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Bibler Bros. v. Ingram
Citations: 266 Ark. 969; 587 S.W.2d 841; 1979 Ark. App. LEXIS 393Docket: CA 79-54
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; October 3, 1979; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
The case concerns an appeal regarding the Workers’ Compensation Commission's award of a 30% permanent partial disability to an employee who suffered a head injury from a falling tree in 1974. The employee appealed the Commission's decision to the circuit court, which reversed the Commission's finding, asserting that the employee’s healing period had not ended and that he could benefit from a therapeutic work program, which the judge independently researched. The appellants argued that the circuit court improperly relied on evidence not present in the record and misjudged the Commission's substantial evidence. The court’s decision to reverse the Commission was based on the determination that the healing period was ongoing, supported by the judge’s inquiry into a rehabilitation agency. However, the court acted beyond its authority by considering evidence outside the official record, violating Arkansas statutory limits on judicial review of Commission decisions. Ultimately, the decision to reverse the circuit court's order and reinstate the Commission's original ruling was warranted, as the question of whether the healing period had ended was not contested by the employee during the proceedings. The court's obligation to consider evidence solely from the Commission is emphasized, particularly regarding medical reports indicating a 10% permanent partial disability and suggesting the appellee could return to work. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Commission's assigned disability percentage, despite one psychologist assessing a 100% disability. It criticized the circuit court for requiring direct medical testimony for the specific percentage of disability, asserting the absence of competent evidence for a 30% award. The Commission is permitted to consider non-medical evidence in its determinations, as established in prior cases. The circuit court erred by disregarding lay testimony when evaluating the evidence supporting the Commission's award. The document highlights that psychological disabilities are compensable and that it is unrealistic to demand precise disability percentages from claimants, especially in cases of traumatic neurosis. The court concluded that the circuit court improperly substituted its findings for those of the Commission, resulting in a reversal and reinstatement of the Commission's decision. Judges Hays and Howard dissented.