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Plafcan v. Griggs
Citations: 1987 Ark. LEXIS 1964; 291 Ark. 335; 724 S.W.2d 467Docket: 86-277
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; March 2, 1987; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
The case revolves around the termination of an oral year-to-year leasehold interest upon the death of the life tenant, Florence Plafcan. The trial court ruled that the lease ended with her death, a decision that lessee David Plafcan is appealing. He argues that he did not receive the required notice to terminate the lease under Ark. Stat. Ann. 50-531, which mandates written notice by June 30 for non-renewal of oral rental agreements. Following Florence Plafcan's death on February 9, 1985, Mary Louise Plafcan Griggs, the remainderman, gained full ownership of the land and demanded cash rent or vacation of the premises, which Plafcan refused, asserting his right to remain due to lack of notice. The chancellor affirmed that the lease ceased upon the life tenant's death, referencing established case law that a lease from a life tenant terminates instantly upon their demise. The statute in question does not change this legal principle; it merely stipulates the notice requirement for non-renewal. Since Griggs did not consent to Plafcan's continued occupancy and provided notice to vacate, he held no further interest in the property. The chancellor also addressed damages claimed by Griggs, which included rental value, the destruction of property, and agricultural payments. It was determined that Plafcan was entitled to the wheat crop he had harvested, valued at $1,052, with Griggs receiving her customary share of one fourth. Additionally, Plafcan received a government diversion payment related to the crop. The total amount allocated for the 70-acre tract was $3,994.56, with approximately half paid in January. David Plafcan received three-fourths of this amount, totaling about $1,497.96. The chancellor ruled that Mary Louise Griggs was entitled to $2,035.78 from Plafcan, representing her pro rata share of the wheat crop rent and a return of A.S.C.S. payments that Plafcan received. Plafcan contested this award, claiming it was speculative. However, the chancellor's findings indicated that if Griggs was entitled to a fourth of the wheat crop, her share would be $504.40. Adding this to Plafcan’s January payment of approximately $1,497.60 results in $2,002.36, only $33.42 less than the awarded amount. Both parties were uncertain how the chancellor arrived at the exact figure of $2,035.78, which appeared to be determined post-trial. The court emphasized that the appellant must prove the chancellor was clearly wrong in his findings, which Plafcan failed to do. Consequently, the court upheld the chancellor's damage award.