Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Little

Citations: 276 Ark. 511; 639 S.W.2d 726; 1982 Ark. LEXIS 1514Docket: 82-17

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; July 12, 1982; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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In a products liability case, Artie Little, 82, was struck by a rim from a passing truck in Strong, Arkansas, leading her to sue truck owner Harvey Shelton, service station owner Jackson Smith, and rim manufacturer Firestone. The jury cleared Shelton and Smith of liability but awarded Little $150,000 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in punitive damages against Firestone. Firestone sought a reversal of the judgment, asserting that the trial court should have compelled disclosure of a potential 'Mary Carter Agreement'—a confidential arrangement where a plaintiff agrees to reduce a defendant's liability if recovering from another party. Firestone's inquiry about such an agreement occurred just before trial, while Shelton's and Smith's attorneys objected to its disclosure. On appeal, it was determined that Firestone did not waive its right to object, and the trial court erred by not requiring disclosure. The ruling emphasized that such agreements are discoverable and admissible in evidence, with the need for transparency underscored by the jury's reliance on the testimonies of Shelton and Smith, which were crucial to Little's case against Firestone. The court highlighted that secret agreements could mislead juries and undermine the pursuit of justice, referencing similar cases that support full disclosure in such scenarios.

Firestone argues for dismissal of the case on the grounds that the wheel presented as evidence cannot be the one involved in the accident. The lawsuit centers on the RH5° rim base, produced by Firestone from 1946 to 1973, with nearly twenty-five million units manufactured. The rim consists of an outer ring that allegedly detached and struck Artie Little, and a base that supports a disc with bolt holes and hand holes. Firestone's position relies on testimonies from truck driver Shelton and others, stating that Shelton had owned the trailer since 1968 without changing the wheels, and that the previous owner confirmed no multi-piece wheel was ever used. Baker, another driver, reported noticing a flat tire the day before the accident, which was repaired by Jackson Smith. After a short drive, Baker witnessed the explosion of the repaired tire, which he claims was caused by the rim detaching and hitting Little.

Discrepancies arise concerning the wheel's whereabouts post-accident; Smith claimed to have stored the rim at his station, while Shelton stated he retrieved it and cut out the 'eye' of the disc to prevent reuse. Shelton was convinced the wheel in evidence was the accident wheel, and Baker affirmed its similarity to the one involved. However, Firestone presented evidence that the wheel had five hand holes and did not match the specifications of the accident wheel, which should have six bolt holes. A Firestone technical adviser testified that Shelton’s trailer could only accommodate a six-bolt wheel. During the trial, Smith examined the wheel assembly and asserted it could not be the one he installed because the outer ring would easily detach, contradicting the characteristics of an RH5° wheel. Additionally, engineer Roger B. McCarthy from Failure Analysis Associates attempted to replicate the rim assembly and found it could not maintain the necessary pressure for safe operation, failing at around 45 pounds. Firestone contends that these arguments should ultimately be presented to the jury.

It was not deemed physically impossible that the introduced wheel was the accident wheel, as referenced in General Motors Corp. v. Tate, where the appellate court determined that evidence regarding physical impossibility cannot be arbitrarily disregarded by the trier of fact. In the current case, the defendant's evidence was disputed, with witnesses testifying that the wheel in question was indeed the accident wheel. Firestone raised concerns regarding the wheel's authenticity, but it was ultimately the jury's role to determine witness credibility. The case did not necessitate that Artie Little produce the accident wheel.

Firestone was adversely affected by the admission of certain documentary evidence, particularly a 1969 letter from Paul Hykes, an engineer with the Budd Company, which criticized the safety and design of the RH5° Rim. The letter stated that the rim was prone to dangerous wear, difficult to detect when improperly assembled, and questioned why it remained on the market despite these issues. The letter was accepted as evidence to show that Firestone had notice of these deficiencies, not to prove the truth of its contents. Firestone contested the letter's admissibility on hearsay and relevance grounds, and after trial, Hykes' deposition was taken, where he qualified his earlier statements. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the letter, and Firestone should be allowed to introduce Hykes' deposition in a retrial. An additional objection arose regarding a letter from Firestone's attorney that accompanied Hykes' letter, expressing disbelief in the criticisms of the rim.

The Budd Company received a letter from Firestone, which was later surrendered in response to a discovery motion in a lawsuit. Firestone argued that the letter was inadmissible under Ark. Stat. Ann. 28-1001, Rule 502 due to attorney-client privilege, but the court found the privilege waived because Firestone allowed the letter into Budd's possession. On rehearing, Firestone contested the admissibility of a letter from Mr. Lynn L. Bradford, asserting it was sent post-accident and could not serve as notice. The court maintained that the trial court's earlier decision to admit the letter was correct, although it noted that its probative value on retrial was questionable due to potential prejudice.

Firestone claimed that complaints made to it did not constitute evidence of a design defect or a duty to act. However, the court indicated that such evidence was admissible as notice, with the trial judge having discretion over its relevance. The judge also admitted evidence regarding the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's investigation of the RH5° wheel, a tentative order from the Utah Industrial Commission banning the wheel, and multiple interoffice memorandums discussing RH5° wheel issues, all deemed relevant to notice. 

Firestone's arguments regarding the exclusion of certain testimony were rejected, as the trial judge's discretion in admitting and excluding evidence, including expert testimony, was affirmed. The judge's role in determining the relevance and potential confusion of evidence is emphasized, and the court stated it would not override the judge's decisions unless there was clear error. Finally, the court expressed that remarks from Artie Little's counsel about a former Firestone employee were unlikely to reoccur during retrial.

Firestone was barred from introducing evidence regarding its support for an OSHA regulation on employee training for servicing multipiece wheels during a previous trial. Despite contemplating warning labels for the rim in 1976, Firestone ultimately opted for an educational program, influenced by expert advice that warnings might be counterproductive. The court believes this evidence should have been allowed to counter claims of willful and wanton conduct against Firestone. 

In a retrial context, Firestone argues that the jury’s finding—that it did not supply a defective wheel—should prevent relitigation of strict liability due to res judicata, citing Womack v. Brickell. However, the court disagrees, stating that the jury's responses to interrogatories do not constitute separate verdicts, and thus, the strict liability issue is not precluded. The jury found Firestone negligent, with sufficient evidence supporting this finding, allowing the appellee to pursue either liability theory in a retrial.

The court also noted that Firestone's attempt to introduce a Commission order that did not ban the wheel was excluded due to being absent from its pretrial list, but this evidence should be allowed in a retrial if properly presented to challenge punitive damages. The decision was reversed and remanded, with a dissent from Judge Purtle.