Ramon L. Smith v. State of Idaho

Citations: 383 F.3d 934; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18822; 2004 WL 1965169Docket: 02-36043

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 7, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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Ramon L. Smith appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, which determined that Smith’s claims were procedurally barred due to his failure to adhere to state procedural rules during his post-conviction proceedings. The district court found no demonstration of cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Smith was convicted in October 1997 for lewd conduct with a minor, receiving a 20-year-to-life sentence. His appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals was rejected on March 22, 1999, and he failed to file a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, finalizing his conviction by April 13, 1999.

Smith, acting pro se, submitted a state post-conviction petition in August 1999, alongside a motion for appointed counsel, which was not addressed by the trial court. The trial court issued a notice indicating that Smith’s claims were either meritless or could have been raised earlier, leading to the dismissal of his petition on April 28, 2000, due to his failure to respond within the 20-day deadline. 

Smith appealed this dismissal, again requesting counsel, but the trial court denied this request. He submitted an inadequate handwritten brief to the Idaho Supreme Court, which was returned for noncompliance with procedural rules. After multiple submissions, the Supreme Court warned Smith that noncompliance would result in dismissal, which ultimately occurred on December 19, 2000, due to his failure to meet the outlined requirements. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, noting a lack of personal jurisdiction but recognizing Idaho's waiver of any jurisdictional defects, ultimately concluding that Smith did not demonstrate cause for his procedural default.

Smith filed a federal habeas petition pro se on January 2, 2001, which the state moved to dismiss on September 5, 2001. The district court granted the motion on September 3, 2002, citing Smith's procedural bars due to his failure to seek review from the Idaho Supreme Court during his direct appeal and his improper brief submission. Smith appealed this decision.

The district court's lack of personal jurisdiction over the petition was examined, despite it not being raised by the parties. Under established precedent, a habeas petitioner must name the state officer in custody of the petitioner as the respondent. Smith named the State of Idaho instead of the appropriate custodian, leading to a lack of personal jurisdiction. However, personal jurisdiction can be waived, and the court noted that the State of Idaho waived this issue, allowing the case to proceed.

Smith's appeal also addressed the procedural default of his claims. While the district court dismissed his claims as procedurally barred, Smith argued that he could demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse this default. The court would review the procedural dismissal de novo.

A petitioner must demonstrate that a procedural default arises from an objective factor external to themselves to establish cause for that default. Smith argues that his procedural default should be excused based on a state statutory right to counsel, which he believes extends beyond the Sixth Amendment and includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. He presents two arguments: first, that ineffective assistance of his appointed counsel during direct appeal, who failed to file a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, constitutes cause; second, that the state trial court erred by not appointing counsel during his post-conviction proceedings.

The first argument is dismissed, as there is no constitutional right to counsel beyond the initial appeal; therefore, ineffective assistance in seeking discretionary review cannot establish cause for procedural default. The fact that counsel was appointed by the state does not alter this conclusion.

The second argument is stronger, asserting that the trial court's failure to appoint counsel during Smith's post-conviction proceedings violated Idaho law, which requires counsel to be appointed unless the petition is deemed frivolous. Smith filed two motions requesting counsel, neither of which received a proper response from the court. 

Despite recognizing a potential state law error, the court concludes that Smith cannot secure habeas relief based on this, as federal habeas corpus claims do not address alleged misapplications of state law. Smith does not have a federal constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, which means he cannot establish cause for procedural default based on the trial court's failure to appoint counsel, regardless of the state law violation.

The State of Idaho has waived any objections regarding the district court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Smith's custodian. Smith is unable to demonstrate sufficient cause to circumvent the procedural default that barred the district court from reviewing his federal claims. Consequently, the court affirms the lower court's decision. Notably, the Honorable Clyde H. Hamilton, a Senior United States Circuit Judge, participated by designation. Smith's request for a 120-day extension to respond was denied by the trial court. Relevant procedural rules for filing briefs in Idaho were referenced, including requirements for the structure and content of appellate briefs. While no federal appellate court has specifically ruled on similar circumstances, precedent from other circuits indicates that the failure to name the correct respondent can be waived by the government. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that such rules may be subject to waiver. In this instance, Idaho has explicitly conceded the waiver of any defects in personal jurisdiction. The court emphasizes that expediting the resolution of prisoners' claims is essential, and remanding the case for minor amendments would unnecessarily consume judicial and party resources.

Smith's appeal raises concerns about the consistent application of Idaho's procedural rules, particularly referencing the case of Fox v. State, where the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that improper denial of appointed counsel for post-conviction relief negates dismissals based on procedural errors. This ruling suggests that procedural bars may not be uniformly enforced, potentially allowing for habeas relief. However, since Smith did not adequately present this argument in his appeal, it will not be addressed. The Idaho legislature has since amended the code, granting trial courts discretion in appointing counsel for post-conviction proceedings, effectively overruling prior decisions like Brown and Fox. Consequently, as Smith fails to demonstrate cause for his claims, the court does not need to evaluate the accompanying prejudice element.