Gerald Cash v. Hamilton County Department of Adult Probation
Docket: 03-3916
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; November 12, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Homeless individuals in Cincinnati, including Gerald Cash and his associates, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Cincinnati and Hamilton County, claiming violations of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the unlawful destruction of their personal property without notice or opportunity for reclamation. The district court initially ruled in favor of the defendants by granting summary judgment. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed this decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The factual background reveals that the City of Cincinnati contracts with Hamilton County for cleanup services, which involves community service workers clearing areas where homeless individuals reside. In October 2001, the Cashes discovered their belongings being removed by these crews while they were living under the Fifth Street Viaduct. Despite attempts to retrieve their property, including inquiries to city sanitation officials, they were informed that the belongings were discarded without proper notification or storage.
The procedural history notes that five homeless plaintiffs, including the Cashes, initiated the lawsuit in October 2001; three of the plaintiffs have since passed away, but the remaining individuals continue to pursue the case.
Plaintiffs claimed actual damages and injunctive relief, alleging violations of their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the City and County's destruction of their property without due process. They sought a preliminary injunction to stop the City and County from seizing homeless individuals' property without notice and hearing. However, the plaintiffs later conceded that they did not contest the City's authority to remove property from municipal areas, emphasizing that their case centered on the destruction of property without due process. In May 2002, the City and County filed for summary judgment, which the district court granted over a year later, denying the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, leading to this appeal.
The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo, requiring the court to assess whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must favor the nonmoving party in its inferences. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals to seek redress for deprivation of constitutional rights. They alleged that the City and County violated their due process rights by destroying their property without notice or opportunity for recovery.
The court follows a two-pronged analysis for municipal liability: first, determining if a constitutional right has been violated, and second, if the City and County are liable for that violation. The court recognized that the plaintiffs possess a protected property interest in their belongings, and due process generally requires notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before property can be taken.
A determination must be made regarding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the City and County's responsibility for the alleged due process violation. Plaintiffs cannot rely on respondeat superior under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for claims against the City and County based on the actions of workers conducting sweeps of homeless areas, as established in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs. The plaintiffs must prove that the City and County themselves caused the constitutional violation. Local governments may be sued under § 1983 if they are alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through officially adopted policies or through a widespread custom that functions as law, even without formal approval. A "custom" must be permanent and deeply embedded in state policy, reflecting a deliberate choice among alternatives. Plaintiffs must demonstrate a direct causal link between the custom and the constitutional deprivation to avoid the prohibited de facto respondeat superior liability.
The district court concluded from undisputed testimony that police officers instructed probationers to separate personal belongings from trash, which suggested any destruction of property at the homeless site would be unauthorized and thus not a due process violation. The district court's decision was supported by the Supreme Court's rulings in Parratt and Hudson, which state that unauthorized deprivations of property do not violate due process if postdeprivation remedies exist. Consequently, plaintiffs retain the right to pursue claims against the City and County for recovery of their property or for monetary damages.
The district court's assertion that the testimony of supervising police officers was "undisputed" is challenged by the plaintiffs, who provided significant evidence indicating a City and County practice of discarding unattended property found at specific sites. Testimony from Jeffrey Smith, a Field Supervisor for the Hamilton County Adult Probation Department, revealed that he has directed probationers in cleanup jobs for a decade, following police instructions without being present during the cleanup. Smith stated that items collected were treated as trash, with no segregation or efforts to preserve any belongings. Cincinnati Police Officer Thomas J. Branigan corroborated this by describing a rapid and indiscriminate cleanup process, contrasting it with the Police Department's standard procedure for handling personal property elsewhere, which includes logging and holding found items.
The City and County presented conflicting testimony, but for summary judgment purposes, the evidence must favor the plaintiffs. This creates a genuine material issue regarding the City’s policy on handling homeless individuals' property, leading to an error in the district court's summary judgment ruling. Additionally, there is a dispute over whether adequate notice was provided to the homeless regarding the disposal of their property. Legal precedent requires that individuals affected by property actions receive "notice and opportunity to be heard." The City claimed to have published a notice in a local newspaper, while the plaintiffs argued this was insufficient given the homeless community's challenges. This matter is to be resolved by the district court on remand.
City argues that the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe due to the plaintiffs' failure to pursue adequate state compensation procedures, stating this claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the plaintiffs have abandoned their Fifth Amendment claim and now rely solely on the Fourteenth Amendment, negating the need to address the ripeness issue.
Hamilton County claims Eleventh Amendment immunity, asserting that the Hamilton County Department of Adult Probation functions as an arm of the state’s common pleas and municipal courts, referencing specific Ohio statutes. The court establishes that an assertion of immunity based solely on this claim is insufficient; several factors must be weighed, with the primary consideration being whether the state or county would pay any judgment against the Department. Previous case law indicates that if Hamilton County, not Ohio, would cover potential damages, then Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply. The district court granted the County's motion for summary judgment but did not provide analysis on the Eleventh Amendment issue. Consequently, the matter is remanded for further factual findings regarding the Department's status within the Ohio court system and the financial implications of any constitutional violations. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
