Ramon L. Smith v. State of Idaho

Citations: 392 F.3d 350; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24683; 2004 WL 2709928Docket: 02-36043

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; November 30, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the appeal of Ramon L. Smith challenging the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by the District Court for the District of Idaho. The court concluded that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Smith's custodian, although the State of Idaho had waived any jurisdictional defects. The opinion was amended to clarify that the jurisdictional issue was personal rather than subject-matter, emphasizing the necessity of naming the correct custodian as the respondent in habeas petitions. The court articulated that failure to name the custodian deprives federal courts of personal jurisdiction over the case and specified that the district court should evaluate whether the named respondent has the authority to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Smith’s petition was ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds, as he did not comply with state procedural rules during his post-conviction process.

The district court determined that Smith failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Smith appealed, but the court found it lacked personal jurisdiction over the custodian, although the State of Idaho waived any jurisdictional deficiencies. On the substantive issues, Smith did not establish cause for his procedural default, leading to the affirmation of the district court's decision.

Smith was convicted in October 1997 for lewd conduct with a minor and sentenced to 20 years to life. His appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals was timely but ultimately rejected, with the court issuing a remittitur on April 13, 1999, finalizing his conviction. Following this, Smith filed a pro se post-conviction petition in August 1999, along with a motion for court-appointed counsel, which went unaddressed. The trial court issued a notice to summarily dismiss Smith's petition, citing meritless claims or those that could have been raised during the direct appeal. Smith's failure to respond within the required timeframe resulted in dismissal on April 28, 2000.

Smith then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, again requesting counsel, which was denied without explanation. He submitted an improper handwritten brief, which was returned with a request to comply with appellate rules. Despite being warned that his appeal would be dismissed, Smith failed to comply, leading to dismissal on December 19, 2000.

Subsequently, Smith filed a federal habeas petition on January 2, 2001, which the state moved to dismiss on September 5, 2001. The district court granted this motion on September 3, 2002, citing procedural bars due to Smith's earlier failures to seek proper review and file compliant briefs with the Idaho Supreme Court. Smith's timely appeal was then considered by the reviewing court, which identified the jurisdictional issue as personal jurisdiction.

A petitioner for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must name the state officer having custody of them as the respondent, typically the warden of the facility where the petitioner is incarcerated. Failure to do so deprives federal courts of personal jurisdiction over the custodian. In this case, Smith named the State of Idaho rather than the appropriate state official, which initially resulted in a lack of personal jurisdiction over his habeas petition. However, this requirement can be waived, and the State of Idaho is deemed to have waived the lack of personal jurisdiction, allowing the district court to consider the merits of Smith's appeal.

Smith's claims were found procedurally barred by the district court, and he argued on appeal that he could demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse this default. To show cause, a petitioner must assert that the default stems from an external objective factor not attributable to them. Smith contended that his procedural default was due to ineffective assistance of counsel during his direct appeal and a violation of his statutory right to counsel during post-conviction proceedings. However, his first argument was deemed meritless as defendants do not have a constitutional right to counsel beyond their first appeal, particularly in discretionary appeals to the state’s highest court.

Ineffective assistance of counsel can excuse a procedural default only if the petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel during the related proceeding. Errors by Smith's counsel regarding discretionary review in the Idaho Supreme Court do not qualify as cause under Coleman, as state-appointed counsel is not constitutionally mandated. Smith's stronger argument is based on the state trial court’s alleged error in not appointing counsel during his post-conviction proceedings, contrary to Idaho law, which entitles defendants to counsel if a viable claim exists. Smith filed two motions for counsel, but the court did not act on the first and denied the second without explanation, failing to determine the viability of Smith's claims as required by state law. However, even if the trial court erred, Smith cannot obtain federal habeas relief since alleged state law errors are not cognizable in federal court. There is no federal constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, and thus, Smith cannot establish cause based on the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel. The conclusion affirms that the State of Idaho waived the district court's jurisdiction issue but that Smith cannot excuse his procedural default to consider his federal claims.

Stanley and Belgarde do not alter the established principle that personal jurisdiction can be waived and does not need to be raised sua sponte by the court. Stanley's reference to "personal jurisdiction" pertains specifically to the custodian requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and related rules, indicating that a court is not obligated to address this technical issue unless raised properly by a party. Belgarde, however, requires the court to assess whether the named respondent has the authority to grant the requested relief, particularly in cases where the petitioner has not named the correct party. If the named respondent lacks the power to provide relief, the court cannot proceed unless the petition is amended.

No federal appellate court has directly addressed this particular issue, but several cases from other circuits suggest that the failure to name the correct respondent can be waived by the government. Notably, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the immediate-custodian rule may also be subject to waiver. In this case, Idaho has conceded that it has waived any defects concerning personal jurisdiction over the custodian, aligning with the goal of promptly resolving prisoners' claims.

Smith's argument regarding the consistency of Idaho's procedural rules is noted but not fully addressed due to insufficient presentation in his appeal. The Idaho legislature has amended its code to grant trial courts discretion regarding the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, since Smith cannot demonstrate cause for his claims, the court need not evaluate whether he meets the prejudice requirement.