Moore v. Anthony-Jones Lumber Co.

Citations: 252 Ark. 883; 481 S.W.2d 707; 1972 Ark. LEXIS 1696Docket: 5-5939

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; June 19, 1972; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Mary Alice Moore appeals a Calhoun County Chancery Court decree denying her petition to quiet title to 20 acres of land against Anthony-Jones Lumber Company. Moore originally obtained the land from her father in 1921 but mortgaged it to Calhoun County Bank in 1931. Following her default, the bank foreclosed and purchased the land at auction in 1934. The bank later sold the land to Anthony-Jones Lumber Company in 1941. In her petition, Moore claimed adverse possession of the land, asserting she had cultivated 10 acres and exercised control over the other 10 acres of timberland for over seven years. She amended her petition to assert continuous cultivation since 1921 and timber cutting in 1932, 1941, and 1956. The chancellor ruled that Moore failed to prove adverse possession. On appeal, it was agreed that while she could maintain a suit for quiet title due to adverse possession, she did not meet her burden of proof. Testimony revealed she farmed the fenced land until 1963 when the fence was allegedly removed. Moore paid taxes on the land until the foreclosure but not afterward. Witnesses confirmed her farming activities and noted evidence of paint on trees, but no one could identify who altered the property or when.

William Wood, a cousin of Mrs. Moore, testified about 20 acres of land, noting it comprised both farmland and woodland, although he could not specify the exact distribution. He indicated that the Moores farmed the land until 1963 and harvested timber from it. Recently, he observed that the fence was down and the area overgrown with trees and brush, with red paint markings on some trees that he had only noticed shortly before testifying.

County surveyor I. W. Guthrie testified that he surveyed the land at Mrs. Moore's request, identifying 11.86 acres north of an old fence and 8.14 acres south of it. He described the southern portion as timberland and the northern as previously cultivated farmland with young pine trees approximately 10-12 years old.

Cecil Nutt, a land surveyor and timber cruiser for Anthony-Jones Lumber Company, stated that he had marked the land for the company and confirmed it was part of their selective cutting program. He mentioned that timber was cut in 1959, and he had never observed anyone on the property except for logging operations. He noted that Mrs. Moore never claimed any interest in the land and denied knowledge of any timber being cut. Nutt also reported paying taxes on the land for the lumber company from 1947 to 1965.

Neal Buzbee, a block forester for Anthony-Jones, recalled first seeing the land in 1947 during a boundary survey and assisted in timber cutting in 1966. He confirmed that the company had not cut timber from the land since 1969 and that no farming had occurred since 1947. Buzbee had never seen Mrs. Moore on the property, nor any claims of ownership against the lumber company. The summary concludes with the court's agreement with the appellant on the statutory interpretation but affirms the chancellor's decree based on the evidence presented.

Adverse possession in this state requires seven years of actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive possession, alongside an intent to hold against the true owner, as established in Stricker v. Britt. The possession must be visible and notorious enough that a reasonable owner would be aware of an adverse claim. There is no specific manner required for this manifestation, but there must be physical evidence indicating ownership claims. The document acknowledges that a mortgagor retaining possession for over seven years post-foreclosure can sue to quiet title based on adverse possession against the mortgagee or its assignee, but the burden of proving continuous and adverse possession lies with the original owner. While no Arkansas cases directly support this, a majority opinion in 38 A.L.R. 2d indicates that merely selling property after foreclosure does not inherently change the nature of the mortgagor's possession. The chancellor's decision in this case was upheld as consistent with the evidence.