Boyles v. Clements

Docket: 90-44

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; July 2, 1990; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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In a paternity case, Tammy Clements claims Edwin Boyles is the father of her child, Michelle Pugh, born out of wedlock on December 6, 1985. Clements submitted a blood test report from National Paternity Laboratories, Inc. as evidence, which Boyles contested. The trial court ruled Boyles was Michelle’s father. On appeal, Boyles argues that the trial court improperly refused to dismiss the case at the conclusion of both parties' presentations and erroneously allowed the blood test results into evidence. The appellate court agrees with Boyles regarding the admission of the blood test results and reverses the trial court's decision, remanding the case without addressing the dismissal issue.

According to Arkansas Code Ann. 9-10-108, blood tests in paternity actions must be directed by the court at either party's request and conducted by qualified individuals. The results should be admissible in evidence if accompanied by a written report certified by a qualified expert. Boyles contends that the blood test report failed to meet statutory requirements, lacking proper jurat, affidavit form, identification of the person conducting the test, and qualifications. Although the chancery court has discretion in admitting such reports, the appellate court finds that the chancellor abused this discretion, referencing Ross v. Moore, which highlighted the necessity of establishing the statutory foundation for admitting blood test results.

The report from National Paternity Laboratories, Inc., signed by Dr. Randall A. Smith and Robert W. Gutendorf, indicates that Edwin Boyles cannot be excluded as the potential father of Michelle Pugh based on HLA and Red Cell data, with a Probability of Paternity of 95.44% and a Paternity Index of 21 to 1. However, the report lacks information on who performed the tests or their qualifications, raising concerns about its admissibility as evidence. The court references the case Ross v. Moore, emphasizing that prior to the adoption of Ark. Code Ann. 9-10-108, such reports would have been inadmissible hearsay unless foundational requirements were satisfied. While this statute aims to ease the introduction of paternity test results, it still requires that certain foundational prerequisites be met to ensure reliability. Consequently, since Clements did not establish the necessary statutory foundation, the court finds the evidence inadmissible. The analysis considers the evidence favorably towards the appellee, following established legal precedents.

Chancery cases are reviewed de novo but findings of fact by the chancellor are only reversed if clearly erroneous. In the case at hand, Clements's testimony regarding her relationship with Boyles presents conflicting evidence about when their relationship ended. Clements indicated they broke up on June 18, 1984, prior to the birth of her child, Michelle, in December 1985. She also claimed not to have had a sexual relationship with Boyles in 1985, although she acknowledged being pregnant and having interactions with him during that time, creating ambiguity in her statements. The chancellor concluded that Boyles is the biological father based on the testimony and evidence presented, but it is unclear how much weight was given to Clements's testimony or the paternity report, which was ultimately excluded from consideration. The credibility of witnesses is crucial, and since the chancellor is better positioned to assess this, the case cannot be resolved through de novo review. The decision is therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings, with differing opinions noted from Dudley and Hays, who would affirm, and Price, who would reverse and dismiss.