Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; October 14, 1999; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
The appeal arises from a chancery court order dismissing the Arkansas State Medical Board's complaint against Scott A. Schoen, D.D.S., and the Arkansas State Board of Dental Examiners due to lack of jurisdiction, based on the Medical Board having an adequate legal remedy. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the Medical Board's appeal, claiming it is moot following the enactment of Act 143 of 1999, which amended the definition of dentistry to include the maxillofacial area. The court granted the motion to dismiss concerning the Dental Board but reversed and remanded the claim against Dr. Schoen for further proceedings.
The Medical Board initially alleged that the Dental Board's regulations on 'Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery' exceeded the statutory definition of dentistry, enabling Dr. Schoen to perform procedures traditionally reserved for medicine, such as surgical removal of basal cell carcinoma. The Medical Board sought declarations that these procedures constituted the practice of medicine, invalidation of the Dental Board's regulations, and cessation of issuing specialty licenses in oral and maxillofacial surgery.
Prior to Act 143, the definition of dentistry did not include maxillofacial treatment or surgery. The new definition under Act 143 includes such procedures, which the appellees argue renders the Medical Board's claims moot. The court highlighted that it does not adjudicate moot cases or provide advisory opinions, referencing a precedent case.
An issue is deemed moot when a court's decision would not affect any ongoing legal controversy. In this case, the legality of Dental Board regulations defining dentistry to include maxillofacial diagnosis, treatment, and surgery has already been resolved by Act 143 of the General Assembly. Therefore, the court dismisses as moot the Medical Board's complaint regarding the definition of dentistry and the related regulations. However, the matter of whether Dr. Schoen, with the Dental Board's assistance, unlawfully practiced medicine by performing surgeries, including the removal of a basal cell carcinoma, remains unresolved.
The jurisdictional question arises as to whether this issue should be addressed in chancery court under Arkansas Code Ann. 17-95-402(b) and (c), which permits the Medical Board to seek injunctions against unlawful medical practices, or by the Dental Board as the administrative agency for dentistry under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Medical Board argues for equity jurisdiction based on the Medical Practices Act, asserting that any unlicensed practice of medicine is a public nuisance detrimental to public health.
Nonetheless, the issue of whether courts of law take precedence over equity jurisdiction when an adequate legal remedy is available is contentious. Legal principles suggest that if a sufficient legal remedy exists, equity jurisdiction may be denied. The chancery court found an adequate remedy through the Dental Board's administrative processes, leading to the dismissal of the Medical Board's complaint. In contrast, the Medical Board claims that the administrative remedy is insufficient, citing past case law, including Arkansas State Med. Bd. v. Bolding and Miller v. Reed, to support its position. However, the Miller case is noted as distinguishable because it did not involve a claim that the actions in question constituted the practice of chiropractic.
The key issue at hand is whether the removal of carcinoma falls under the practice of dentistry or medicine. The Dental Board asserts that it constitutes dentistry, raising concerns about its impartiality as a tribunal since its position is already established. Judicial review of the Board’s decisions is limited, indicating that the administrative remedy may be insufficient. Therefore, the chancery court should maintain jurisdiction as per Ark. Code Ann. 17-95-402(b) and (c).
The precedent from Arkansas State Medical Board v. Bolding is relevant, where the court determined that the Dental Board must be included as a defendant in similar cases to avoid conflicting rulings between the Medical and Dental Boards regarding the classification of medical procedures. In the current case, there is a dispute over whether Dr. Schoen’s actions are dental or medical, and the Dental Board has reportedly facilitated these actions while claiming them to be within the scope of dentistry. As the Dental Board has already taken a stance on this matter, it is necessary for it to be involved in the chancery court proceedings to ensure consistent resolution. The court concludes that both professional boards should participate fully in the proceedings, leading to the partial granting and denying of the motion to dismiss the appeal concerning the Dental Board, with the case being reversed and remanded for further consideration.
