James Dixon, Jr. v. John Ashcroft, in His Capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America Robert S. Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Citations: 392 F.3d 212; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26099; 85 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,826; 94 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1743Docket: 03-1542

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; December 15, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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James Dixon, Jr. served as an employee of the FBI for ten years before resigning in 1988 for personal reasons. In 1991, he applied for reinstatement but was denied, prompting him to claim racial discrimination and retaliation related to prior complaints against a supervisor. An Administrative Law Judge initially found in favor of Dixon, but the FBI objected, leading to a reversal of that decision. Dixon subsequently filed a complaint in district court, alleging retaliation under Title VII, but the court dismissed the case, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Dixon appealed, arguing that the district court's finding was erroneous. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit analyzed the jurisdictional basis and determined that the district court incorrectly concluded Dixon had not exhausted his remedies. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 

Dixon, an African-American male, had a successful tenure at the FBI, with consistently high performance evaluations. Upon applying for reinstatement, the FBI initiated a background investigation, which included interviews with references and evaluations from former supervisors.

Anthony's interview resulted in a recommendation against reinstating Plaintiff-Appellant, based on an incident from the early 1980s involving applicant recruitment in Detroit. Anthony, the FBI-Detroit legal advisor at the time, claimed that Dixon, the lead interviewer, improperly changed a panel's rejection of a minority applicant to a favorable outcome without authorization. Anthony confronted Dixon, who admitted the alteration and apologized. This incident led Anthony to question Dixon's integrity and honesty.

Further investigation included interviewing Special Agent Robert Nelson, who corroborated Anthony's account and added that he had reported Dixon's actions to then-ASAC Reutter. However, no formal report was made, and Dixon’s personnel file lacked derogatory information. Nelson expressed concerns about rehiring Dixon, citing a lack of integrity and fidelity.

ASAC Reutter recalled accusations against Dixon regarding the score alteration and noted Dixon's poor work habits and ethics during his early FBI career, recommending against reinstatement. Supervisor SA David Ries, while acknowledging Dixon's capability, also questioned his dedication and chose not to recommend reinstatement. In contrast, former supervisor Kuhl described Dixon positively, recommending reinstatement but expressing a desire to understand his motivations. Thornton, another former co-worker, similarly supported reinstatement, praising Dixon's effectiveness.

Ultimately, ASD Personnel Analyst Wendy Strickland prepared a report recommending denial of Dixon's reinstatement based on the feedback from former supervisors and co-workers. ASD Supervisory SA Peter Gulotta, after reviewing Strickland's findings and Dixon's file, accepted this recommendation without directly consulting Anthony or Nelson. The recommendation was further concurred by ASD Section Chief Faustino Pino, leading to the final decision by ASD Assistant Director Weldon Kennedy to deny reinstatement.

On April 14, 1992, Steven Pomerantz, a Deputy Assistant Director, informed Plaintiff-Appellant Dixon that reinstatement was not possible. Dixon claims he never received this notice and only learned of the Bureau's decision during a 1994 call with Gulotta. In May 1997, after requesting his personnel file under the Freedom of Information Act, Dixon reviewed it and contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor. He alleged that Reutter, who had a history of bias against African Americans and was retaliating for his removal as supervisor, provided a negative recommendation during Dixon's background check. Dixon claimed that Reutter treated him differently than non-African-American colleagues in the early 1980s, which led him to report Reutter’s conduct to higher authorities.

In July 1997, Dixon first contacted an EEO counselor and subsequently filed a formal EEO complaint in August 1997 without legal assistance. His complaint included a "Complaint of Discrimination" form and an "Attached Statement" outlining his claims of racial discrimination. He checked "Race" on the form and identified as "Black." An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the FBI discriminated against Dixon based on race when denying his reinstatement in March 1992. However, this conclusion was rejected by the Department of Justice's Complaint Adjudication Office (CAO), and the EEOC upheld the CAO's decision, stating the record did not support the ALJ’s findings.

On November 12, 2002, Dixon filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan asserting four claims: Title VII retaliation, violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defamation, and injurious falsehood. The FBI moved to dismiss the case or for summary judgment, which the district court granted, dismissing Dixon’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dixon is now appealing this dismissal. The appellate court reviews the dismissal de novo, while factual findings by the district court are reviewed for clear error.

Dixon has abandoned his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, defamation, and injurious falsehood on appeal, as he did not challenge the district court's dismissal of these claims. The focus of the appeal is on his Title VII retaliation claim. The district court determined that the FBI decided against reinstating Dixon before he filed his EEOC Complaint, requiring him to allege retaliation in that complaint to exhaust his administrative remedies. Since Dixon did not include such allegations, his claim was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Federal employees must exhaust administrative remedies to bring a Title VII action, as established in several cases, including Benford v. Frank. This requirement serves to inform the alleged wrongdoer of potential liability and allows the EEOC to facilitate conciliation before litigation. Although Dixon conceded he did not check the 'Reprisal' box on his Complaint of Discrimination, this omission is not determinative in this circuit. The court applies the "expected scope of investigation test," which allows claims not explicitly marked if sufficient facts are presented to notify the EEOC of the uncharged claim.

Dixon's EEOC Complaint, particularly his Attached Statement, alleges discrimination by Bob Reutter based on race and claims of harassment, indicating that he was subjected to unfair treatment and had to report weekly to Reutter. This context may provide the necessary foundation for his retaliation claim, despite not checking the appropriate box.

The factual allegations in Dixon's case sufficiently alerted the EEOC to his claims of retaliation alongside race discrimination. The court referenced Sharabura v. Taylor, which emphasized the importance of the factual allegations in the EEOC charge in determining related claims. Unlike other cases where plaintiffs failed to present adequate facts for the EEOC to investigate, Dixon explicitly stated his belief that he faced discrimination due to race. His detailed account included a history of performance appraisals dating back to 1980, which could be relevant to the EEOC's investigation of his race discrimination claim. The court noted that the EEOC's investigation should not be overly narrow, allowing Dixon to pursue additional claims in court if the EEOC's inquiry was insufficient. This aligns with the Third Circuit’s reasoning that a plaintiff should not be penalized for the EEOC's limited investigation scope.

The Attorney General emphasized a letter from the EEOC to Plaintiff-Appellant Dixon, which identified the investigation focus as a claim of race-based denial of reinstatement. The letter instructed Dixon to clarify any mischaracterization within fifteen days, but he did not respond. Despite this lack of notification, the court determined that Dixon's failure was not detrimental to his claim. Dixon perceived the harassment by Reutter as racially motivated and, as a layperson, would not have recognized the need to amend the Officer's description of his complaint. Historical precedents illustrate that individuals often file discrimination charges without legal representation, and courts do not penalize them for failing to cite precise legal terminology or procedural details. Consequently, Dixon's EEOC complaint sufficiently indicated claims of both race discrimination and retaliation. The district court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.