United States of America, Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Marion T. Frampton, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, Latique Johnson, Also Known as "John"
Docket: 02-1512
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; September 1, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Marion T. Frampton and Latique Johnson were indicted for their roles in the attempted murder of Michael Johnson, the leader of a crack cocaine operation at 41 Ingalls Avenue, Troy, New York. On January 30, 2002, a federal grand jury charged them with multiple offenses, including murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, violent crime in aid of racketeering, conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, and various firearm-related charges under federal law.
After a jury trial in the Northern District of New York, both defendants were convicted on all counts on March 5, 2002. Subsequently, they filed motions for acquittal and for a new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. On July 24, 2002, the district court granted acquittals for Frampton and Johnson on Counts 1 and 2, and Johnson on Counts 3 and 5, citing insufficient evidence. However, the court denied Frampton’s motions for acquittal or a new trial on the remaining counts. The government appealed the acquittals, while Frampton cross-appealed the denial of his motions.
On New Year's Eve 1998, Frampton and Reggie Cooley attended a party in Troy, New York, while Cooley was evading police due to his crack cocaine dealing in the Bronx. Both men, facing financial difficulties, sought assistance from Henry, a mutual acquaintance, leading to an agreement allowing them to sell crack cocaine from a location at 41 Ingalls. However, their understanding of the arrangement differed significantly; Henry viewed it as a temporary setup, while Frampton and Cooley believed they were being welcomed as full partners.
In early January 1999, Henry informed Frampton and Cooley that it was time to leave the 41 Ingalls enterprise, prompting Cooley to resist, insisting on staying in the profitable operation. Feeling that Henry had breached their agreement, Frampton and Cooley conspired to murder him to seize control of the enterprise. They enlisted Johnson, a friend of Cooley's, to act as the triggerman in exchange for a future favor.
On January 19, 1999, Frampton and Johnson traveled to Troy, where they met Cooley. They finalized their plan to kill Henry, with Cooley agreeing to identify the target. After retrieving a loaded handgun, Cooley identified Henry using a prearranged signal. Johnson then approached Henry and attempted to shoot him, but miraculously, Henry survived the attack. Cooley feigned ignorance while Frampton and Johnson returned to the Bronx.
Counts 1 and 2 charge murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire under Title 18, section 1958 of the U.S. Code. This statute makes it illegal for an individual to travel or cause travel in interstate commerce, or to use mail services to facilitate a murder for payment or a promise of payment, with penalties varying based on the outcome—ten years for conspiracy, up to life imprisonment or death if death results.
The statute specifically requires a quid-pro-quo arrangement where the murder is committed in exchange for something of pecuniary value, defined as anything that provides economic advantage. The court must determine if there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants, Frampton and Johnson, intended to commit murder in exchange for such consideration.
The Government presented evidence including testimony from Cooley, who claimed he and Frampton planned to use Johnson as the hitman, asserting that Johnson was capable of the act. Additionally, Cassidy, a driver, reported that Johnson indicated he had experience in such matters. However, critical to the case was whether the agreement involved consideration that met statutory criteria. Cooley's testimony suggested that Johnson would receive an unspecified "favor," which the Government contended could be interpreted as "anything of pecuniary value." The court found this argument problematic, as the evidence of consideration did not clearly align with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 1958, leading to doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charges.
The Government highlighted an incident from Cooley's testimony regarding a rival crack enterprise that threatened the economic success of the 41 Ingalls enterprise. Cooley and Frampton's intervention with the rival's leader eliminated this threat, illustrating that Cooley's influence had tangible "street value" and could provide significant economic benefits. However, the federal murder-for-hire statute (18 U.S.C. 1958) requires that any consideration exchanged for a murder agreement must primarily confer economic advantage. Mere favors, without a clear understanding of their economic form, do not meet this standard. The statute's language is explicit, distinguishing it from broader interpretations found in the Sentencing Guidelines, which do discuss "pecuniary gain." Consequently, the court upheld the acquittal of Frampton and Johnson on Counts 1 and 2, indicating that the evidence did not support a murder-for-hire conviction. Furthermore, Title 18, section 1959 criminalizes violent crimes committed for the purpose of advancing or maintaining a position in a racketeering enterprise.
The Government sought to convict Frampton and Johnson under 18 U.S.C. 1959 based on different legal theories. Frampton was alleged to have willfully caused Johnson to commit a crime of violence to maintain or enhance his position within the 41 Ingalls enterprise, establishing liability under 18 U.S.C. 2(b) for causing the act. Johnson was alleged to have aided and abetted the crime, making him liable under 18 U.S.C. 2(a).
In his cross-appeal, Frampton did not contest that he caused Johnson's crime but argued the evidence was insufficient to prove he possessed the necessary mens rea to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise. He presented two main arguments: first, that there was no evidence he was a member of the 41 Ingalls enterprise, and second, that even if he was a member, the evidence did not show he acted with the requisite intent.
Frampton pointed to trial testimony from Henry, who denied that Frampton was involved with the enterprise. However, the court found that the jury is responsible for evaluating witness credibility and can reject testimony deemed untruthful. The Government provided testimony from other witnesses detailing Frampton's involvement in drug sales and profit-sharing within the enterprise, which was deemed sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude he was a member of the 41 Ingalls enterprise. Thus, the evidence presented at trial supported both the claims against Frampton and Johnson.
Frampton contends that even if evidence establishes his membership in the 41 Ingalls enterprise, it fails to show that his involvement in the plot to murder Henry was driven by a desire to enhance his position within the organization. The only evidence supporting this claim came from Cooley, who testified about a plan to continue drug sales after Henry's death and to take over his operation. Frampton challenges Cooley's credibility, noting his testimony was given in hopes of a reduced sentence. However, the court reiterates that a single, uncorroborated eyewitness's testimony can suffice for a conviction, despite Frampton's argument for a higher standard due to potential bias. The court affirms the district court's upholding of the jury's verdict against Frampton on Count 3.
Regarding defendant Johnson, the Government argues that by committing a violent crime at Frampton's request, Johnson aided and abetted Frampton's violation of 1959. The district court faced a legal dilemma on whether one can aid and abet a crime by performing an act that is a necessary element of the principal offense. The court concluded that aiding and abetting requires actions that assist illegal conduct without directly engaging in it, suggesting one cannot aid oneself. While the Government disputes this interpretation as inconsistent with traditional aiding and abetting law, Johnson supports the district court's reasoning without providing supporting authority. Ultimately, the court finds that the district court's acquittal of Johnson is supportable on other grounds, allowing for the affirmation of its decision regardless of the reasoning used.
To secure a conviction for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), the Government must demonstrate: 1) that another individual committed the underlying crime; and 2) that the defendant acted with the specific intent to facilitate that crime. In this case, the Government successfully established that Frampton was guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 1959, satisfying the first requirement. Furthermore, it was determined that there was sufficient evidence to show that Johnson committed an act. However, the critical issue was whether the Government proved that Johnson acted with the necessary intent during his crime against Henry. The required intent is more than mere knowledge of aiding a wrongful act; it necessitates a specific intent to assist in the principal's crime. The Government failed to provide direct evidence that Johnson was aware of Frampton's intent to enhance his position in the criminal enterprise when he assaulted Henry. The circumstantial evidence presented was deemed too weak to support this inference.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924, additional penalties apply for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking. The statute outlines increased minimum sentences based on the nature of the firearm's use: five years for mere use or carry, seven years if brandished, and ten years if discharged.
Count 5 of the Indictment charged Johnson, with the Government pursuing his conviction on two alternative theories: as a principal or as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Precedent requires assessing the sufficiency of evidence supporting either theory when a jury is properly instructed on them. However, in this case, the jury specifically indicated that it found Johnson guilty only as a principal. Therefore, the court did not consider aiding and abetting as a basis for conviction. To convict Johnson as a principal, the Government needed to prove he committed a federal crime of violence and knowingly used a firearm in relation to that offense. The crimes alleged were murder-for-hire and a violent crime in aid of racketeering, which had been previously dismissed. Consequently, without a supporting predicate crime of violence, Johnson's conviction as a principal could not be upheld. The district court's judgment of acquittal for Johnson on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 was affirmed. Additionally, Frampton's acquittal on Counts 1 and 2 was also affirmed, while his convictions on Counts 3, 4, 6, and 7 were addressed, with the court affirming the district court's judgment on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 related to Frampton.
The mandate in this case is suspended pending the Supreme Court's rulings in United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan. Parties may file motions to seek the issuance of the mandate before the Supreme Court's decision if necessary. Any petitions for rehearing must follow Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, but the court will not reconsider aspects of the defendant's sentence until after the Supreme Court's decisions. Parties have 14 days post-decision to file supplemental petitions for rehearing.
Frampton was indicted for possession of a weapon after a felony conviction (Count 8) but the government agreed to sever that charge pending a possible dismissal if he was convicted on other counts. He raised a Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence based on the Supreme Court's Blakely decision, which was rejected based on precedent.
The case involved Frampton and Johnson's actions being labeled as attempted murder-for-hire, though this was deemed technically inaccurate since the act of traveling with intent to commit murder for pecuniary gain constitutes a substantive offense on its own. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish an element of murder-for-hire, thereby invalidating the conspiracy conviction related to that charge. Furthermore, Frampton contested the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction on a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, but the evidence presented negated his claims.
Cooley was indicted for conspiring to murder Henry and, prior to his trial, entered a plea and cooperation agreement, testifying for the Government at the trials of Frampton and Johnson in exchange for a reduced sentence. In a cross-appeal, Frampton raised two issues regarding Count 3, primarily challenging the district court's jury instruction on the distinction between "enterprise" and "racketeering activity." He argued that the court should have provided definitions from United States v. Turkette. The court found this argument unmeritorious, noting that the jury instructions accurately reflected the statutory language, which is generally sufficient to avoid finding error. Additionally, Frampton contended that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his lawyer's failure to object to the jury instruction. The court rejected this claim, having found no error in the instruction itself.
