Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; November 2, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case of Ronald Berry Washington, who appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his hotel room. Washington argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the Reno Police Department (RPD) officers, alleging that his written consent to search was coerced and that the evidence collected was tainted by these violations. The court agreed with Washington, concluding that the officers did indeed violate his Fourth Amendment rights and that both his consent and the evidence obtained were contaminated. The case arose from a police tip about methamphetamine activity in the Comstock Hotel, leading officers to approach Washington's room, where they conducted a "knock and talk" without probable cause for a search warrant. At the time, Washington exited his room to find six officers, five of whom were armed. The court ultimately reversed the district court's decision, emphasizing the improper nature of the officers' actions in obtaining consent and evidence.
Washington, previously arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and failing to register with the RPD, was approached in a hallway by Officer Sceirine, who requested a pat-down search for weapons. The search yielded no weapons or drug-related evidence. While in the hallway, the officers were alerted that another individual was in Washington's room. Sceirine reiterated that Washington's failure to register was an arrestable offense.
As Leo "Libo" Nolan exited Washington's room, Washington requested him to close the door, but the officers refused, stating they preferred it open for visibility. Sceirine questioned Washington about a potential methamphetamine lab, which Washington denied.
Sceirine then sought Washington's consent to search the room, which Washington tentatively agreed to by responding, "Uh, sure." Sceirine interpreted this as consent. When Washington asked if his wife could arrive first, Sceirine, looking into the room, queried about a possible gun, to which Washington clarified it was a pager. Following this, Washington agreed to the officers entering the room.
Once inside, Washington was instructed to sit on the bed, and Sceirine admitted that Washington was not free to leave. The officers resumed questioning about drug trafficking and Washington's connection to a former occupant of the room. Washington acknowledged having a line of methamphetamine in the room, which an officer later discovered while moving his coat, despite Washington's denials of involvement in drug production or distribution.
Officer Sceirine presented a permission to search form to Washington, explaining the purpose and indicating a desire to expedite the process without applying for a search warrant. Washington initially refused to sign, asserting he had nothing to hide. Despite Sceirine's acknowledgment that he had not observed any methamphetamine-related equipment in Washington's room, Washington ultimately signed the form approximately fifteen minutes later. During the search, officers discovered a handgun, and Washington admitted ownership while denying any involvement with a methamphetamine lab.
Subsequently, Washington was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the handgun and his admission of ownership, which the district court addressed in a hearing. The court evaluated the encounter as a "Terry-stop" and determined that the combination of a tip about drug activity, the desk clerk's observations, and Washington's criminal history provided reasonable suspicion for the officers to detain him. However, the court deemed Washington's initial oral consents to search invalid due to lack of clarity and intelligence, rendering the officers' entry unconstitutional. Despite this, the court concluded that Washington's later written consent was voluntary and sufficiently purged any taint from the prior constitutional violation. On June 11, 2002, Washington entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, leading to the current appeal where the standard of review is de novo for the suppression ruling and clear error for factual findings.
Washington argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was unconstitutionally seized by six RPD officers in the hallway outside his room. The analysis begins with the precedent set in *Terry v. Ohio*, where police observed suspicious behavior from two men, leading to a stop and frisk that revealed weapons. The Supreme Court upheld the officer’s actions, establishing that police could conduct brief stops based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, allowing for limited searches for weapons to ensure safety.
Since *Terry*, the scope of permissible stops has expanded to include asking detainees questions to confirm or dispel suspicions and applying the same principles to vehicle stops. However, the Court has not extended these principles to allow stops at an individual's home, indicating a clear boundary in the application of *Terry* protections.
Terry's justifications for brief investigatory detentions—evasive street activities and minimal intrusion—do not apply to encounters at a suspect's home. Unlike street encounters, where officers may lose a suspect before establishing probable cause, officers at a suspect's residence can investigate further while knowing the suspect's location. The Fourth Amendment's protections are strongest within the home, making it uncertain if a Terry-stop is constitutionally permissible there, but it is clear that the officers' actions with Washington exceeded lawful detention limits.
A seizure occurs when law enforcement restricts a person's liberty through coercion, force, or authority. Factors to determine if a reasonable person feels free to ignore police presence include: the number of officers, display of weapons, setting of the encounter, the officers' authoritative demeanor, and whether the individual was informed of their right to terminate the encounter.
Washington faced six officers, five uniformed and armed, in a private hallway and then his apartment. The officers physically moved him away from his door, ignored his request to close it, and repeatedly stated he could be arrested for failing to register, implying he was not free to leave. They also did not inform him of his right to refuse to answer questions. Given these circumstances, a reasonable person in Washington's position would not have felt free to disregard the police presence, indicating he was seized. The analysis, however, does not conclude whether this seizure was unconstitutional.
A seizure based on reasonable suspicion, such as a Terry-stop, is not inherently unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment if it remains brief and minimally intrusive. However, Washington's detention by the six RPD officers was unconstitutional because it was neither brief nor minimally intrusive. The determination of whether a Terry-stop escalates into an arrest hinges on whether the detention exceeds the limits of a brief stop, interrogation, and a limited weapons check. Although Washington consented to a brief weapons check, which revealed no incriminating evidence, the encounter should have concluded after he denied involvement in drug activities. Instead, the officers continued to pressure him to allow entry into his room, which constituted an unlawful seizure as their actions exceeded what was necessary for their initial justification. The scope of a detention must align with its purpose, and the officers’ insistence on entering Washington's room was a circumvention of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Additionally, Washington asserted that the officers unconstitutionally gained visual access to his room by preventing the door from being closed after his friend exited. Officer Sceirine acknowledged that the officers lacked probable cause for a search and confirmed that leaving the door open allowed them to see into the room clearly.
Police officers may only gain visual access to a hotel room under three conditions: (1) the occupant voluntarily opens the door in response to a request, not a threat or command; (2) they possess a warrant; or (3) they have probable cause along with an exception to the warrant requirement. The case of Bailey v. Newland establishes that visual entry gained through coercion constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, necessitating consent, a warrant, or probable cause plus an exception. In this instance, officers violated Washington's Fourth Amendment rights by preventing him from closing his door, lacking any legal basis for entry.
The district court determined that Washington did not consent to the officers' entry, a finding unchallenged by the Government on appeal. Therefore, it is accepted that the officers entered Washington's room unconstitutionally. Following this unlawful entry, Washington admitted to possessing methamphetamine, which allowed the officers to check the indicated area for visible evidence. However, they lacked legal justification to physically move his coat, as this action constituted a search requiring probable cause. Consequently, the officers' actions violated Washington's Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, despite the officers' repeated violations of Washington's rights, he later signed a search permission form, which raises questions about the validity of his consent under circumstances of prior coercion.
Officers discovered a firearm during a search that led to Washington's arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court ruled that Washington's consent to search was given freely under the Fifth Amendment and that it eliminated any taint from prior violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. However, the appellate court determined that the district court erred, stating that even if consent was voluntary, it did not suffice to purge the taint of the earlier Fourth Amendment violations. Under Fourth Amendment principles, evidence obtained following an illegal search is considered tainted and inadmissible unless subsequent events sufficiently distance it from the illegality. Established case law, including United States v. Bautista and others, supports the notion that consent given after an unlawful entry is invalid. The court emphasized that evidence cannot be admitted if it is derived from exploitation of illegal police actions. The "attenuation analysis" is utilized to assess whether the taint from the initial constitutional violation has been removed, focusing on deterrence and judicial integrity. Evidence directly obtained from illegal police behavior must be suppressed, as outlined in several judicial precedents. To evaluate the connection between prior illegality and subsequent consent, three factors are considered: the timing of consent in relation to the illegality, any intervening circumstances, and the nature of the police misconduct involved.
Temporal proximity between police violations of Washington's Fourth Amendment rights and his consent to search significantly supports the argument for suppressing evidence obtained from the search. The unconstitutional seizure occurred just fifteen minutes before Washington signed the permission form, and an even shorter time passed before the officers conducted an illegal search of his room. This brief interval is deemed insufficient to eliminate the taint of the officers' illegality, aligning with precedents where courts found similar timeframes inadequate to purge taint.
The assessment of intervening circumstances considers significant events that could sever the connection between prior illegal actions and subsequent evidence. Such circumstances must demonstrate that any obtained evidence was acquired through a process distinct from the exploitation of illegal conduct. Common examples include release from custody or consultation with an attorney, which would indicate that consent was a free and independent choice, unrelated to previous coercion.
The Government contends that Washington's signing of the consent form, which informed him of his right to refuse, serves as a sufficient intervening circumstance to dissipate the taint. However, this argument is rejected, as signing the form does not equate to the significant intervening events recognized by the courts, such as release from custody or legal consultation, and fails to sufficiently distance Washington from the coercive effects of the earlier violations.
Significant issues arise with the Government's assertion that Washington's signing of the permission to search form eliminated the impact of the officers' unconstitutional actions. Consent may be solicited to validate prior illegal conduct, leading suspects to believe that refusal to consent would be ineffective, akin to "closing the barn door after the horse is out." Accepting the Government's view would allow officers to effectively negate the consequences of their misconduct by merely informing suspects that they can refuse consent, undermining the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring police violations.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Brown is cited, emphasizing that Miranda warnings alone do not sever the link between an illegal arrest and a confession, reinforcing that prior unlawful conduct cannot be disregarded by obtaining consent afterward. The Seventh Circuit has similarly rejected the notion that written consent can act as an intervening factor to break this causal connection when consent follows an illegal search.
Regarding the purpose and nature of official misconduct, courts tend to favor suppression if law enforcement acted with the intent to gather evidence unlawfully or demonstrated flagrant disregard for the law. However, if an officer's violation is deemed to have been executed in good faith, courts are less likely to classify it as purposeful or flagrant misconduct. The district court suggested that the officers acted in good faith, which would influence the outcome in favor of not suppressing the evidence collected.
Officers approached Washington's room in a professional manner, attempting to investigate a crime, yet lacked probable cause for a search, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Officer Sceirine acknowledged this lack of probable cause but nonetheless sought access to the room, initially visually and later physically. He repeatedly threatened Washington with arrest for failing to register as a gun-crime convict, a tactic perceived as coercive to obtain consent for the search. Despite not arresting Washington, Sceirine's statements were intended to manipulate him into consenting, circumventing the warrant requirement. Once inside the room unlawfully, the officers used evidence obtained from this unconstitutional entry to pressure Washington into signing a search permission form. The officers' actions were not in good faith, as they exploited their prior violations of Washington's rights. Their goal was clearly to gather evidence of criminal activity, specifically regarding a methamphetamine lab, without any transformation of circumstances that would justify probable cause. The entry into Washington's room was investigatory in nature, aiming to uncover evidence of criminal wrongdoing.
Strong evidence indicates that the officers acted in bad faith toward Washington, leading to the conclusion that the "purpose and flagrancy" factor favors suppression of evidence. The court determined that the six RPD officers violated Washington's Fourth Amendment rights on four occasions. Washington's written consent to search his room, the discovery of his gun, and his confession to owning the gun were all deemed tainted by these constitutional violations. Consequently, the district court should have granted Washington's motion to suppress. The order denying this motion is reversed, the judgment vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. Judge C. Arlen Beam concurs with this result. The excerpt also notes that Washington's responses to the officers were found insufficiently clear to constitute consent to search, a finding not challenged by the Government on appeal. Additionally, discrepancies in testimony regarding the presence of officers in Washington's room were acknowledged, with the district court favoring Officer Sceirine's account.
A razor blade, credit card, or similar object is commonly used to create a line of a substance, which is then snorted through a straw or cylindrical object, as noted in *United States v. Cravens*. The legal standard established in *Terry v. Ohio*—which allows for reasonable suspicion to justify stops and searches—cannot be applied to warrantless entries into homes, as established by various cases including *LaLonde v. County of Riverside* and *United States v. Winsor*. These cases affirm that a warrant is generally required for home searches, and warrantless entries must meet strict criteria, such as exigent circumstances, which include protecting public safety, preventing evidence destruction, or urgent situations like hot pursuit of a suspect.
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment typically mandates that searches of a home require probable cause supported by a warrant, with exceptions being strictly defined. The legality of evidence obtained from an illegal search is assessed through de novo review, focusing on the interplay of facts and legal standards. The voluntariness of consent to search under the Fifth Amendment is distinct from its validity under the Fourth Amendment, as outlined in *New York v. Harris* and *United States v. Patzer*, which discuss the implications of prior illegal conduct on the admissibility of evidence.
Consent obtained from Washington was deemed tainted due to prior illegal actions by law enforcement, eliminating the need to assess its voluntariness. The court referenced Garvin v. Farmon, emphasizing that for statements to be admissible despite a Fourth Amendment violation, the link between the illegal arrest and subsequent statements must be severed, regardless of Fifth Amendment voluntariness. Voluntariness alone does not negate the taint of a prior Fourth Amendment violation, as established in United States v. George and further clarified in United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez.
The search consent form was signed around 8:45 p.m., shortly after the police returned, and it was unclear if Washington read the form before signing. The district court acknowledged he had the opportunity to read it, but evidence indicated it was not read to him, nor was he informed of his right to refuse consent. The officers conducted three unlawful searches of Washington's room prior to obtaining his signature.
The government’s argument incorrectly merged Fifth Amendment voluntariness with Fourth Amendment attenuation analysis. Courts typically analyze attenuation using a conjunctive approach, focusing on both purpose and flagrancy, but often find taint based on either factor alone. Although the Supreme Court's positions on these factors present some tension, the analysis concluded that all three attenuation factors favored suppression of the evidence.
Additionally, when presented with the consent form, Washington was explicitly told to disregard the portion related to Miranda rights, misleading him about his legal standing.
