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Rutledge v. State
Citations: 263 Ark. 300; 564 S.W.2d 511; 1978 Ark. LEXIS 1989Docket: CR 78-7 & CR 78-8
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; April 24, 1978; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Larry Rutledge received a ten-year suspended sentence in April 1975 for two counts of burglary and grand larceny. Following his conviction for burglary and theft on June 16, 1977, the State filed a petition to revoke his suspended sentence based solely on this new conviction. The trial court revoked the suspension after judicially noticing the new conviction. POINT I: The court's order lacked a written statement detailing the evidence and reasons for revocation as required by Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-1209 (2. Repl. 1977). However, the signed "Bill of Exceptions" indicated that the revocation was based on the June 16 conviction, demonstrating substantial compliance with the statute. Thus, this point was deemed without merit. POINT II: Appellant argued that revocation was erroneous while his subsequent convictions were under appeal. The court upheld the revocation, stating that pending appeals do not prevent incarceration for subsequent convictions. If the convictions were overturned on appeal, post-conviction relief may be available. POINT III: The claim regarding inadequate written notice of the revocation hearing was not addressed as it was raised for the first time on appeal, and appellant did not explain how he was prejudiced. POINT IV: Appellant's complaint about the lack of a transcription of the proceedings was found to be harmless, as the court relied solely on the judicially noticed convictions, which were undisputed and already recorded. POINT V: The court rejected appellant's claim for credit on the ten-year sentence from April 10, 1975, to June 24, 1977. The suspension was contingent on good behavior, and upon violation, the full sentence could be imposed. POINT VI: The court ruled that taking judicial notice of the subsequent convictions did not constitute an abuse of discretion, as there were no objections at the time. The five-year limitation in Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2331 (Repl. 1977) did not restrict the court from revoking the sentence under Ark. Stat. Ann. 43-2332 (Repl. 1977), which allows for sentence enforcement upon probation violations. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.