorney cannot face sanctions for labeling a district judge as 'dishonest' because accompanying terms like 'ignorant' and 'right-wing fanatic' indicated contempt rather than a literal accusation of corruption. In contrast, sanctions were upheld for claiming another judge was 'drunk on the bench' due to the lack of contextual qualifiers that could mitigate the literal interpretation of this statement. The analysis of context in determining the meaning of statements necessitates considering all related communications. This approach allows for the inclusion of material not directly alleged in the complaint, following the 'incorporation by reference' doctrine. This doctrine permits consideration of documents referenced in a complaint, provided their authenticity is uncontested, even if they are not physically attached to the complaint. This principle has been applied to both physical documents and digital content, emphasizing that both are evaluated within their respective contexts. The Knievels' complaint includes only the allegedly defamatory photograph and caption without addressing the surrounding context. ESPN contends that to view the photograph, users must also see the accompanying web pages, which they provided in their motion to dismiss. The Knievels do not dispute this requirement or the authenticity of the materials presented by ESPN. The court determined that accessing the photograph necessitates viewing at least nine preceding images and the EXPN.com homepage, allowing the incorporation of these pages under the 'incorporation by reference' doctrine. The court analyzed the broader context of the statement, recognizing the lighthearted, youthful tone of the EXPN.com main page, which is characterized by slang and non-literal language aimed at a younger audience. Phrases indicative of this youthful culture are prevalent, leading to the conclusion that viewers would expect similar language throughout the site. The court further evaluated the specific context of the statements, noting the use of slang in surrounding content, which reinforces the non-literal interpretation of the terms used, including "pimp." Even if the term was taken literally, the court found that the photograph and caption would still be perceived as humorous within the context of the site. Citing precedents, the court emphasized that material intended as humor and not to be taken literally cannot be deemed defamatory, as demonstrated by cases involving satirical content. The 'Green Carpet Gallery' satirizes celebrities, evident in captions that humorously describe the subjects without implying factual allegations. For instance, one caption suggests Shannon Dunn and Leslee Olson embody cheesiness, while another depicts Todd Richards humorously defending his companion. The court finds that a reasonable reader would not interpret a photograph of the Knievels as a serious criminal accusation, even though the suggestion that Evel Knievel is a pimp could be construed as factually provable in isolation. However, the context—satirical and humorous—renders such interpretations unreasonable, thus making the literal meaning immaterial. Although the Knievels argue that the term 'pimp' is always an insult, this perspective fails to consider the surrounding context, which is critical in assessing the statement's potential for defamation under the First Amendment. The court affirms the district court's judgment, emphasizing that context can determine the defamatory nature of a statement. In dissent, Circuit Judge BEA argues that a reasonable person could view the caption as defamatory, citing Shakespeare to underscore the significance of one's reputation. The dissent also outlines the elements required to establish a defamation claim under Montana law, which include proving the falsity of the published material and the defendants' fault in its publication. To be actionable under the First Amendment, statements must be reasonably interpreted as factual assertions about an individual that can be proven true or false. Courts can evaluate the potential defamatory meaning of statements during motions to dismiss but should not dismiss complaints unless it's clear that no set of facts could support the claim. Complaints must be read generously, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff. A court's ability to rule a statement as non-defamatory is limited to instances where it can definitively conclude that the statement is incapable of any defamatory interpretation. In the Ninth Circuit, the determination of whether a statement has a defamatory meaning involves a three-part test that assesses the totality of circumstances, including the broader context, specific content and language of the statement, and whether it is sufficiently factual. A preliminary question is whether a reasonable factfinder could see the statement as implying an assertion of objective fact, interpreted from the perspective of the average reader. The Knievels allege damages from a photograph and caption they claim are capable of defamatory meaning, supporting their actionable claim. The 'average reader' is defined as a 'reasonable factfinder,' and the key issue is whether a reasonable factfinder could determine that statements imply Milkovich perjured himself. A statement is considered defamatory if a reasonable juror could conclude it likely conveys false assertions of fact. The court must assess whether the language is reasonably interpreted as defamatory, without the court imposing its own views on the language's libelous nature. It is established that potentially defamatory words should be interpreted in their natural meaning, and courts will not interpret them in a milder sense if they could reasonably be seen as defamatory. If language can be understood both as defamatory and non-defamatory, it raises a factual question for the jury. For instance, in cases involving satire, statements may imply objective facts despite their humorous context. The example of Andy Rooney's assertion that a product "didn't work" illustrates this, as the statement was perceived as a factual assertion by viewers, despite being part of a satirical segment. Thus, the impression of factuality can exist even within comedic discourse. Rooney's unfavorable evaluation of the product diverges markedly from his assessment of other items, leading to a conclusion that it lacks protection under the context of his "60 Minutes" segment. The Ninth Circuit's three-part test, as outlined in Underwager, requires consideration of the broad context of the statement, specifically the publication's nature, subject matter, and format. The Majority correctly identifies the context as the EXPN.com website and its "Green Carpet Gallery," noting that the photo and caption are not reasonably interpretable as defamatory within this context. Courts typically assess the publication context for potential defamation claims, as illustrated in Falwell v. Flynt, where a jury found a parody in a satirical magazine not to be taken seriously. In contrast to the Hustler case, the EXPN website does not present itself as a satirical publication, lacks elements of inherent absurdity, and offers no disclaimers suggesting parody. Furthermore, the Majority's analysis incorrectly limits the "broad context" to the publication's target audience, neglecting the broader implications of the content and its potential interpretations, particularly regarding the website's lighthearted tone aimed at a younger demographic. The document addresses the legal principles governing defamation, particularly in the context of statements made on the EXPN.com platform, which targets a youthful audience that may not take statements seriously. It emphasizes that the determination of whether a statement is defamatory should not depend on the intended audience but rather on who was actually exposed to the statement. The law holds publishers liable for unintended consequences of their publications, as established in case law such as DeTomaso v. Pan American. Additionally, the intent of the speaker—whether jocular or not—does not exempt them from liability if the statement could be reasonably interpreted as serious. The analysis must also consider the specific context of the statement, including the language used and the expectations of the audience. Courts assess the context by examining the type of language in the allegedly defamatory statement and surrounding statements, referencing cases such as Cochran and Underwager. Even statements presented as opinions may imply false assertions of fact, which can fall outside First Amendment protections. The Majority's view is critiqued for focusing narrowly on the intended audience while neglecting the broader implications for those affected, including clients who may perceive harm from the statements made in the context of a photo gallery featuring jocular phrases. The court concluded that statements concerning Knievel were "loose, figurative, and hyperbolic," rendering them non-actionable. The Majority emphasized the prevalence of slang and non-literal language in the surrounding context, suggesting that terms like "pimp" were not meant to be taken literally. The Majority argued that "pimp" has both slang and common meanings, with slang usage potentially being complimentary, thus excluding any defamatory interpretation. However, this rationale was critiqued as flawed. It was pointed out that even if the slang usage of "pimp" could be seen as positive, the term also has a well-established pejorative meaning that is recognized in dictionaries. The critique further noted that the Majority's reliance on slang fails to consider that reasonable people might still perceive the statement as defamatory. The court referenced a precedent where ambiguous statements, capable of defamatory interpretations, were deemed appropriate for jury consideration. Ultimately, the excerpt argues that while non-defamatory meanings of "doctor" exist, no such non-defamatory meaning for "pimp" has gained recognition, indicating that its use in this context remains potentially defamatory. The alleged use of "slang" language does not diminish the potential for a statement to be interpreted in multiple reasonable ways. In Hughes v. Hughes, the California Court of Appeals determined that the term "pimp," even when used jokingly, could have a defamatory meaning. The case involved a statement published in Vanity Fair, where the plaintiff's sons referred to him as a "pimp." The court noted that the dictionary definition of "pimp" implies engagement in criminal activity and that it was appropriate for a jury to decide if the statement could be understood in this manner. The majority opinion argued that "pimp" is "loose, figurative or hyperbolic" language, which should not be considered defamatory. However, this reasoning was contested on the grounds that the term "pimp" explicitly describes a criminal act and possesses negative connotations related to exploitation and sexism. In contrast, other terms used to describe individuals in the same context were deemed playful or figurative, lacking any implication of criminality. While other descriptions pointed towards fun or harmless behavior, the characterization of Knievel as a "criminal" set him apart, as it suggested specific wrongdoing. Courts have established that statements implying criminality are not protected simply because they are presented as opinions. The notion that some might interpret "pimp" as a compliment does not align with the allegations in the complaint, nor with the district court's findings regarding reasonable interpretations of the statement. In Knievel v. ESPN, Inc., the court concluded that the term "pimp" can be interpreted in a manner that suggests involvement in criminal activities, such as prostitution, thereby supporting a defamation claim. The court noted that it is reasonable for an executive to assume a well-known daredevil might engage in such behavior, particularly when visual evidence is presented. The Ninth Circuit's three-part test requires determining whether a statement is factual and can be proven true or false. Here, the term "pimp" has a clear dictionary definition that makes it susceptible to factual proof, unlike more subjective terms such as "hottie." The majority opinion erroneously focused solely on the slang meaning of "pimp," neglecting its literal definition, which is relevant for assessing defamation. The dissent argues that the term "pimp" can be reasonably viewed as defamatory, and it is a jury's responsibility to determine the impact of such statements on the plaintiffs' reputations. The dissent emphasizes the importance of allowing the jury to assess whether the publication harmed the plaintiffs' standing in the community. The Knievels filed a notice of appeal that did not explicitly reference the dismissal of their claims but instead focused on the denial of their motion to alter or amend the judgment. According to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), a notice of appeal must specify the order being appealed. However, courts have allowed appeals of unlisted orders if the intent to appeal can be inferred and the appellee suffers no prejudice from the omission. In this case, the Knievels clearly indicated their intention to appeal the dismissal order in their opening brief, and ESPN was not prejudiced by the lack of specificity in the notice. Both parties addressed the merits of the case, affirming that the appeal could be interpreted as encompassing the underlying dismissal order. Additionally, the document includes definitions of various slang terms, detailing their meanings and contexts, along with a note on the existence of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Knievels claimed that the defendants' website led to the cancellation of contracts due to defamatory statements. The district court's conclusion regarding the likelihood of the targeted audience using certain terms on a website lacks evidentiary support. The court cannot take judicial notice that young people refer to each other as "pimps" in a light-hearted context, as this usage may not be universally applicable, particularly among older viewers or those from traditional or religious backgrounds who value modesty. The court and the Majority have overly relied on a single stereotype of adolescents, dismissing a broader audience under the "reasonable person" standard for assessing credibility. Furthermore, the Majority criticized anecdotal evidence regarding the definition of "pimp," indicating that the court's role at this stage is to evaluate whether the plaintiffs' claims are conceivable, not to determine their credibility. The definition of "pimp" is provided from several dictionaries, emphasizing its negative connotations related to prostitution. A relevant case from California, Hughes v. Hughes, is cited, where the court upheld the jury's ruling that the statement "our dad's a pimp" was not defamatory based on the evidence presented, illustrating that truth remains a viable defense in defamation cases. Additionally, legal statutes from Montana and Nevada regarding promoting prostitution and pandering are referenced, highlighting the criminal implications of such actions. The discussion suggests that a dismissal could occur if a defendant successfully establishes specific factual premises about the audience's understanding of the term "pimp," though skepticism remains about whether such a narrow audience could be convincingly represented.