Kenneth Michael Trentadue, the Estate of by and Through Its Personal Representative Carmen Aguilar, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant, and Carmen Aguilar Trentadue, Individually and as Personal Representative for the Estate of Kenneth Michael Trentadue and Guardian Ad Litem for Vito Miguel Trentadue Wilma Lou Trentadue Jesse James Trentadue Donna Trentadue Sweeney Lee Frederick Trentadue Jesse Carl Trentadue v. United States of America Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Bureau of Investigation, Stuart Lee, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee, Kenneth Freeman, Defendant-Cross-Appellee. United States of America, Amicus Curiae. Kenneth Michael Trentadue, the Estate of by and Through Its Personal Representative Carmen Aguilar Carmen Aguilar Trentadue, Individually and as Personal Representative for the Estate of Kenneth Michael Trentadue and Guardian Ad Litem for Vito Miguel Trentadue Wilma Lou Trentadue Jesse James Trentadue Donna Trentadue Sweeney Lee Frederick Trentadue Jesse Carl Trentadu

Citations: 386 F.3d 1322; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22156Docket: 02-6030

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; October 25, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed an appeal from the United States, which contested a $1.1 million judgment awarded to the Estate of Kenneth M. Trentadue and his family under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for intentional infliction of emotional distress following Trentadue's death in a federal detention center. The prison official, Stuart A. Lee, also appealed a jury verdict that found him liable for deliberate indifference to Trentadue's medical needs based on the precedent established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.

The Trentadue family raised twenty-one issues on cross-appeal, primarily challenging the district court's conclusion that Trentadue committed suicide and the court's findings regarding the alleged intentional destruction of evidence by federal officials. The government’s appeal focused on several key issues: the plaintiffs' compliance with the FTCA's notice requirements, the applicability of the FTCA's misrepresentation exception to the emotional distress claim, the plaintiffs' ability to meet the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Oklahoma law, and whether the FTCA’s judgment bar provision prevents the Bivens judgment against Lee.

Ultimately, the court affirmed some aspects of the lower court's decision, reversed others, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Kenneth M. Trentadue was arrested in California in June 1995 for driving under the influence and subsequently found to have an outstanding warrant for federal parole violations from a bank robbery conviction. He was held in local jails until August 18, 1995, when he was transferred to the Federal Transfer Center (FTC) in Oklahoma City for a parole revocation hearing. After requesting protective custody, he was moved to the Special Housing Unit (SHU). On August 21, at 3:02 a.m., guards discovered Trentadue hanging from a noose made of bed sheets in his cell, and he was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. 

Trentadue's family alleges he was murdered by prison staff or inmates and that officials attempted to cover up the suspicious circumstances of his death by destroying evidence. They also claim guards were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, delaying their response to his hanging. In contrast, the government maintains that Trentadue's injuries were self-inflicted and that he was dead when discovered. On the day of his death, Trentadue had expressed fears for his safety in the SHU and was placed in a cell alone. Records indicate no unusual activity around him before his death, but the response to his hanging involved significant delays, including decisions by Lieutenant Stuart A. Lee to not immediately enter the cell or cut Trentadue down, which further raises concerns about the handling of the situation.

Trentadue was found dead after hanging in his cell, with a physician assistant determining he was deceased without performing CPR. His body was moved to the prison infirmary at 3:10 a.m., eight minutes post-discovery. Lieutenant Kenneth Freeman, responsible for investigating inmate deaths, was notified shortly after the body was moved. He did not consider the cell a crime scene based on prison officials' claims of suicide, leading to a superficial investigation. Freeman collected some physical evidence and photographed the scene and body before the cell was cleaned by noon.

An autopsy conducted by Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Fred Jordan revealed multiple injuries, including contusions, a bruised anal verge, lacerations, a neck fracture, and abrasions. Initially, the manner of death was marked as 'pending' and later classified as 'unknown.' 

Warden Marie Carter informed Trentadue's mother of his apparent suicide and stated an autopsy would occur with family consent. However, only Trentadue's wife, Carmen, could authorize the procedure, and she did not give consent. Jesse Trentadue, Trentadue's brother, a lawyer, insisted on managing affairs related to the death and requested an autopsy, but was told authorization was needed from Wilma Trentadue. Despite this, prison officials had already authorized an autopsy that was completed the same day.

On August 22, Jesse faxed a letter to Warden Carter seeking details about the death and indicating that he would soon provide autopsy authorization. He received no responses, and the district court found that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to notify the family about the autopsy or the extensive injuries found on Trentadue's body.

On August 26, Trentadue's remains were shipped to a California funeral home, where his family discovered autopsy incisions and significant bruising, which they had not been informed of prior. They photographed the body upon seeing its condition.

On September 1, the FTC released a statement regarding Trentadue's death, suggesting it was a suicide based on the Oklahoma Medical Examiner's tentative ruling, which contradicted the BOP's knowledge that the cause was listed as 'unknown.' The press release marked the Trentadue family's first awareness of an official investigation. Following the death, multiple federal and local investigations ensued. The BOP's internal inquiry was brief, as the FBI's criminal investigation commenced in late 1995 and progressed slowly. The DOJ's Civil Rights Division later took over, finding no credible evidence of civil rights violations or murder. However, the DOJ Office of the Inspector General identified serious deficiencies in the BOP's handling of the case and concluded that Trentadue had committed suicide.

The Oklahoma City Police Department, prompted by the District Attorney, also investigated and concluded Trentadue's death was a suicide, leading the medical examiner to revise the manner of death from 'unknown' to 'suicide' with a cause of 'traumatic asphyxia.' In August 1996, Trentadue's estate filed an administrative claim with the DOJ, alleging murder by prison guards and seeking damages for emotional distress due to the concealment of his death's circumstances. The DOJ denied this claim. Subsequently, Trentadue's estate and family initiated legal action against the United States, DOJ, BOP, FBI, and twelve individual prison officials. Their amended complaint included allegations of extreme misconduct by the government, such as concealing the true circumstances of Trentadue's death, mutilating his body, and making false assertions regarding his cause of death, all deemed outrageous and intolerable by the plaintiffs.

Civil rights violations were asserted against Lieutenants Lee and Freeman under Bivens. Prior to trial, the district court granted Freeman summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The FTCA action and remaining Bivens claims against Lee were tried together, with the FTCA action heard by the bench and Bivens claims presented to a jury. After a four-week trial, the jury found Lee liable for violating Trentadue's civil rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, awarding $20,000 in compensatory damages, while rejecting the remaining Bivens claims. Subsequently, the district court awarded the plaintiffs $1.1 million in damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the FTCA, finding against them on all other FTCA claims. Both the government and Lee appealed.

The FTCA offers a limited waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity for private suits, requiring that liability arises from a negligent or wrongful act by a government employee. On appeal, the government and Lee raised four issues concerning the FTCA damages: (a) the notice of claim, (b) the misrepresentation exception, (c) the application of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (d) the judgment bar.

The first issue pertains to whether the plaintiffs' administrative claim met the FTCA's notice requirements, which are jurisdictional and strictly construed. According to 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), claims must be presented with a written statement describing the injury and a specified sum for damages. The plaintiffs' claim included an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and specified sought damages. The government argued that the claim was inadequate as it was based on a theory of murder and failed to address the grounds for damages awarded by the district court. However, courts have interpreted the notice requirement pragmatically, suggesting that as long as the claim gives sufficient notice for investigation into potentially tortious conduct and specifies damages sought, it fulfills the requirement.

A claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is deemed sufficient if it notifies the relevant agency of the incident's facts without needing to detail all potential legal theories. The administrative claim process aims to facilitate a swift resolution and minimize litigation. The court affirms that the FTCA's notice requirements should be interpreted flexibly. In this case, the plaintiffs’ administrative claim properly informed the Department of Justice (DOJ) about the alleged misconduct of prison officials, specifically citing claims of emotional distress related to extreme acts, including the handling of Trentadue's body. This claim aligns with the allegations in their amended complaint, contrasting with the case of Dynamic Image, where the claim did not mention the grounds for subsequent tort claims, leading to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the plaintiffs provided adequate notice for their emotional distress claim, thus not lacking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) of the FTCA.

The second issue addresses the intentional torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), which states that claims related to misrepresentation are not covered by the FTCA. If a claim falls under this exception, it must be dismissed due to lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, as established in prior case law. The court will review the application of this exception de novo, as it pertains to jurisdictional determinations.

Plaintiffs' emotional distress claim is argued by the government to fall under the misrepresentation exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting that damages arose from the government's failure to communicate key facts regarding Trentadue's condition and the autopsy. The government maintains that since plaintiffs cannot identify conduct independent of this failure, their claim is essentially one of misrepresentation as defined by 2680(h). However, the court disagrees, clarifying that the misrepresentation exception applies only to actions that fit the traditional definition of misrepresentation claims, which typically involve negligent or willful misrepresentation in economic contexts. The court notes that claims must include essential elements of misrepresentation, specifically reliance on false information leading to pecuniary loss, which are not present in this case. The claim arises from the government's insensitive treatment of the family post-death, rather than commercial decisions based on misinformation. Consequently, the court agrees with the district court's conclusion that the misrepresentation exception does not apply here, as the emotional distress does not stem from commercial misrepresentations but from the government's conduct toward the family.

The district court determined that the case does not constitute negligent misrepresentation or deceit under 2680(h), allowing the plaintiffs' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress to proceed without being barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The government contested the award of damages, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to meet the necessary elements of the tort under Oklahoma law. 

To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Recklessness is defined as deliberate disregard for a high probability of causing emotional distress. The conduct must be considered within its context, emphasizing that it must be so extreme that it surpasses societal norms of decency. 

The court noted that the emotional distress must be severe enough that no reasonable person could endure it, with intensity and duration being significant factors in evaluating severity. Additionally, evidence of extreme conduct can indicate the presence of distress. After a bench trial, the district court found the government liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, noting that the news of the plaintiff’s death was shocking to the family.

The family of Kenneth Trentadue was not informed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that an autopsy had been conducted on him, leading them to discover the autopsy and extensive injuries on his body only upon its receipt on August 26, 1995. This lack of prior notification caused significant emotional distress to the family, which the court deemed to be a quantifiable level beyond what would normally be expected from the death of a loved one. The court determined that the United States was liable for this distress due to their reckless treatment of the family, which included failing to inform them about the autopsy and the condition of the body. The court found that the plaintiffs successfully proved their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, having established the elements of intentional or reckless conduct, outrageousness, and causation. However, due to insufficient findings regarding the severity of emotional distress suffered by each individual plaintiff, the court vacated the judgment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and remanded the case for further findings in accordance with Oklahoma law. Additionally, Lieutenant Stuart Lee argued that the FTCA judgment required vacating the judgment against him in a Bivens action. The court noted that since it was vacating the FTCA judgment, the application of the judgment bar would depend on the district court's conclusions on remand, while also highlighting that the claims were tried in a bifurcated proceeding. Lee had previously been found guilty of constitutional violations under Bivens, and the court had entered judgment on those claims before addressing the FTCA claims.

A final judgment in a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case precludes a subsequent Bivens action based on the same underlying conduct. Victims of intentional torts by federal officers can sue either the officer through a Bivens claim or the United States under the FTCA. However, if a plaintiff chooses to sue the government and obtains a judgment, this bars any action against the individual officer for the same subject matter, as established by 28 U.S.C. § 2676. This statute has been interpreted to mean that claims arising from the same actions or occurrences are subject to this bar. In the case at hand, the plaintiffs' FTCA action and Bivens claim involved the same misconduct by prison officials. Even though the plaintiffs received a judgment on narrower grounds than those claimed, this does not change the fact that both claims arose from the same incidents.

The timing of the district court's judgment on the Bivens claims versus the FTCA case is irrelevant; the FTCA's judgment bar applies regardless. The statute's intent is to prevent multiple lawsuits and recoveries for the same subject matter. Consequently, a judgment in favor of any plaintiffs in the FTCA case will prevent a Bivens judgment against the individual officer, Lee, for those plaintiffs. If no favorable FTCA judgment is entered for any plaintiff, the Bivens claims will still need to be resolved.

Additionally, the plaintiffs have raised twenty-one legal and factual errors from the district court in a cross-appeal, but none of these necessitate a reversal of the lower court's decisions. The standard for reviewing factual findings by the district court is the "clearly erroneous" standard.

A finding is deemed "clearly erroneous" when, despite evidence supporting it, a reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has occurred. This standard does not allow for reversal merely because the reviewing court would have reached a different decision. Appellate courts must remember they do not decide factual issues anew. A district court's in-camera or ex parte review of documents, permission for pleadings, and denial of sanctions are subject to abuse of discretion review, as are evidentiary rulings. Legal conclusions by the district court are reviewed de novo. 

The harmless-error rule assesses whether an individual error warrants reversal, while cumulative-error analysis examines whether the combined effect of multiple harmless errors impacts the trial outcome. For cumulative errors to be considered harmful, they must affect the defendant's substantial rights. 

In the case at hand, the plaintiffs argue that the district court's conclusion that Trentadue's injuries were self-inflicted is clearly erroneous, citing uncontroverted evidence of his injuries and the presence of another person's blood in the cell. However, the court disagrees, citing testimony from Commander Tom Bevel, who indicated that forensic evidence suggested Trentadue attempted suicide twice and sustained injuries from a ligature that gave way. Additionally, a handwriting expert confirmed that a note found in the cell matched Trentadue's handwriting, leading the court to reasonably classify it as a suicide note.

The court determined that the government presented credible evidence minimizing the relevance of a small blood spot found in Trentadue's cell, which had housed other inmates prior to his death. Multiple investigations by federal and local law enforcement corroborated that Trentadue's death was a suicide. Following a year-long inquiry overseen by the DOJ's Civil Rights Division, a federal grand jury opted not to pursue murder charges against any officials or inmates involved. Subsequently, the DOJ's Office of the Inspector General validated these findings in a November 1999 report. The Oklahoma City Police Department, directed by the local District Attorney, also concluded that there was no evidence of a beating and ruled the death a suicide, prompting the Oklahoma Medical Examiner to revise his earlier classification from "unknown" to "suicide." 

Despite the various questions surrounding Trentadue's death and the troubling response from prison officials, the district court, after a four-week trial, identified significant evidentiary issues that hindered a clear understanding of events on August 21, 1995. The appellate review found no clear error in the district court's conclusion that Trentadue’s injuries were self-inflicted and his death was a suicide.

On the issue of evidence destruction, the district court ruled that any loss was due to ignorance or incompetence rather than intentional actions by federal officials. Although the court acknowledged deviations from standard investigative practices, it upheld that there was no intentional destruction of evidence. Lieutenant Freeman documented the scene thoroughly, taking photographs that accurately represented the conditions in the cell and the state of Trentadue's body at the time of his death.

Freeman collected physical evidence related to Trentadue's death, which he provided to the medical examiner's office. Given prison guards' assertions that the death was a suicide, Freeman had less reason to treat the cell as a crime scene, supporting the district court's conclusion of no intentional evidence destruction. During trial, plaintiffs' counsel rigorously examined Freeman's credibility, but the government offered inadequate explanations for the missing cell rotation log and clothing. Nonetheless, the district court's determination of no intentional evidence destruction was not deemed a clear error, adhering to the standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' spoliation claim, referencing Patel v. OMH Medical Center, which established that spoliation is not recognized as an actionable tort in Oklahoma. As spoliation is not a recognized tort under Oklahoma law, the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' claim was justified.

Regarding sanctions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sanction the government for evidence loss or destruction. It requires a showing of bad faith for imposing adverse inferences, and mere negligence is insufficient to imply a weak case. The court found that the loss of evidence stemmed from ignorance or incompetence rather than intentional action. The district court carefully considered the implications of the missing evidence during the trial, allowing plaintiffs to argue its significance, which led to the conclusion that no abuse of discretion occurred in refusing sanctions.

Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the district court also abused its discretion in denying declaratory or injunctive relief against the government.

Plaintiffs assert that the government's loss or destruction of documents and the perjury by employees infringed upon their Fifth Amendment civil rights. However, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to grant injunctive or declaratory relief, as it only allows for claims against the United States for money damages related to property loss or personal injury. At trial, only Lee remained as a defendant, and no basis for injunctive relief against him existed. The Trentadues did not appeal the dismissal of individual defendants and voluntarily dismissed several FTC defendants prior to trial, leading to no perceived abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying injunctive relief.

The plaintiffs contended that the district court wrongly required them to prove Trentadue was alive when discovered, rather than placing the burden on the government. Under Oklahoma law, plaintiffs bear the responsibility to demonstrate that a defendant's wrongful act was the proximate cause of death, validating the court's stance that the burden remained with the plaintiffs.

Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the presumption against suicide should shift the burden to the party claiming suicide, and that a presumption of life exists when the time of death is uncertain. In Oklahoma, presumptions are procedural tools and do not constitute affirmative evidence. The presumption against suicide can be rebutted by evidence indicating self-inflicted death. In this case, evidence showed Trentadue's injuries were self-inflicted, thus negating the presumption against suicide. The district court found no evidence suggesting Trentadue could have been revived, preventing the plaintiffs from linking the FTC personnel's actions to his death.

Finally, any adverse presumption arising from the destruction or spoliation of evidence requires willful action, not mere negligence, which does not imply a weak case.

The court affirmed the district court's finding that the government did not intentionally destroy evidence, concluding there was no error in this determination. Regarding the "physical fact" rule, plaintiffs argued that physical evidence contradicted oral testimony about the circumstances of Trentadue's death. They asserted that the ligature was intact, the ligature was low in the cell, and the presence of liver mortis indicated he was face down after death, not hanging. However, the court noted that the evidence was not sufficiently clear and irrefutable to override the reasonable explanations provided by the district court and jury, thus finding no error.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Oklahoma definition of death should apply, stating that the relevant statute does not create an evidentiary presumption against the district court’s findings. 

Lastly, the plaintiffs contested the government's in camera submissions as violating their due process rights. The court clarified that these submissions were not ex parte but were made under claims of privilege, and the plaintiffs were given appropriate notice and opportunity to contest their confidentiality. The court concluded that not all ex parte proceedings violate due process and found no merit in the plaintiffs' allegations of error regarding these submissions.

The Trentadues failed to demonstrate any prejudice or harm from the motions for in camera review and did not contemporaneously claim bias by the district court, leading to the conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion by the court. The protective order issued by the district court was upheld as it did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and the court maintained its responsibility in overseeing the discovery process. The government justified the need for protection of confidential materials, and the court's order allowed for challenges to confidentiality designations.

The plaintiffs’ assertion that the order requiring prior court approval for filing motions constituted an unconstitutional "filing ban" was rejected; the order was seen as a necessary measure due to an excessive number of motions filed by the parties. No specific documents were identified by the plaintiffs whose exclusion prejudiced their case, indicating no significant constitutional deprivation occurred.

Additionally, the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' request for findings regarding the government's alleged misconduct related to Trentadue's death was validated, as previous findings indicated that the government had not intentionally destroyed evidence. The court also found no basis for claims of perjury concerning a guard's actions related to the incident. Deference was given to the trial court's findings, particularly regarding witness credibility.

The district court's decisions regarding hearsay objections and the exclusion of trial exhibits were upheld, with greater deference given to the court's rulings due to the fact-specific nature of hearsay. Even if there was an abuse of discretion in excluding an exhibit, it was deemed harmless, as such errors must significantly affect a defendant's rights to warrant reversal. Additionally, the court rejected plaintiffs' claims about Jesse Trentadue's emotional distress, finding the allegations against the DOJ to be collateral to the main issues in the case and not substantiated by evidence of misconduct by federal officials. The Trentadues failed to demonstrate any material errors during the trial, rendering their claim of cumulative error invalid.

The FTCA action (02-6030) is vacated and remanded for the district court to make supplemental findings on whether the plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress under Oklahoma law. The court must also determine if judgments against Stuart Lee (01-6444) and Kenneth Freeman (02-6037) are barred under the FTCA. The district court's dismissal of other cross-appeals (02-6037 and 02-6051) is affirmed. The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded. The amended complaint included allegations of assault, negligence, evidence destruction, conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and various statutory torts under Oklahoma law. Compensation awarded included $250,000 to Trentadue's wife, $200,000 each to his mother and three siblings, and $50,000 to his deceased father's estate. Circuit courts have recognized emotional distress claims under the FTCA in previous cases.

The excerpt addresses several key legal principles and case law related to claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Notably, it clarifies that the government did not argue that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is categorically excluded under the FTCA. Section 2680(h) specifies exceptions to FTCA claims, including those arising from assault, battery, and misrepresentation. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in JBP Acquisitions emphasizes that the misrepresentation exception applies when reliance and pecuniary loss are evident, highlighting a scenario where government misrepresentation led to a plaintiff’s injury.

Under Oklahoma law, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper for emotional distress claims, determining if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous according to the standards set in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court assesses the initial legal thresholds of outrageousness and severe distress, with the jury tasked to evaluate the existence of such distress.

The excerpt outlines the ongoing dispute regarding whether Jesse Trentadue consented to an autopsy and notes the lack of clarity around the authorization from his mother. The government's treatment of the Trentadue family is scrutinized, particularly regarding consent and communication about the autopsy.

Lastly, the judgment bar under 28 U.S.C. § 2676 indicates that a judgment in an FTCA action bars any subsequent claims against government employees related to the same matter. The court has opted not to address additional claims, including those related to qualified immunity and summary judgment, pending the remand of the FTCA claim.

Claims against Freeman will be barred for any plaintiffs who receive a judgment on the FTCA claim. For those without a judgment, the possibility of granting summary judgment in favor of Freeman remains unresolved. Findings of fact are not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous, with deference given to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility. Commander Bevel testified regarding the sequence of events leading to Trentadue's injuries, indicating that the ligature broke, causing Trentadue to fall and strike his head multiple times. The district court has sealed the Office of the Inspector General's report. A jury found insufficient evidence to conclude that Lee or others caused Trentadue's injuries. Plaintiffs allege that BOP officials intentionally destroyed key evidence, including Trentadue's clothing and cell rotation logs, and assert that cleaning the cell the day after his death and painting over a handwritten note constituted evidence destruction. Luminol testing confirmed blood presence in the cell, supporting the physical evidence collected. The plaintiffs’ claim that the Restatement (Second) Torts § 870 recognizes spoliation as a tort in Oklahoma is also rejected.