Wanda Gordon, Individually and as Administratrix Ad Prosequendum for the Estate of Willie James Gordon, Jr., Deceased v. Wawa, Inc., AKA Wawa Food Markets John Does I and X John Doe Corporations, I to X, Individually Jointly, Severally, And/or in the Alternative. AKA Wawa Dba Wawa

Citations: 388 F.3d 78; 175 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3206; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22444Docket: 03-3089

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; October 28, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Wanda Gordon, acting as the administratrix for her deceased son Willie Gordon, who was an active member of the United States Army Reserve and employed by Wawa, Inc. On September 17, 2000, after returning from military duties, Gordon was allegedly coerced by his shift manager to work a late shift, despite being entitled to an eight-hour rest period under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). He subsequently lost consciousness while driving home from work and died in a car accident. 

Wanda Gordon filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for New Jersey, claiming that Wawa violated USERRA by denying her son his rest period and that the threat of termination constituted an adverse employment action. The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that USERRA does not provide a cause of action for this situation, as it only requires notice of intent to return to work without mandating employers to prevent employees from working before the rest period ends. The court emphasized that USERRA seeks to prevent discrimination against military personnel but deemed the case inapplicable. Consequently, the court dismissed Wawa's motion and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. The appeal to the Third Circuit affirmed this dismissal.

The review of the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) is conducted with plenary authority. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is deemed inappropriate unless it is clear that no facts could support the plaintiff's claim for relief. The court must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. USERRA is interpreted liberally in favor of service members, based on precedents that advocate broad construction of laws protecting military beneficiaries.

The plaintiff argues that 38 U.S.C. § 4312(e) provides a "right to eight hours of rest" after returning from military service before reporting to work. The court emphasizes that statutory interpretation starts with the language of the statute itself, assessing clarity and context. Section 4312(e) outlines the employee's responsibilities upon returning from service, specifically stating that an employee must notify the employer of their intention to return to work within certain timeframes, including an eight-hour period for safe transportation. The court concludes that this statute focuses solely on the employee's obligations, not granting any substantive right to an eight-hour rest period for the returning employee, as indicated by the District Court's assessment of the statutory language.

Section 4312(e) outlines the requirements and exceptions related to an employee's reemployment rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Key stipulations include the necessity for employees to provide advance notice of leave, limit cumulative leave to five years, and comply with reporting requirements. Specific exceptions to these rules are detailed in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of the section, which address advance notice, the five-year limit, and conditions under which reemployment may not be required. The section ultimately guarantees reemployment rights for those meeting the outlined criteria.

Case law supports the notion that Section 4312 provides an unqualified right to reemployment contingent on adherence to service duration and notice requirements. It emphasizes the entitlement of veterans to their previous jobs upon return from service. The eligibility for reemployment after military duty is contingent on meeting the notice requirements stipulated in Section 4312. The document critiques the reliance on Boelter v. City of Coon Rapids, arguing that the case misinterpreted USERRA's provisions and did not establish a right to an eight-hour rest period. 

While legislative history indicates a concern for service members' well-being, the clear language of the statute limits interpretations regarding rest periods. Committees indicated that service members should have reasonable time to return home, rest, and travel to work. An example illustrates that if a service member returns home shortly before a work shift, they cannot be required to report to work until at least eight hours after their return, reinforcing the intent to provide adequate rest.

An employer cannot require a reservist to report to work shortly after returning from military duty, as adequate rest is essential for safe performance. However, while Congress recognized the need for rest in shaping reporting requirements under USERRA, it did not establish an independent right to rest for employees. The legislative focus was on conditions for reemployment following military service rather than creating new employee rights. Specifically, section 4312 outlines that returning employees are entitled to reemployment if they meet certain conditions, including providing notice of intent to return, but it does not confer a right to rest. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim against Wawa for failing to allow Willie Gordon sufficient rest before work is unfounded, as USERRA does not grant such a right.

The plaintiff also claims that a store manager's threat to fire Gordon constituted an 'adverse employment action' under section 4311(b) of USERRA, which prohibits discrimination against individuals exercising their rights under the statute. However, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that Gordon attempted to exercise any rights under USERRA, as previously established, there is no right to rest. Additionally, the complaint lacks allegations that Gordon informed the store manager about his recent military duty, fatigue, or desire not to work the night shift. The court can only consider allegations in the original complaint, and since the plaintiff did not claim that the store manager's actions were motivated by Gordon's military service, the claim under section 4311(c) also fails. Lastly, the allegation that the store manager's actions led to Gordon's death is framed more as a tort claim, which is outside the scope of protections offered by USERRA, as the act is not intended to address tortious employer conduct or work-related injuries.

Provisions of USERRA aim to support noncareer service in the uniformed services by reducing negative impacts on civilian employment and ensuring prompt reemployment after service, while prohibiting discrimination based on military status. The remedial aspects of USERRA are specifically designed to combat employment discrimination due to military affiliation. In this case, the plaintiff's claims do not pertain to employment discrimination or benefits related to military status, rendering USERRA unsuitable for the tort claims presented. Consequently, it is concluded that 38 U.S.C. 4312(e) does not grant a right to rest, and the plaintiff has not established a valid claim under USERRA. The plaintiff's allegations do not involve the employment rights of Willie Gordon, leading to the affirmation of the District Court's order, with each party responsible for its own costs. Additionally, the plaintiff is pursuing separate tort claims against Wawa in state court, which are not relevant to this appeal. Jurisdiction for the USERRA claims was exercised by the District Court under 38 U.S.C. 4323(b) and 28 U.S.C. 1331, with appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.