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Okla Homer Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Larson & Wear, Inc.
Citations: 278 Ark. 467; 646 S.W.2d 696; 1983 Ark. LEXIS 1292Docket: 82-298
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; February 28, 1983; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Appellant Frank Holt engaged appellees Larson and Wear as general contractors for an addition to his furniture factory, which was completed in 1974. They subcontracted roofing work to appellee Industrial Roofing. After a storm on April 2, 1980, the roof was damaged, leading Holt to file a lawsuit on June 30, 1981, alleging negligence in the roof's design, fabrication, installation, and supervision. The circuit court dismissed the case, citing the five-year statute of limitations for contractual claims (Ark. Stat. Ann. 37-237) and the three-year statute for tort actions (Ark. Stat. Ann. 37-206). Holt contends that § 37-237 applies only to contract actions and that his claim of negligence falls under tort law, thus governed solely by § 37-206. He asserts that his cause of action arose when the damage occurred in 1980, making his 1981 filing timely. The key legal issue is whether § 37-237 is limited to contract claims or if it also encompasses tort claims related to construction deficiencies. The court emphasizes that the legislature intended to protect construction industry professionals from long-term liability for their work, aligning with similar statutes enacted in other states during the 1960s. Statutes can preemptively eliminate an injured person's right to pursue legal action if the claim arises post the statutory period. In the context of Act 42, which establishes a statute of limitations for deficiencies in construction-related work, the preamble indicates its intent to encompass all deficiencies from construction contracts. The interpretation of § 37-237 must align with the legislative purpose expressed in Act 42; thus, it applies to all actions stemming from a construction contract where property damage is alleged due to deficiencies in design, supervision, or construction. The case at hand mirrors Atkins Pickle v. Burrough-Uerling-Brasuell, where negligent performance was deemed contractual rather than tortious. Here, the action was filed over five years post substantial completion of the improvement, making it subject to § 37-237, which the trial court correctly upheld, resulting in the case being barred. Other arguments presented by the appellant were not addressed due to this conclusion. The decision was affirmed, with Chief Justice Adkisson dissenting.