Kurt Snyder, a Married Man, Individually, and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated Employees of the Navajo Nation Division of Navajo Public Safety Darrell Boye, a Married Man, Individually Larry Etsitty, Sr., a Single Man, Individually Sarah Habaadih, a Single Woman, Individually Jones R. Begay, a Married Man, Individually Johnny Peshlakai, a Married Man, Individually Ronald Platerio, a Married Man, Individually Rex Butler, a Married Man, Individually Tyrone Benally, a Single Man, Individually Charlene Bahe, a Single Woman, Individually Kenny James, a Married Man, Individually Rosalyn Benally, a Single Woman, Individually Leroy Butler, a Married Man, Individually Lucy Lane, a Married Woman, Individually Dale Dennison, a Married Man, Individually Randall Tomasyo a Married Man, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated Employees of the Navajo Nation v. The Navajo Nation, Kurt Snyder, a Married Man, Individually, and on Behalf of All Other Similarly Situated Employees of the Navajo Nation D

Citation: 382 F.3d 892Docket: 03-15395

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 2, 2004; Federal Appellate Court

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Kurt Snyder and multiple other plaintiffs, representing themselves and similarly situated employees of the Navajo Nation, filed an appeal against the Navajo Nation and the United States in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case originated in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and involved various plaintiffs, including both married and single individuals, identified by name. The appeal was submitted on February 9, 2004, and the opinion was filed on June 10, 2004, with amendments made on September 2, 2004. The court, led by Chief Judge Schroeder and Circuit Judges Tallman and Callahan, issued an order amending the previous opinion by making specific deletions and substitutions in the text. The panel denied both the petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc, noting that no judge requested a vote on the latter.

Appellants, law enforcement officers from the Navajo Nation Division of Public Safety, filed claims against the Navajo Nation and the United States asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) due to unpaid overtime and inadequate compensation compared to Bureau of Indian Affairs officers. The district court dismissed the claims against the Navajo Nation, determining that law enforcement was an intramural matter under the precedent of Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, which exempts certain tribal self-governance matters from FLSA application. The court also dismissed claims against the United States. The FLSA generally applies to Indian tribes, but exemptions exist when tribal self-government is interfered with in purely intramural matters, such as employment conditions. Citing previous cases, the court underscored that such exemptions apply only when the implications are confined to the reservation and tribal members. The Chapa De case further clarified that commercial activities, even with ties to tribal self-governance, do not fall under this exemption. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissals.

Employees of the Navajo Nation's Department of Public Safety (DPS), tasked with law enforcement within the reservation, are engaged in a traditional governmental function. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exempts state and local law enforcement officers, and this exemption is applicable to tribal law enforcement as part of tribal government activities. Although appellants argue that the officers' off-reservation activities negate the intramural affairs exception, the court finds that such travel is directly related to crimes affecting the reservation and serves tribal self-government interests. The officers' interactions with external law enforcement agencies are necessary for investigations that impact the tribal community. Additionally, none of the officers' official travel benefits private entities or non-members; their roles serve the tribe’s law enforcement needs. This aligns with previous court rulings, notably the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, which similarly held that FLSA did not apply to law enforcement activities of tribal officers working outside their reservations. The presence of a small percentage of non-Navajo officers (less than four percent) does not alter the primary governmental function and service to tribal interests. Consequently, the court affirms that the FLSA does not apply to the Navajo Nation's DPS, upholding the district court's dismissal of the tribe.

Claims against the United States are fundamentally claims against the Navajo Nation, the true employer of the appellants. The connection to the United States arises from the tribe's self-determination contract and a statutory provision that limits tribal liability for employee torts under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA). The ISDEAA allows federal agencies to contract with Indian tribes to manage reservation services and aims to enhance tribal management involvement while limiting tribal liability. Under the ISDEAA, the United States may be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for torts committed by tribal employees acting under self-determination contracts. However, the appellants do not assert a tort claim against the United States under the FTCA, making the ISDEAA seemingly inapplicable to their case. They rely on a provision in the ISDEAA that classifies Indian contractors as part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), arguing this legitimizes their Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) suit against the United States. Nonetheless, Congress did not intend for this provision to allow civil actions unrelated to the FTCA against the United States. Consequently, the United States is deemed an inappropriate party in this case, leading to the district court's correct dismissal of claims against it, which is affirmed.