David Genzler v. Peter J. Longanbach, and Jeffrey O'Brien County of San Diego, a Governmental Entity San Diego County District Attorney's Office Gregory Thompson James Pippen Paul Pfingst, David Genzler v. Peter J. Longanbach County of San Diego, a Governmental Entity San Diego County District Attorney's Office, and Jeffrey O'Brien Gregory Thompson James Pippen Paul Pfingst
Docket: 02-56572
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 27, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
David Genzler, the plaintiff, is seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional rights violations during his state homicide trial. The defendants include San Diego County Deputy District Attorney Peter Longanbach and Investigator Jeffrey O'Brien, who are appealing the partial denial of their summary judgment motions based on claims of absolute official immunity. Supervisors in the District Attorney's Office, including District Attorney Paul Pfingst, Assistant District Attorney Gregory Thompson, and Deputy District Attorney James Pippen, are appealing the complete denial of their summary judgment motions based on both absolute and qualified immunity.
The Ninth Circuit Court affirms the partial denial of immunity for Longanbach and O'Brien, finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding their conduct during a witness interview, which may not be protected by absolute immunity. Conversely, the court reverses the denial of immunity for the supervisory defendants, determining their actions were sufficiently connected to the judicial process to qualify for immunity.
The background of the case reveals that Genzler stabbed Dustin Harless during a fight on April 18, 1996. Following Harless's death, Genzler turned himself in, leading to his arrest. Subsequent legal proceedings included a criminal complaint filed on April 23, 1996, with various hearings culminating in a trial preparation phase. A pivotal moment occurred when Genzler's ex-girlfriend, Sheri Logel, testified under immunity regarding evidence, leading to a motion to recuse Genzler's lawyer, Gerald Blank, based on Logel's claims of false testimony under pressure from Longanbach.
Genzler was initially convicted of second-degree murder for the death of Harless, but this conviction was reversed by the California Court of Appeal due to improper recusal of the trial judge. The Court of Appeal also determined that Genzler should have received a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter, citing evidence supporting imperfect self-defense. Although Genzler raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate court did not address these concerns. In the retrial, after the San Diego District Attorney’s office recused itself, Genzler was prosecuted by the State Attorney General’s office, which resulted in a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
Sky Blue Flanders, Harless's fiancée, was a critical prosecution witness. She initially reported to police that Genzler had approached her in his car before the incident, during which Harless confronted Genzler. Flanders described a physical altercation where Genzler was overpowered by Harless, leading to Genzler stabbing Harless. Flanders also indicated that Harless had prior experience in street fights. However, after meeting with Deputy District Attorney Longanbach and Investigator O'Brien, Flanders altered her account, claiming she could not recall details of the fight due to distractions from another individual. During Genzler's second trial, Flanders acknowledged having been evasive regarding Harless's fighting history and expressed feeling pressured not to disclose his involvement in street fighting.
Davis, the doorman, provided inconsistent testimonies regarding the events leading to the homicide, initially stating he saw Genzler chase Harless and Flanders hand-in-hand, but later modifying his account to indicate they were standing apart during the altercation. Genzler claimed he acted in self-defense after being attacked by Harless and subsequently stabbed him. After being sentenced to six years for involuntary manslaughter, Genzler filed a § 1983 action against defendants for prosecutorial misconduct. The defendants' motion to dismiss was denied, and their subsequent motion for summary judgment based on official immunity was partially granted, except for allegations in paragraph 66 of Genzler's complaint, which accused Longanbach and O'Brien of suborning perjury by pressuring Flanders to alter her testimony. The court found sufficient evidence suggesting potential misconduct. Additionally, the supervisory defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding their knowledge of Longanbach's actions was denied. The defendants appealed, and the court will review the issue of official immunity as a question of law, considering all facts in favor of Genzler.
An official is granted absolute immunity from damages under § 1983 when performing traditional advocacy functions, as established in Kalina v. Fletcher. In contrast, qualified immunity applies when officials engage in administrative or investigative roles. The distinction between these types of functions is determined through a functional analysis, which focuses on the nature of the action rather than the actor's identity. Prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity solely due to their position, as seen in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons. Absolute immunity is reserved for actions that are closely linked to the judicial phase of the criminal process, termed "quasi-judicial" conduct. Courts must first assess whether a prosecutor's actions fall within this category to determine entitlement to absolute immunity, which exists regardless of potential violations of constitutional rights. This immunity extends to acts such as initiating prosecutions maliciously, using perjured testimony, or suppressing evidence. Specific examples include participation in probable cause hearings and the preparation and filing of charging documents. Despite recognizing that absolute immunity may leave wronged defendants without redress against malicious prosecutors, the Supreme Court has upheld it to protect prosecutors' independence and ability to advocate without fear of retaliation.
The Supreme Court has been restrictive in granting absolute immunity, only recognizing it in contexts closely tied to judicial functions. In **Buckley**, absolute immunity was denied for prosecutors involved in a defamatory press conference and for those who fabricated evidence during early investigations, as these actions lacked a direct connection to judicial processes. Additionally, prosecutors cannot claim absolute immunity when providing legal advice regarding probable cause for arrests or when attesting to the truth of evidence in charging documents.
The burden of proving that absolute immunity is justified lies with the official seeking it, with a presumption favoring qualified immunity as adequate protection for government officials performing their duties.
In the case involving **Longanbach and O'Brien**, a claim persisted that they coerced a witness, Ms. Flanders, to lie during the investigation. The distinction between advocacy and investigation is critical; if their actions were intimately associated with the judicial process, they could claim absolute immunity. Conversely, if their conduct is deemed investigative, only qualified immunity applies.
The acquisition or fabrication of evidence, especially through coercive means, is typically considered investigatory and outside the scope of absolute immunity. The D.C. Circuit in **Moore v. Valder** emphasized that intimidating witnesses for altered testimony is a misuse of investigative techniques, reinforcing that actions resembling police work are generally classified as investigative rather than quasi-judicial advocacy.
Prosecutors possess absolute immunity when gathering additional evidence after probable cause has been established or when criminal proceedings are underway, provided they are acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. This immunity distinguishes the prosecutor's role in evaluating evidence and preparing for trial from that of a detective gathering evidence to establish probable cause. The Supreme Court has emphasized that while prosecutors are protected when acting in their advocacy role—such as organizing and evaluating evidence for trial—this protection does not extend to police-like investigative activities aimed at acquiring evidence for prosecution.
The timing of evidence collection is crucial in determining the connection of the prosecutor's actions to their judicial function; evidence gathered during trial, even if it involves advising a witness to lie, can still be protected by absolute immunity. However, the Supreme Court clarified that a determination of probable cause does not grant blanket immunity for all subsequent actions, as prosecutors may engage in investigative work that only warrants qualified immunity.
In the case at hand, Longanbach and O'Brien argue for absolute immunity based on the timing of their meetings with Flanders, which occurred after Genzler's arrest based on probable cause. While absolute immunity is not applicable before probable cause, its application after such a determination remains context-dependent. Courts have previously ruled that actions resembling police work—like directing coercive confessions—do not qualify for absolute immunity. Thus, while timing is a relevant factor in assessing immunity, it is not the sole determinant; the nature of the meetings—whether they were more advocatory or investigative—is also critical. Longanbach and O'Brien’s distinct roles necessitate separate evaluations of their claims to absolute immunity.
O'Brien's meeting with Flanders occurred several days before Genzler's bail hearing on April 29, 1996, and was characterized as an investigative function rather than quasi-judicial advocacy. Flanders estimated the meeting took place about one week prior to the joint meeting with Longanbach and O'Brien, where they primarily discussed the identity of the individual who stabbed Harless. At this time, police investigations were ongoing, and the preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for Genzler's trial was still over a month away. Evidence suggests that O'Brien's meeting with Flanders occurred before the criminal complaint was filed on April 23, 1996, and prior to the completion of the police investigation on April 24, 1996. The filing of the complaint is noted as a relevant, though not definitive, factor in distinguishing between investigation and advocacy. Notably, the police synthesis omitted Flanders's initial statement about Harless being on top of Genzler during the altercation and emphasized Davis's perspective without including details about Flanders and Harless walking together. If all inferences favor Genzler, it could be concluded that O'Brien aimed to alter Flanders's narrative to align it more closely with Davis's account. Additionally, O'Brien was involved in other investigative activities during this period, including interviews with Scott Davis, Sheri Logel, Paul Ernst, and John Belsan, which supports the inference that his meeting with Flanders was also investigative in nature.
Evidence supports the conclusion that O'Brien, during his initial meeting with Flanders, was actively engaged in acquiring evidence in an investigative capacity, which does not afford him absolute immunity. Longanbach, if directing O'Brien's investigative activities, similarly lacks absolute immunity. Case law indicates that prosecutors who participate in evidence gathering prior to indictment function more as investigators than in their quasi-judicial roles. Longanbach cannot be held vicariously liable for O'Brien’s independent actions due to the limitations of § 1983 liability principles.
Further evidence suggests Longanbach was directing O'Brien's actions in the Genzler case, as indicated by testimony that Longanbach instructed Flanders, which O'Brien then echoed. This involvement precludes Longanbach from claiming absolute immunity regarding actions taken with respect to O'Brien's meeting with Flanders prior to April 29.
The analysis shifts to the nature of Longanbach and O'Brien’s April 29 meeting with Flanders. Although a criminal complaint had been filed by that date, the timing does not automatically confer absolute immunity. The context of witness interviews is pivotal; such meetings are especially pertinent when occurring during judicial proceedings aimed at influencing those proceedings. The timing of the April 29 meeting is less compelling for absolute immunity than in previous cases where immunity was granted for actions taken well after an indictment, particularly since the preliminary hearing regarding probable cause was still weeks away.
On April 29, officials were investigating to determine probable cause and charges against Genzler. The Supreme Court established that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for actions taken as advocates during trial preparation, including evidence evaluation. Evidence indicated that Longanbach and O'Brien were reviewing details at this meeting for the preliminary hearing and trial. However, after considering the context of ongoing investigations and resolving ambiguities in favor of Genzler, it was determined that their actions were investigatory rather than advocative. O'Brien's notes from the meeting, labeled "Witness Interview," detailed Flanders' evolving recollection of events but lacked indications of coaching her for court. The notes suggested that Longanbach and O'Brien were gathering information and possibly influencing Flanders to alter her testimony. This situation contrasted with the Fifth Circuit’s Cousin case, where a prosecutor clearly acted to instruct a witness on how to testify, indicating a different engagement than observed in the current case.
Longanbach and O'Brien are not entitled to summary judgment for absolute immunity concerning their actions during a meeting with Flanders on April 29. Evidence presented regarding general practices in the San Diego County District Attorney's Office supports this conclusion. Assistant District Attorney Gregory Thompson emphasized the necessity of follow-up investigations after preliminary hearings, indicating that thorough fact-finding is essential for proper case management. He described how deputy district attorneys guide police officers in gathering further evidence and interviewing additional witnesses to ensure the right person is charged and to explore all possible suspects. This process is critical not just for trial preparation but for uncovering the truth. The general description of these investigative functions illustrates that such responsibilities were integral to the roles of prosecutors and investigators in the office. Additionally, while a prosecuting attorney may fulfill various functions, not all are shielded by absolute immunity.
The excerpt addresses the legal principles surrounding absolute immunity for prosecutors and supervisory defendants in the context of trial preparation and witness interviews related to Genzler's criminal case. It emphasizes that while some actions by prosecutors may relate to the decision to prosecute, absolute immunity is not automatically granted for all prosecutorial activities. The court examined whether the actions of prosecutors Longanbach and O'Brien during witness interviews were closely tied to the judicial phase of the trial. The conclusion was that there was insufficient evidence to grant them absolute immunity, leading to the affirmation of the district court's partial denial of their summary judgment request.
In contrast, the court considered the supervisory defendants, Pfingst, Thompson, and Pippen, who were associated with allegations related to prosecutorial misconduct, including the use of perjured testimony and promises of immunity for favorable testimony. The court determined that these actions were closely related to prosecutorial decisions and therefore entitled the supervisory defendants to absolute immunity. As a result, the court reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment for the supervisory defendants.
The final ruling affirmed the partial denial of summary judgment for Longanbach and O'Brien, while reversing it for Pfingst, Thompson, and Pippen, remanding the case for further proceedings without expressing an opinion on the potential constitutional rights violations or the applicability of qualified immunity.
Senior United States Circuit Judge Robert E. Cowen, ruling in a matter involving Genzler, determined that Genzler's suit is not barred by the precedent set in Heck v. Humphrey, as he does not allege conduct that would imply the invalidity of his conviction post-second trial. Key allegations include misconduct by prosecutors Longanbach and O'Brien, specifically regarding an evidentiary hearing on August 22, 1996. During this hearing, Longanbach granted immunity to prosecution witness Sheri Logel in exchange for her favorable testimony, which included immunity from future perjury. This act effectively provided Logel with a "get out of jail free card" for any lies she might tell during Genzler's trial, a decision made with the knowledge of other officials, Pfingst, Thompson, and Pippen. Notably, neither Genzler's attorney nor Logel was called as witnesses by Longanbach, who allegedly orchestrated a presentation of false evidence and perjured testimony to remove Genzler's attorney and improperly influence the trial's outcome, a tactic Longanbach reportedly employed in other cases as well, with the complicity of Pfingst, Thompson, and Pippen.
