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Carlton v. Carlton
Citations: 316 Ark. 618; 873 S.W.2d 801; 1994 Ark. LEXIS 238Docket: 93-1135
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; April 18, 1994; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Terry Carlton and Jeanne Carlton divorced in 1991, with Mr. Carlton ordered to pay $425 per month in child support for their daughter, Carrie. After remarrying and incurring new child support obligations, Mr. Carlton sought a reduction in his payments to Jeanne based on changed circumstances. Jeanne counterclaimed for specific visitation terms and requested an increase in child support due to Mr. Carlton's indicated intention not to exercise visitation. Following a hearing, the chancellor reduced Mr. Carlton's child support obligation to $352 per month, citing his inability to visit due to work commitments and stating a lack of authority to modify the support based solely on visitation issues. Jeanne Carlton appealed, arguing the trial court erred in not increasing the child support above the chart amount due to Mr. Carlton’s failure to exercise visitation. The court affirmed the chancellor's decision, referencing a prior order which indicated that child support amounts could be adjusted based on relevant factors. However, the court found no justification for adjusting the support amount based solely on non-specific claims of increased childcare costs. Mr. Carlton testified about his work schedule and challenges in maintaining visitation, further supporting the decision to uphold the original child support calculation based on the established chart. Mrs. Carlton sought to know their daughter's whereabouts at all times, complicating Mr. Carlton's visitation rights. He indicated he would not exercise visitation due to his job but might do so if his employment changed. Mr. Carlton expressed a willingness to relinquish parental rights, though these rights were not formally terminated. The trial court determined no special needs were present and that Mrs. Carlton could not compel Mr. Carlton to visit; thus, imposing economic penalties for non-visitation would indirectly enforce visitation. The court established child support according to the standard chart and rejected Mrs. Carlton’s claim for increased support based on Mr. Carlton’s failure to visit. The court clarified that the Per Curiam order does not allow custodial parents to claim additional support for unexercised visitation, emphasizing that such provisions apply mainly when the non-custodial parent has temporary custody for extended periods. The chancellor acknowledged Mr. Carlton's intentions were not definitive, noting that he had visited regularly until two months before the hearing, primarily due to work commitments and concerns over their daughter's care. The court found that while Mr. Carlton could not visit in the foreseeable future, he had not permanently terminated his parental rights. The chancellor's discretion in child support matters was affirmed, and the order was upheld. Brown dissented, while Corbin did not participate.