Ocoma Foods v. Grogan

Citations: 253 Ark. 1111; 491 S.W.2d 65; 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1722Docket: 5-6190

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; March 5, 1973; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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Marie Grogan began her employment with Ocoma Foods on September 9, 1952, working primarily as a "saw girl" until her departure on March 6, 1970. During her tenure, she experienced ongoing back pain, consulting Dr. Rhys Williams and later Dr. John Tsang, a neurosurgeon, who performed three laminectomies at L4 between 1962 and 1965 due to protruded intervertebral discs. After her last surgery, she continued to work but returned to Dr. Tsang multiple times for recurrent back pain, receiving recommendations for non-surgical treatment and spinal fusion, which she did not pursue. After leaving Ocoma in 1970, she sought medical attention again, and Dr. Tsang diagnosed her with a lumbosacral strain and advised against returning to work for one year.

On October 26, 1970, Grogan filed a workmen’s compensation claim for injuries related to her lower back, seeking various compensatory benefits. Ocoma Foods and its insurance carrier contested the claim, arguing that no injury occurred during her employment, that she failed to report any injury, and that her claim was time-barred. A referee determined that Grogan's work aggravated a preexisting condition, leading to her temporary total disability for one year, while claims prior to October 26, 1968, were dismissed due to limitations. She was awarded a lump sum for temporary disability and coverage for medical expenses incurred after October 26, 1968. This decision was affirmed by the full commission and the Circuit Court of Carroll County. The appellants subsequently appealed this judgment.

Reversal is sought on the basis that there is insufficient evidence to support the commission's findings regarding Mrs. Grogan's claim of an accidental injury related to her employment. The appellants assert that no substantial evidence exists to demonstrate that she sustained such an injury. Mrs. Grogan first reported back issues in 1962 without identifying a specific cause, and she did not formally report an injury to her employer. Dr. Williams noted her back pain during an examination in March 1962, but she denied any traumatic history, and he could not ascertain the cause of her condition. Dr. Tsang, who treated her subsequently, confirmed that she never stated she had sustained an injury and indicated that her job, which involved minimal physical exertion, was unlikely to have caused her disc herniation. He acknowledged that while physical exertion might aggravate her existing condition, any activity, including household chores, could similarly exacerbate her pain. Dr. Tsang's records reflected no significant neurological changes since 1965, and Mrs. Grogan repeatedly claimed she had not experienced any specific injury. Testimonies from coworkers corroborated that she mentioned back pain but did not link it to any workplace injury. Although some past cases allowed for awards based on medical opinions using tentative language, those cases involved a clear connection between the claimant's condition and their employment, which is not evident in Mrs. Grogan's situation.

Yarbrough noted that Kearby’s doctor could not definitively establish a causal link between Kearby’s work and the heart attack, only suggesting a possible connection. The ruling upheld by the commission and reversed by the circuit court referenced the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, which stated that determining mere possibility requires considering all relevant evidence. Testimonies using terms like “might” or “could” do not preclude a jury from finding a causal connection if supported by supplementary evidence. In Exxon Corp. v. Fleming, substantial evidence linked a job-related brain injury to a subsequent heart attack. However, in this case, there was no job-related injury or causal evidence connecting employment to the disability. Similarly, in Young v. Flanders Mfg. Co., no doctors linked Mrs. Young’s injury to her cervical spine condition despite treatment. In Farmer v. L. H. Knight Co., the burden of proof rests on the claimant to demonstrate that an injury or death resulted from an accident arising from employment, which was not satisfied here. Consequently, there was no need to address whether Mrs. Grogan’s claim was time-barred. The Carroll County Circuit Court's judgment was reversed, directing the reversal of the commission’s award.