Redman v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway

Citations: 1994 Ark. LEXIS 246; 316 Ark. 636; 873 S.W.2d 542Docket: 93-1246

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; April 18, 1994; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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In a wrongful death case, Troy Redman's wife and child were killed in a collision with a St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. train at a railroad crossing. Redman, representing the estates of the deceased, appealed a jury verdict favoring the railway company, arguing that a state trooper should not have testified as an expert on normal motorist reaction time. The court found no error in allowing the testimony. Redman also contested the admissibility of a state highway official's testimony regarding safety upgrades for railroad crossings, which the court ruled did not instruct the jury on the law. Additionally, Redman claimed the Trial Court erred by providing an instruction on expert witnesses not aligned with Arkansas Model Jury Instructions, but this was deemed non-prejudicial.

Redman's negligence claim against the railway centered on the argument that overgrown trees obstructed visibility at the crossing, which he believed necessitated the installation of crossing lights. The railway company countered that the accident resulted from Mrs. Redman's negligence. The jury found both parties not negligent, leading to judgment for the railway.

Redman presented Dr. Larry Williams, an accident reconstructionist, as an expert, but the railway did not challenge this status at the time. Williams discussed average reaction times. In rebuttal, State Trooper Larry Kirk testified that typical reaction time is three-quarters of a second, influenced by various factors. Redman objected to Kirk's testimony due to concerns over his qualifications, which the court initially sustained. After questioning Kirk about his training and experience, the railway's counsel argued that his law enforcement background qualified him as an expert. The court ultimately had to determine Kirk's expertise in a bench conference, considering the trooper's specialized knowledge as a law enforcement officer.

The court acknowledged a portion of the conference as 'unintelligible' and proceeded with a discussion about the admissibility of Trooper Kirk's testimony. The court indicated it would allow Trooper Kirk to answer a specific question despite concerns raised by Mr. Redman regarding Kirk's qualifications as an expert witness under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 702. This rule permits expert testimony that aids the jury, requiring witnesses to be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, or education, with the trial court having discretion over qualifications.

Mr. Redman argued that Trooper Kirk was not properly qualified to testify, citing his insufficient education and understanding of reaction times. However, precedent established that law enforcement officers can testify based on their experience, as supported by various Arkansas cases affirming their expertise on related issues. Although Trooper Kirk's credentials differed from those of a previously qualified expert, the court found no abuse of discretion in allowing his testimony about motorists' reaction times.

Redman further contended that Kirk lacked sufficient knowledge, noting his inability to clearly differentiate between 'reaction time' and 'perception time' during cross-examination. The court ruled that such deficiencies pertained to the weight and credibility of the testimony rather than its admissibility. Finally, while the trial court did not formally declare Kirk an expert, the court maintained that this omission was not a reversible error, as it had already addressed objections regarding Kirk's qualifications during the proceedings.

Trooper Kirk was permitted to answer a question after initial objections from Mr. Redman's attorney regarding his qualifications as an expert witness. The Trial Court's decision to allow his testimony implied a change in its prior stance on Kirk's expertise, although it did not formally recognize him as an expert. Mr. Redman challenged the admissibility of testimony from Mike Selig, a traffic safety engineer, arguing that it instructed the jury on the law, a role reserved for the court. The Trial Court overruled this objection. Selig's testimony indicated that the federal government allocates funds for upgrading railroad crossings and that the crossing in question had a low priority for upgrades, which Mr. Redman contended contradicted the common law duty of railroad companies to provide adequate warnings at dangerous crossings. The court noted that the jury was properly instructed on this law and found no merit in Mr. Redman's claim that Selig’s testimony constituted legal instruction. Additionally, the Trial Court provided a non-AMI jury instruction on expert witnesses instead of the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions. Mr. Redman's claim of error was dismissed as the provided instruction was similar to AMI 105, and he failed to demonstrate why it was erroneous. The court confirmed that using a non-AMI instruction was appropriate under the circumstances. The Trial Court's decisions were affirmed.