Seneca Nation of Indians, Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, United States of America, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants v. The State of New York, New York Thruway Authority, John R. Platt, Executive Director, New York Thruway Authority, Moore Business Forms Corp., Individually and as a Representative of a Class of Landowners Similarly Situated, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, George E. Pataki, Governor, State of New York, Bernadette Castro, Commissioner, Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation, Ronald W. Coan, Director, Erie County Industrial Development Agency, John Cahill, Commissioner, New York Department of Environmental Conservation, Joseph Boardman, Commissioner, New York Department of Transportation, Erie County, Individually and as a Representative of Class of Landowners and Similarly Situated, Moore Business Forms, Individually and as a Representative of a Class of Landowners Similarly Situated, Indicom, Inc., Individually and as a Representative of a Class of Landowners Similarly Situated, R
Docket: 02-6185
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; September 9, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves the Seneca Nation of Indians and the Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians challenging the legality of New York State's acquisition of certain islands in the Niagara River from the Senecas in 1815 for $1,000 and a perpetual annual payment of $500. The plaintiffs argue that the transaction violated the Non-Intercourse Act, which prohibits the transfer of land from Native Americans to non-Natives without Congressional approval. It is acknowledged that the sale lacked such approval. The key legal question is whether New York had pre-existing title to the islands at the time of the purchase, which would determine the legality of the transaction under the Non-Intercourse Act.
The District Court for the Western District of New York ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment, concluding that New York had acquired fee title to the Islands prior to the 1815 Transaction for two main reasons. First, the Court found that the Senecas' aboriginal title was extinguished by either the 1764 Treaties of Peace, transferring title to the British Crown, or the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, which passed the title to New York. Second, it determined that the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua did not return the Islands to the Senecas. The Court's comprehensive opinion was affirmed. The case's procedural history spans a decade, with the original claim dating back to an Indian Claims Commission (ICC) proceeding initiated by the Senecas in the 1950s.
The Niagara River, forming part of the U.S.-Canada boundary, is a significant freshwater river that connects Lakes Erie and Ontario. It runs approximately 35 miles from Buffalo to Lake Ontario, featuring a notable portage route bypassing Niagara Falls. The disputed lands consist of over 40 islands in the River, with Grand Island being the largest at about 19,000 acres. Initially believed to be bisected by the U.S.-Canada boundary, it was later established that the main channel of the River defined the boundary, placing Grand Island entirely within the United States.
The Senecas, as part of the Iroquois Confederacy, historically utilized the Niagara region primarily for seasonal hunting and fishing, rather than as a permanent settlement. They interacted with and displaced other tribes in the area but did not establish permanent villages there. The ownership of the islands is deeply rooted in a complex history involving numerous Colonial-era documents, treaties, and proclamations.
Disputes regarding ownership of the Niagara region and its islands trace back to the 17th century, beginning with the French establishing a presence in the area. In 1678, La Salle founded a settlement near Lewiston, New York, at a seasonal Seneca fishing village, leading to the construction of two fortifications: Fort Conty in 1680 and Fort Denonville around 1687, both of which were short-lived. Tensions between the French and British over control of the Great Lakes and Niagara River escalated, culminating in King William's War in 1689, during which the Iroquois allied with the British. The war severely impacted the Iroquois, leading to the 1701 Treaty, which required them to remain neutral in future conflicts and resulted in their surrender of a vast tract of land, including the Niagara region, to the British.
Despite the treaty, hostilities resumed in Queen Anne's War in 1702, with the French successfully persuading the Iroquois to remain neutral. By 1720, the French established a permanent settlement at Lewiston and built Fort Niagara in 1727, which became a crucial military base and trade route, hindering British trade expansion. This period saw the deterioration of Anglo-French relations, culminating in the series of conflicts during the 1750s, ending with the Treaty of Paris in 1763.
Post-war, the British recognized the need for centralized policies governing Indian relations, which led to the Royal Proclamation of 1763. This proclamation reserved land west of the Appalachian Mountains, including the Niagara region, for the Indians under Royal protection, prohibiting any purchases or settlements without governmental approval. Following British control in 1759, factions of Senecas opposed to British rule participated in Pontiac's Rebellion, which concluded with two peace treaties in 1764 between the Senecas and the British, crucial to the claims being litigated.
In April 1764, the Senecas ceded a tract of land four miles on either side of the Niagara River to the British Crown, agreeing not to obstruct the portage or the use of this land, referred to as the "northern strip." This agreement included a stipulation that the tract would be exclusively for the Crown's use. Concerns about the security of the Niagara portage led British Superintendent Sir William Johnson to propose an expansion of this treaty at a multi-tribal peace conference in July, seeking additional lands extending to the Rapids at Lake Erie, termed the "southern strip," which would also include local islands.
The August 1764 Treaty formalized this expansion, surrendering all lands from the northern grant to the Rapids for the Crown's sole use, while maintaining that these lands should not be considered private property. It specified that the islands between the falls and the Rapids were granted to Sir William Johnson as a gesture of goodwill from the Senecas. Johnson accepted the islands on behalf of the Crown, with the intent to present them to the King for future use, emphasizing their potential importance. There is no record of the King's response to Johnson regarding the islands, and they were not mentioned in Johnson's will.
The August Treaty involved the Senecas conveying a strip of land to the British for Royal purposes, specifically four miles on either side of the Niagara River, while excluding the Islands from this restriction. Instead, the Senecas sought to convey the Islands personally to Johnson, who was aware of the Royal Proclamation prohibiting unapproved private land acquisitions but accepted the land intending to pass it to the Crown.
The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix established a new boundary, superseding the 1763 Proclamation Line, whereby the Indians ceded land east of a line from the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to Fort Stanwix. The Niagara region remained west of this line, thus within Indian territory. The Indians conditioned their cession on the King's adherence to their requests made during negotiations, explicitly stating that no provinces or their residents should invade the land west of the boundary under any pretense.
Following the onset of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress drafted the Articles of Confederation, completed in 1777, amid conflicts with British forces and Indian Nations, including the Senecas. A significant issue arose between the landed states, which claimed western lands based on colonial charters and dealings with the Six Nations, and the landless states. To resolve this, the landed states, including New York, ceded western land claims to the United States, securing recognition of their eastern boundaries. Consequently, New York relinquished claims to all lands west of a meridian from the western tip of Lake Ontario, which retained the Niagara region within its boundaries.
The Articles of Confederation exhibited a strong skepticism toward centralized government, emphasizing state sovereignty as articulated in Article II, which asserts that states retain all powers not expressly delegated to Congress. When states ceded claims to western lands, they obtained assurances: no state would lose territory for the benefit of the United States (Article IX, Clause 2), and the U.S. could not infringe upon state legislative rights regarding trade and Indian affairs (Article IX, Clause 4).
The 1783 Treaty of Paris ended hostilities and established the U.S.-Canada boundary, but did not resolve ongoing conflicts with Indian nations. Consequently, Congress aimed to secure land from the Iroquois in the Northwest Territory to mitigate these tensions and generate revenue to pay war debts. Although Congress authorized commissioners to negotiate treaties with the Indians, the Niagara region was not specifically targeted for acquisition.
Simultaneously, New York attempted to negotiate a peace treaty with the Iroquois, claiming rights to lands near Niagara and Oswego, but the Iroquois countered that these lands were already ceded to New York by the Treaty with Great Britain, resulting in no agreement. The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix established a boundary for Iroquois land claims, yielding all claims west of this boundary to the United States, which included the Niagara region and Fort Oswego, despite the lack of explicit authorization from Congress for these acquisitions.
The Treaty purportedly secured land in the Niagara region, roughly aligning with territory acquired by the British in the August 1764 Treaty. Congress approved and published the Treaty with an added declaration from New York delegate Melancton Smith, asserting that purchases from the Indians would not interfere with state jurisdiction over the soil. In response to Seneca concerns in 1787 about U.S. movement through their territory, the New York State Senate clarified that land ceded in the 1784 Fort Stanwix Treaty was not under state jurisdiction, except for specific areas near Oswego and Niagara.
The 1786 Hartford Compact resolved a dispute between Massachusetts and New York regarding competing claims and preemption rights over Indian lands. It granted Massachusetts preemption rights for lands east of the Niagara River while New York retained rights to the west, including the river and islands.
With the adoption of the Constitution, the federal government gained exclusive authority over Indian affairs, replacing the Articles of Confederation's Legislative Rights Proviso. Congress subsequently enacted the Non-Intercourse Act, prohibiting the conveyance of Indian lands without federal approval.
The 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua arose from dissatisfaction with the 1784 boundary and ongoing hostilities with western tribes. In 1793, Secretary of War Henry Knox suggested ceding some land to secure peace, which was deemed permissible by President Washington's cabinet, although no agreement was ultimately reached. By 1794, the U.S. sought a lasting peace with the Iroquois Nations, with the Senecas initially requesting the return of land along the Niagara River. Negotiations included offers from U.S. negotiator Timothy Pickering to relinquish the land in exchange for the right to establish a road with taverns, which the Senecas rejected, along with another proposal for limited land retention along the river for a fee.
The United States recognized significant land belonging to the Seneca Nation under the Treaty of Canandaigua, which included parts of western New York and the southern Niagara strip. The Treaty, signed on November 11, 1794, designated the Senecas' western boundary as "along the river Niagara to Lake Erie," but did not clarify the status of the Islands in the river, which is a key issue in the current litigation.
In the early 19th century, as tensions between the U.S. and Great Britain increased, the ownership of the Islands became strategically important. In 1811, the New York legislature authorized Governor Daniel Tompkins to negotiate the purchase of the Islands from the Senecas, although he expressed uncertainty about the legal necessity of such a purchase. In an 1812 letter, Tompkins conveyed that the Seneca Chiefs were hesitant to sell the Islands, which he argued were not included in their land reservation under the Treaty, as the Treaty explicitly described the reserved lands but did not mention the Islands. He claimed that the Islands rightfully belonged to New York based on historical cessions by the Iroquois Nations.
Tompkins suggested that any purchase would be a gesture of goodwill rather than a legal requirement. He speculated that the Senecas’ reluctance to sell stemmed from their concerns about the unstable political climate and the potential for British interference.
During the War of 1812, after hearing rumors of a British invasion of Grand Island, which the Senecas claimed as their own, they decided to ally with the United States. Chief Red Jacket articulated the need for the Senecas to defend their property against British forces, emphasizing that inaction could result in the British claiming the land through conquest.
The 1814 Treaty of Ghent established a Commission to determine the international boundary in the Niagara River basin, referencing the 1783 Treaty of Paris. Following this, New York sought to acquire the Islands from the Seneca tribe, with Governor Tompkins suggesting payment to avoid conflict, despite questioning the Senecas' land title. On September 12, 1815, the Senecas agreed to sell all islands in the Niagara River to New York for $1,000 and a $500 annual annuity, though no federal commissioner was present, raising potential violations of the Non-Intercourse Act.
After the 1822 boundary settlement confirmed the Islands as U.S. territory, New York auctioned lots on Grand Island in 1825. The Senecas' claim under the Non-Intercourse Act hinges on four criteria, particularly whether the land was tribal at the time of the 1815 conveyance, which is disputed. The Senecas assert that the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua granted them recognized title to the Islands, making the 1815 Purchase subject to the Non-Intercourse Act. New York counters that it inherited title from the British and that any prior aboriginal title held by the Senecas was extinguished by earlier treaties, thus invalidating the claim that the 1815 Purchase violated the Act.
Additionally, treaties involving Indian tribes are interpreted more liberally than standard agreements, with considerations of historical context, negotiations, and the parties' practical understandings. Ambiguous treaty provisions are to be construed in favor of the tribes.
An important qualification exists regarding the interpretation of Indian treaties, specifically that the rule of generous construction does not apply if the intention to divest a state of land is not clearly indicated in the treaty. In this case, it is established that New York held title to the Islands prior to the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua. The primary issue is whether New York acquired land from the Senecas in 1815 despite already holding title, which is traced back to the 1764 Treaties and the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix.
The August 1764 Treaty is found to have extinguished Seneca title to the Islands, as the District Court determined that the language used reflects a clear intent by the Crown to eliminate any Seneca title. The court noted that the treaty aimed to secure the Niagara portage and punish the Senecas for their involvement in Pontiac's Rebellion. Furthermore, the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix did not affect New York's existing title. The 1764 Treaties, particularly the August 1764 Treaty, used language such as "cede," "grant," and "surrender," indicating an unequivocal intention to extinguish Seneca title. The court concluded that the Senecas ceded any possessory rights to the Islands, supported by the consistent language and purpose of the treaties, which were deemed to manifest a plain and unambiguous intent to extinguish Seneca title.
All land between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie is vested in the Crown, except for the islands between the Great Falls and Lake Erie, which the Senecas granted to Sir William Johnson as a sign of goodwill. The Senecas assert that the 1764 Treaties did not extinguish their aboriginal title, but rather affirmed British dominion while preserving their possessory rights. They cite provisions in the 1764 Treaties, along with earlier agreements, arguing that the language indicates retained rights in the ceded land. Specifically, Article 9 of the April 1764 Treaty states that the Senecas shall retain possession of rights not included in the treaty, suggesting that they kept some land rights. The Senecas also note that restrictions on the land's private use were necessary for retaining their possessory rights and argue that their obligation not to obstruct access to the land implies that not all rights were ceded.
Despite these claims, the distinct treatment of the islands in Article 5 of the August 1764 Treaty indicates a different intent for those lands. The article specifies that the ceded land is for the Crown's use but not as private property, except for the islands, which were to be privately used by Johnson. This exclusion undermines the Senecas' arguments regarding the preservation of their possessory rights, as the islands were set apart for Johnson's use without the restrictions applied to the broader ceded lands. Furthermore, the Senecas acknowledge that their claim to "Indian title" inherently conflicts with the notion of private property, reinforcing the interpretation that the islands were treated differently from the other ceded territories.
The transfer of the Islands to Sir William Johnson in the August 1764 Treaty is examined in relation to the 1763 Royal Proclamation. The argument that the transfer extinguished the Senecas' possessory title is not adequately justified, aside from claiming the transfer was void due to the Proclamation. The conclusion is that, if valid, the grant of possessory rights to Johnson extinguished the Senecas' rights. It is determined that the 1764 Treaty did not violate the 1763 Royal Proclamation, which prohibited land purchases west of the Appalachian Mountains without the Crown's permission. The District Court ruled that the Islands were ceded to the Crown, and even if ceded to Johnson, his acceptance on behalf of the Crown remedied any potential violation. Johnson's correspondence confirms that he accepted the Islands to offer them to the Crown rather than for personal gain. There is no evidence of Crown disapproval regarding the Treaties, supporting the conclusion that Johnson acted as the Crown's agent. Additionally, the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix did not revoke the 1764 cession of the Islands, affirming the earlier District Court's ruling.
The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix did not revoke the Seneca cession of the Islands, as it established a "Boundary Line" intended to prevent encroachments and fraudulent land dealings affecting the Senecas. The Treaty maintained that the Niagara region remained within Seneca territory and explicitly stated that no provincial entities, including the Crown, could invade the land west of this Boundary under any prior deeds. The language of the Treaty differentiates between the "Crown" and "Provinces," suggesting that the Crown was not included in the prohibition against invasions based on old deeds. The Treaty indicates the Senecas granted land to the Crown only between the Boundary Line and existing settlements, excluding areas already in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the Crown's intent to retain its holdings west of the Boundary is supported by historical directives to maintain British posts like Niagara. The Iroquois Nations' disclaimers regarding "old Deeds" were primarily aimed at fraudulent transactions, and there is no evidence that they considered the 1764 Treaties unfair. Their references to these treaties in communications with the United States government further imply that they did not intend to relinquish British rights under the 1768 Treaty.
The speech by the Seneca chiefs addressed key historical treaties and land rights related to the Seneca Nation and the State of New York. It affirmed that the 1768 Treaty did not alter the land cessions from the 1764 treaties, which extinguished Seneca title to certain islands. The document states that the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix did not affect New York's title to these islands, which passed from British control to New York after the American Revolution.
It highlights that prior to the Revolution, property rights were vested in the Crown, and post-Revolution, the states acquired these rights, including New York's jurisdiction over Iroquois lands. The text indicates that New York's title to the islands survived various land disputes and was confirmed by the 1782 cession of western land claims to the Confederation. It describes New York's challenges with neighboring states, particularly Vermont and Massachusetts, which influenced its territorial claims and the eventual acceptance of its cession by Congress.
New York's 1782 cession established its western boundary, including the Niagara region, confirming its jurisdiction and title to the Islands. The Senecas argue that acceptance of this cession did not imply congressional recognition of New York's territorial claims or cessation of disputes with other states. However, congressional inaction on state borders during this period does not indicate that New York's territory was open to U.S. acquisition. The resolution of New York's boundary dispute with Massachusetts in 1786 does not negate New York's title established in 1782, supported by historical documentation. Furthermore, the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix did not undermine New York's title to the Islands. Although peace with Great Britain was achieved via the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the Iroquois remained hostile until the 1784 treaty, which aimed to settle territorial disputes. Congress acknowledged the necessity of land for military bounties and public creditors, stating that the Iroquois had to comply with proposed boundaries to make amends for their wartime actions. Importantly, Congress ensured that the treaty would not infringe upon state territorial claims or legislative rights, although the treaty ultimately extended beyond the lands authorized by Congress, resulting in the Iroquois yielding claims to the Niagara region and parts of western New York.
Congress, in accepting and publishing the Treaty, included a provision from a New York delegate stating that any purchases from Native Americans regarding land rights should not interfere with state jurisdiction. This context, combined with the Articles of Confederation, informs the interpretation of the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. The treaty text suggests that while the Islands are included in its boundaries, the Iroquois only yielded rights they may have had, and since the Senecas ceded all rights to the Islands by 1764, they could not convey them in 1784. Furthermore, the Articles of Confederation explicitly prohibited the confederal government from appropriating state land, reinforcing the conclusion that New York retained title to the Islands. The argument that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution retroactively validated the treaty and resolved any conflicts with the Articles is not convincing. The focus here is on understanding the meaning and implications of the treaty under the Articles, which indicates that New York's title to the Islands remained unaffected by the treaty.
The legal analysis centers on the implications of the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua regarding land ownership between the Seneca Nation and the State of New York. The District Court determined that the treaty did not transfer title of certain islands in the Niagara River from New York to the Senecas. This conclusion was based on two key findings: first, the phrase "along the river Niagara" was interpreted not to include the islands; second, even if the islands were included, the transfer would constitute a taking without just compensation, thus preventing title transfer.
The court's interpretation of "along the river" was deemed ambiguous, leading to the application of a legal principle from United States v. Minnesota, which requires a clear intention to divest a state of land in treaty provisions. The court found no such clear intention regarding the islands. Additionally, the interpretation of treaty boundaries was considered in the context of common law, which indicated that ownership of a river's bed, including islands, depended on the navigability of the river. The legal definition of "navigability" was debated, with implications for whether the riverbed was owned by adjoining landowners or held by the sovereign. Overall, the ruling affirmed New York's title to the islands based on the ambiguity in the treaty's language and the legal framework surrounding navigable rivers.
Title ownership of the riverbeds hinges on whether it is held by landowners or the sovereign. If landowners hold title, the boundary "along the river" encompasses the Islands; if the sovereign holds title, the Senecas' grant ends at the riverbank. This matter is complex under common law, with references to Lord Chief Justice Hale's treatise suggesting land under non-tidal rivers belongs to adjacent landowners, though this interpretation has faced significant debate. Historical texts note ambiguities surrounding Crown ownership and navigability of riverbeds, leading to the conclusion that no clear common law rule exists regarding riverbed ownership. The District Court found the phrase "along the river" to be ambiguous.
In relation to Minnesota v. United States, which addressed swamp lands granted to Minnesota and subsequently included in treaties with the Chippewa, the Court ruled that prior grants to the state were not divested by later treaties unless explicitly stated with certainty. This reasoning applies here, as there is no clear intention in the treaty to convey the Islands. The Senecas argue that the Minnesota rule pertains only to property rights established by prior federal statute, suggesting that Congress should not be presumed to grant the same land twice.
The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on whether a treaty can grant state land to another sovereign, but it has expressed skepticism regarding this authority. The holding of the Minnesota case reflects uncertainty about the federal treaty power and suggests that such power does not extend to actions prohibited by the Constitution, including altering state governance or ceding territory without state consent. U.S. jurisdiction covers all state territory, necessitating both federal and state approval for any transfer of sovereignty. The Treaty of Canandaigua does not indicate an intention to transfer New York’s title to the Islands, and thus, Minnesota precludes any interpretation that would affect New York's ownership. Consequently, the Islands were not considered part of the "property of the Seneca nation" under the 1794 Treaty, leaving New York's title intact and confirming that its purchase of the Islands complied with the Non-Intercourse Act. The District Court's judgment is affirmed. Additionally, the Senecas, along with the Tonawanda Band, challenge a 1954 easement granted to New York, which was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, with the Senecas appealing that decision separately. The Non-Intercourse Act prohibits land transactions with Indigenous nations unless conducted through treaty.
It is lawful for state agents present at treaties with Native Americans, authorized by the U.S. government, to negotiate compensation for land claims extinguished by those treaties. The Non-Intercourse Act of 1802, amended in 1834 and codified at 25 U.S.C. 177, recognizes the concept of aboriginal title, which grants Native Americans exclusive rights to lands they have occupied historically, despite those lands being "discovered" by European settlers. Under the doctrine of discovery, European nations claimed fee title to these lands, while Native Americans retained aboriginal rights of occupancy. However, these rights can be extinguished through war, physical dispossession, or treaties, without the requirement for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Typically, extinguishment consolidates possessory and ownership rights in the sovereign, but if fee title is granted prior to extinguishment, the grantee holds a "right of preemption," which allows for the exclusive right to acquire full title upon extinguishment. This right is contingent upon the sovereign's action to extinguish aboriginal title. The legal history surrounding these rights is complex, with notable cases referenced, including County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York and Johnson v. M'Intosh. The Iroquois historically claimed ownership of lands through conquest, having driven out previous inhabitants, and enjoyed possession until disturbances arose from conflicts such as the war with France.
Free hunting rights were granted to the Five Nations and their descendants, ensuring protection by the Crown of England. In 1765, the Senecas offered Navy Island to Lieutenant Colonel John Vaughan, who consulted Sir William Johnson about the offer. Johnson expressed appreciation for the Senecas' gesture but indicated that he did not consider the land as his property since he only acquired land from white inhabitants. He suggested that the government might grant Vaughan the island, although he noted that the islands were secured to the Indians by treaties in 1701 and 1726, which could prevent private ownership.
The United States retained the exclusive right to declare war and peace, which did not limit its ability to make treaties with Native Americans. Congress was granted the authority to negotiate treaties concerning war and peace with the Indians while allowing states the power to purchase or extinguish Indian land titles, as long as it did not conflict with federal powers. There was ambiguity regarding whether New York had the authority to enter into peace treaties with Native Americans, as confederal treaty commissioners urged the state to align its dealings with the Indians with confederal treaties, a request that New York ultimately ignored. Additionally, a historical dispute arose from Massachusetts's royal grant, which extended its territory significantly beyond current state boundaries, affecting interactions with New York.
New York's territorial boundaries to the west of the Hartford Compact were limited to a meridian through the westernmost point of Lake Ontario due to a prior cession made in 1782 to the confederal government. In response to dissatisfaction regarding this arrangement, the United States attempted to negotiate compensation for the Iroquois Nations through the 1789 Treaty of Fort Harmer, which was never ratified. However, it appears the Senecas were compensated under this treaty for their earlier cessions. The Senecas expressed discontent with the 1784 boundary established by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, acknowledging their prior allegiance to the British and requesting reconsideration of the treaty to restore part of their land and access to fishing rights. President Washington responded that he could not invalidate treaties formed by the United States, insisting that the boundaries set at Fort Stanwix and Fort Harmer must remain in place. The final boundary was established in 1822, following a commission report, and it ran along the navigable channel of the Niagara River, keeping most islands within U.S. territory. The term "recognized title" refers to federal recognition of Indian land ownership, distinct from aboriginal title, which can be extinguished without compensation. The U.S. argues that even if New York held title to the islands as per earlier treaties, the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua legally transferred that title to the Senecas. However, there is skepticism regarding the federal government's ability to cede state land to foreign nations without state consent, supported by legal precedents that assert the need for state approval in such matters.
The supremacy of the Constitution over treaties is reaffirmed, referencing Geofroy and Minnesota, while acknowledging that treaties may override state powers in certain contexts, as established in Missouri v. Holland. The analysis focuses on whether New York secured title to the Islands prior to the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua, concluding that New York indeed possessed the land before this treaty. The next issue is whether this treaty divested New York of its title to the Islands. Principles regarding treaties and legislative actions by the U.S. government are cited, particularly the policy to respect Indian occupancy rights, and it is suggested that similar standards apply to treaties negotiated by Great Britain.
The Seneca perspective is emphasized through Sir William Johnson's 1763 proposals, which contained no explicit cession of Seneca territory and allowed for continued Seneca rights over the land, indicating no intention to extinguish their title. Historical documents, including the 1701 and 1726 Deeds, show that while the Iroquois surrendered land rights to the British Crown, they retained certain privileges, such as hunting, reflecting a status of protected occupancy rather than absolute ownership. The terms outlined in these deeds illustrate a complex relationship between the Iroquois and the Crown, where the latter's authority was meant to protect the former's rights.
Governor Tryon's 1774 report recognized the ambiguity surrounding New York's western boundaries, which were tied to the claims of the Five Nations. He concluded that the boundaries extended west to a point in Lake Erie, directly south of the East Bank of the Strait of Detroit, reaching the 45th degree of Northern Latitude. This delineation included much of present-day southeastern Ontario and the area between Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario, including the Niagara region.
The New York Act of Cession (1780) indicated that states could acquire Indian lands within their borders without needing congressional approval, though such purchases could be restricted by the confederal government to maintain peace. The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, unlike earlier treaties, did not allocate state land to Native Americans but instead transferred it to the United States, highlighting a significant distinction given the prohibition in Article IX(2) against taking state land for federal benefit.
Additionally, historical legal interpretations varied by state regarding navigable waters. For example, New York's Court of Appeals ruled in People ex rel. Loomis v. Canal Appraisers (1865) that upon independence, New Yorkers inherited the crown's rights to lands within the state's jurisdiction, allowing them to use the waters of navigable rivers like the Mohawk for any purpose. This reflects the evolving understanding of property rights concerning navigable waters and public use in the early republic.
The Court established that from at least 1786 to 1792, the New York legislature recognized the state as the owner of freshwater riverbeds in navigable rivers, countering the Senecas' claim that this theory originated in Chief Justice Kent's dissent in *Palmer v. Mulligan* (1805). The Court of Appeals in *Loomis* criticized previous New York cases stemming from the *Palmer* dissent for ignoring legislative acts that asserted state ownership of underwater lands. Additionally, the rule proposed by the Senecas would unjustly elevate the property rights of later states like Minnesota, established post-1789, above those of the original thirteen states, which inherited their rights from the Crown, violating the Equal Footing Doctrine. The Senecas also referenced *Lessee of Lattimer v. Poteet* (1840) to argue that the federal treaty power allows for state land appropriation for tribal use, but the Court disagreed, stating that *Lattimer* did not support such an interpretation, focusing instead on retroactive treaty boundaries.
