Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; October 26, 2000; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
An appeal was made by former Pine Bluff mayor Carolyn Robinson challenging the trial court's denial of her petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to compel current mayor Jerry Taylor to pay her retirement benefits under Ark. Code Ann. 24-12-123. Robinson claimed entitlement to these benefits due to her ten years of service and reaching retirement age on August 6, 1997. She alleged that Mayor Taylor improperly deleted her retirement pay from the budget, violating her constitutional rights, and also accused him of gender discrimination under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, seeking damages from him personally. Mayor Taylor countered that Robinson forfeited her retirement benefits by opting for a lump-sum payment from a city plan, citing Ark. Code Ann. 14-42-117, which prohibits elected officials from receiving both lump-sum benefits and pensions simultaneously. The trial court dismissed her claims, and on appeal, Robinson contended that her right to benefits vested before the enactment of Ark. Code Ann. 14-42-117. However, it was established that while Robinson accumulated the necessary ten years of service, her service completion date was December 31, 1992, which was after the effective date of the new provision that restricted her benefits. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of her motion and dismissal of her complaint.
Ms. Robinson acknowledges receiving a lump-sum payment from the city's pension program upon completing her second term as mayor. Mayor Taylor contends, supported by the trial court, that Act 604 of 1991 bars her from receiving annual retirement benefits under section 24-12-123 after electing the lump-sum option. In contrast, Ms. Robinson asserts that her right to these benefits vested when she was elected for her second term on January 1, 1989, prior to the Act's effective date in July 1991. She argues that any attempt to revoke her rights post-enactment would violate both the Arkansas and U.S. Constitutions.
The appeal hinges on whether her retirement benefits vested before Act 604 was enacted. Ms. Robinson references the case of Jones v. Cheney, where a former official's retirement rights were deemed vested before a law change, allowing him to receive benefits. However, this case is distinguished from hers because, at the time Act 604 was passed, Ms. Robinson had not completed the required ten years of service to establish vested rights. Furthermore, the pension system in Jones was based on employee contributions, thus establishing a contractual obligation, whereas Ms. Robinson's benefits, funded by the city’s general fund without her contributions, are classified as a gratuitous allowance with no vested rights. Consequently, it was determined that Ms. Robinson's rights to retirement benefits under section 24-12-123 had not vested prior to the Act's adoption.
Ms. Robinson's claim for retirement benefits under Ark. Code Ann. 24-12-123 is subject to legislative authority, allowing the General Assembly to modify or eliminate such benefits without infringing upon the Arkansas or U.S. Constitutions regarding ex post facto laws or contract impairments. She contends that Act 604 of 1991 does not bar her from receiving these benefits, arguing that since she did not receive a lump-sum payment and a pension simultaneously, the 'double dipping' prohibition does not apply. However, this interpretation is incorrect. Statutory construction principles dictate that legislative intent is derived from the statute's plain language and must be understood in context with the entire statute.
The relevant statute, section 14-42-117, clearly prohibits any former elected official or city employee from receiving retirement benefits from both the city plan and a General Assembly plan for the same service period. It allows only one retirement benefit for that period, regardless of the timing of the payments. Since Ms. Robinson opted for a lump-sum retirement benefit from the City of Pine Bluff, she forfeits her right to benefits under section 24-12-123 for the same service period. Consequently, the trial court's denial of her writ of mandamus is affirmed.
