Reginald Clemons, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Allen Luebbers, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center, Appellant/cross-Appellee
Docket: 02-3201, 02-3239
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; September 9, 2004; Federal Appellate Court
Reginald Clemons, the appellee, was involved in a case stemming from the sexual assault and murder of two women in St. Louis, Missouri. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a district court's grant of habeas corpus relief to Clemons, which was based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury. The district court's ruling was influenced by the precedent set in *Witherspoon v. Illinois*, which held that excluding a veniremember for expressing general conscientious objections to the death penalty was unconstitutional. However, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision, determining that Clemons had procedurally defaulted on his claim.
The background of the case indicates that on April 4, 1991, Clemons and three accomplices attempted to rob three individuals on the Chain of Rocks Bridge, leading to the rape and murder of Julie and Robin Kerry. While Julie's body was found weeks later, Robin's remains were never discovered. One accomplice, Winfrey, pleaded guilty to lesser charges and testified against the others, including Clemons, who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
After his conviction, Clemons filed a Rule 29.15 motion challenging the jury selection and raising claims of prosecutorial misconduct. However, he did not directly assert the improper exclusion of death-qualified jurors as a standalone claim, instead linking it to ineffective assistance of counsel allegations. His Rule 29.15 motion was denied, and this denial was upheld by the Missouri Supreme Court.
Clemons's habeas corpus petition raises several claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and errors related to jury selection and the denial of a motion to suppress. The appeal focuses on claims regarding the prosecutor's closing argument and two jury selection issues: the exclusion of six jurors deemed not death-qualified and the exclusion of prospective juror Doss.
In Claim 4B, six jurors initially expressed a willingness to impose the death penalty but later indicated they could not do so based on an accomplice-liability theory. Clemons argues the prosecutor misapplied Missouri law by failing to include necessary elements in hypothetical questions, leading to their erroneous exclusion under Witherspoon. The district court agreed that these claims were preserved and found that the trial court misapplied Supreme Court precedents regarding juror qualifications.
In Claim 4A, the court ruled that juror Doss was correctly dismissed for cause, as he initially stated he could never impose the death penalty, despite later equivocation. The court concluded that Doss's initial statement was sufficient to justify his exclusion.
Most of Clemons's claims for prosecutorial misconduct (Claims 6B-E and 8) were deemed procedurally barred due to lack of prior state court adjudication. However, the district court addressed two claims: the alleged intimidation of a potential exculpatory witness (Claim 6A) and improper comments during closing arguments (Claim 11), ultimately denying both claims.
The state is appealing a district court's unfavorable ruling regarding Claim 4B, which pertains to the exclusion of six jurors deemed not death-qualified. Additionally, the district court has granted Clemons a certificate of appealability for Claim 4A (involving Doss) as well as Claims 6A-E, Claim 8, and Claim 11, centered on prosecutorial misconduct. The review of the district court’s legal conclusions is conducted de novo, while factual findings are assessed for clear error. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a state prisoner can obtain federal habeas relief only if the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court law.
To evaluate a state court’s decision, the first step is to identify relevant Supreme Court precedent. A state decision is deemed 'contrary' if it applies a rule that contradicts Supreme Court precedent or reaches an opposite result on materially similar facts. Furthermore, an 'unreasonable application' of the law is not synonymous with being incorrect; it may simply be erroneous in the independent judgment without being 'objectively unreasonable.'
In the context of Claim 4B, the state argues procedural default, contending that inadequate objections by defense counsel at trial and their omission in the motion for a new trial resulted in the appellate courts not reviewing the voir dire issues. A federal court cannot consider a habeas corpus claim disposed of on independent state grounds. A claim is considered procedurally defaulted when a state procedural rule has not been followed, barring direct review by the Supreme Court unless the prisoner demonstrates cause and prejudice for the default or actual innocence. For a federal court to enforce a state procedural bar, it must be clear that the state court either declined to address the issue for procedural reasons or would hold the claim as procedurally barred.
The federal court assesses the last reasoned state court opinion to determine if a claim is procedurally defaulted. If the state court addresses the merits of a federal claim, it eliminates any procedural bar to federal review. Federal courts do not evaluate the correctness of a state court's application of procedural rules. In Clemons's case, the Missouri Supreme Court identified several claims of trial court error that were not preserved for appeal and stated that these could only be reviewed for plain error, which requires showing manifest injustice. The court declined to review these claims but agreed to consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to the unpreserved issues.
The Missouri Supreme Court also analyzed whether Clemons’s attorneys were ineffective for not objecting to improper voir dire questions, leading to erroneous dismissals. The state court applied a procedural bar to this substantive claim. However, the district court mistakenly found that the claim was preserved, which is contrary to the principle that federal courts do not review state procedural rule applications. Since Clemons's counsel failed to preserve the voir dire issue for appeal, the state supreme court did not review it.
Clemons argued that he had fairly presented his claim to the state court but this argument relates to exhaustion rather than procedural bar. Exhaustion involves presenting a claim for initial adjudication, while procedural default means federal courts cannot review claims decided on independent state grounds. Although Clemons attempted to present his claims, the failure of his counsel to preserve them resulted in the state courts dismissing the voir dire arguments on procedural grounds. Without sufficient justification to overcome the procedural bar, federal review is not possible.
Clemons claimed that his procedural default was caused by ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that this deficiency prejudiced him. To establish this, he needed to demonstrate that his lawyer's performance fell below the reasonable standard set by Strickland v. Washington and that he had presented this claim to the state court. Clemons did present his ineffective assistance claim to the state courts. However, even if his counsel's performance regarding Claim 4B was inadequate, the Missouri Supreme Court found that Clemons was not prejudiced because the outcome of the trial would not have changed despite the alleged failures. The trial court's decision to exclude certain jurors was deemed correct, as their beliefs would significantly impair their ability to serve, and this finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. 2254(e).
During voir dire, while defense counsel questioned jurors about their ability to impose the death penalty, the prosecutor's clarification about accomplice liability caused some jurors to hesitate. Although defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate some jurors, the trial court reasonably judged their responses as inadequate. Clemons also argued that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the 'cool reflection' standard during voir dire, but this argument was rejected; jurors had previously been informed about this requirement in a group setting, and the prosecutor was not obligated to reiterate it individually.
The prosecutor's use of a robbery hypothetical during jury selection was deemed particularly prejudicial, as it was intended to clarify accomplice liability. Although all six jurors heard this hypothetical, they were not individually questioned about it; instead, they were asked if they could impose the death penalty assuming Clemons did not physically push the victims. The court concluded that the jurors understood they were being asked about their ability to impose the death penalty under an accomplice theory rather than a robbery scenario. The excerpt emphasizes that a misleading prosecutor could infringe on a defendant's constitutional rights if jurors were improperly excluded based on misleading questions, but asserts that this was not the case here.
Clemons did not successfully argue that his procedural default should be excused, failing to show cause or demonstrate that his counsel's performance affected the outcome. Consequently, the claims regarding voir dire were procedurally barred unless he could prove actual innocence, which he did not substantiate effectively. The district court had previously found evidence supporting Clemons's culpability, thus rejecting his claim of actual innocence.
Regarding Juror Doss, the state waived its procedural bar defense, allowing for a merits review. However, it was unclear if previous state court adjudications warranted Section 2254(d) deference. Assuming the Doss claim wasn't adjudicated on its merits, the court considered applying the pre-AEDPA standard of review, maintaining the presumption of correctness for the trial court's factual findings. Doss initially stated he could not impose the death penalty due to religious beliefs but later indicated he might under certain circumstances. Ultimately, he affirmed he could impose the death penalty under the accomplice-liability theory.
Doss was dismissed from jury duty due to concerns over his ability to impose the death penalty, stemming from his religious beliefs. The trial court noted that Doss initially indicated he could not impose the death penalty but later modified his stance. Despite this, the court maintained that Doss's beliefs would significantly hinder his juror responsibilities, a determination that warrants deference in review processes. The Missouri Supreme Court supported the trial court's decision, highlighting Doss's inconsistent responses regarding the death penalty as a valid basis for dismissal.
In terms of prosecutorial misconduct, claims made by Clemons, including improper statements during closing arguments, evidence tampering, a Brady violation, improper introduction of out-of-court statements, and the presentation of perjured testimony, were found to be procedurally defaulted by the district court. Although a certificate of appealability was issued, Clemons did not pursue these claims in his appeal, resulting in their abandonment.
Clemons also alleged that the prosecutor intimidated witness Michael Chapey to prevent him from testifying, which would have been detrimental to the state's case. Chapey claimed that after being listed as a witness, the prosecutor threatened him with future retaliation regarding potential criminal prosecutions. An evidentiary hearing was granted by the district court to address this intimidation claim.
Chapey contacted the prosecutor from his jail cell seeking assistance with his parole, to which the prosecutor declined, stating he did not aid defense witnesses. The district court found Chapey's testimony wholly unreliable, characterizing him as self-serving and indicating skepticism about his claims regarding Daniel Winfrey. The court concluded that Chapey's potential testimony would not have altered the trial's outcome, affirming the application of the harmless error rule for witness intimidation claims.
Clemons argued that the prosecutor's closing remarks, which referenced notorious criminals Charles Manson and John Wayne Gacy, violated his Due Process rights. The court evaluated whether these comments rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, requiring extreme misconduct for a mistrial declaration. The Missouri Supreme Court determined that the trial court had properly addressed the prosecutor's comments by instructing the jury to disregard them and found no extraordinary circumstances warranting a reversal.
Ultimately, the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief on Claim 4B was reversed, while the denial of relief on the remaining claims was upheld. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The district court reviewed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision concerning counsel's ineffectiveness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but noted that the Missouri Supreme Court did not evaluate the substantive claim on its merits, focusing only on the ineffectiveness related to the Rule 29.15 motion. Although trial counsel objected to the dismissal of prospective jurors for cause, these specific claims were not included in the motion for a new trial. Additionally, Clemons did not raise a voir dire claim concerning one juror (Wetteroth) in state courts, and while the Missouri Supreme Court addressed five jurors in its opinion, Wetteroth was not mentioned. The state waived exhaustion for the Wetteroth claim, allowing it to be treated as exhausted but procedurally defaulted.
The Missouri Supreme Court found no merit in Clemons's ineffective assistance claim, which the district court also rejected, and this claim was not included in the certificate of appealability, barring further consideration. A key issue remains regarding the standard of review for the ineffective assistance claim—whether to apply a de novo Strickland analysis or defer to the state court's evaluation under § 2254(d). Although the Supreme Court has not definitively required deference for previously adjudicated ineffective assistance claims, the district court opted not to resolve this ambiguity since the outcome would be the same under either standard.
When ineffective assistance is cited as cause for procedural default, the overlap in the prejudice standards of Strickland and Murray v. Carrier can create confusion. The courts have noted that the levels of prejudice required may be similar, though some suggest that overcoming procedural default may necessitate a higher standard. Ultimately, the claim was dismissed based on the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice exception to the procedural bar doctrine involving ineffective assistance.
The district court identifies Clemons's actual innocence claim as a due process violation due to insufficient evidence. Although the court does not explore the Carrier prejudice prong, it acknowledges Clemons's argument that actual innocence excuses procedural default. The case presents several concerns, particularly regarding the confession of Cummins, one of the alleged victims, who initially admitted to murdering his cousins but later retracted it, alleging police coercion. Clemons also claims police brutality in his habeas petition. The prosecutor, Nels Moss, faced contempt for improper jury arguments, described as abusive and intimidating towards the defense.
Clemons's actual innocence claim lacks direct evidence; he does not contest his presence with the four suspects but claims he was not at the specific location where the victims were pushed. His primary evidence rests on hearsay from a prison cellmate of Marlin Gray, which the district court found unconvincing. It is unclear whether the substance of this claim was raised in state court or adjudicated adequately, as the post-conviction court and the Missouri Supreme Court did not substantively address it. Despite this, the appellate court assumes it was presented but ignored.
Consequently, the issue does not rely on independent state grounds, allowing for a pre-AEDPA standard of review. Judge Melloy concurs with parts of the majority opinion regarding juror exclusion and prosecutorial misconduct but dissents on the exclusion of venireperson Doss, arguing that clear and convincing evidence undermines the state court's decision, recommending reversal and remand for this specific claim.
Factual findings in a legal decision carry a presumption of correctness that can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. During voir dire, juror Doss initially stated he would not support the death penalty due to religious beliefs but later clarified that he could set aside those beliefs for this case. Doss indicated he would require firm conviction to vote for the death penalty and stated he could do so if presented with aggravating circumstances. When questioned about accomplice liability, Doss initially expressed hesitation but ultimately confirmed he could vote for death even if Clemons was only an accomplice. Defense counsel noted Doss had been rehabilitated and could follow judicial instructions, yet the trial court mischaracterized Doss’s statements regarding accomplice liability and the standard of proof needed for the death penalty. The court concluded Doss's religious beliefs would prevent him from applying the law, leading to his exclusion as a juror. The majority opinion recognized the trial court's mischaracterization but maintained that the judge's firm conviction justified Doss's exclusion. The dissent argued that the trial court's errors in recalling Doss's statements invalidated the basis for exclusion and that clear and convincing evidence supports this claim. The dissent concluded that the federal court could question the state court's credibility determinations and that the trial court’s ruling should not stand based on factual inaccuracies. A reversal and remand were recommended due to the incorrect factual premise underlying the exclusion of Doss.
