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Brewer v. State

Citations: 251 Ark. 7; 470 S.W.2d 581; 1971 Ark. LEXIS 1088Docket: 5534

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; September 20, 1971; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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Leotis Brewer was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 21 years in prison by the Ashley County Circuit Court. He has appealed, arguing that the trial court made several errors: it denied his motion for a directed verdict on the first-degree murder charge, improperly instructed the jury regarding that charge, and refused to provide requested instructions on misfortune or accident and justifiable homicide. 

The incident occurred on February 15, 1969, at a tavern called Cox’s Honkey Tonk, where Brewer and the victim, Pete Hadley, were both drinking. Brewer engaged in an argument with Eugene Morris and discharged his pistol into the air three times. Following a confrontation with Hadley, Brewer kicked him and threw a bottle at him. The two wrestled outside, where Brewer threw a beer can at Hadley and subsequently shot him as Hadley staggered closer. Witnesses, including tavern manager Margaret Allen Cox and Lee Charles Porter, provided testimony indicating that Hadley was unarmed and that Brewer threatened him after the shooting. The dispute centered around whether Hadley posed a threat to Brewer at the time of the shooting, with evidence suggesting Hadley was not armed and had his hands raised.

Leotis Brewer is accused of murdering Pete Hadley on February 15, 1969, in Ashley County, Arkansas, using a .32 caliber pistol. Witnesses testified that Brewer kicked Hadley and subsequently shot him while Hadley had his hands raised in defense. Brewer claimed he did not remember firing inside the tavern and stated that he retrieved the gun to scare Hadley, asserting he did not intend to kill him. Brewer’s brother testified that he perceived Hadley as a potential threat to Brewer. The prosecution's information outlines the charge of murder with malice aforethought. Brewer's attorney filed a motion for a bill of particulars, requesting clarification on how the alleged murder was committed.

A response to the motion details the events surrounding the death of Pete Hadley on February 15, 1969, caused by Leotis Brewer at Cox’s Honky Tonk in Montrose, Arkansas. Brewer confronted Eugene Morris over a $1 debt while Hadley was asleep nearby. Brewer brandished a .32 caliber pistol, fired shots at the floor and ceiling, and subsequently shot Hadley in the left shoulder after following him outside, resulting in Hadley's death. Brewer was charged with murder under Arkansas law, which defines murder as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, divided into first and second degrees based on the nature of the act. Additionally, manslaughter is defined as an unlawful killing without malice or deliberation, further categorized into voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Arkansas statutes allow for a defendant to be found guilty of any degree of the offense charged in the indictment and specify that all homicide offenses are considered degrees of the same offense. Upon conviction for murder, the jury must determine the degree, while the indictment must meet certain criteria without necessitating a detailed statement of the offense unless essential for charging.

Allegations of intent, such as willfulness or premeditation, are not required in an indictment for murder, as the offense name encompasses these elements. Upon the defendant's request, the State must provide a bill of particulars detailing the acts leading to the charge. In this case, the jury received instructions on both first and second degree murder, as well as manslaughter. Brewer contends that the indictment only charged him with "murder," implying a second degree charge since it lacked language indicating premeditation necessary for first degree murder. He asserts that the trial court erred by not directing a verdict on first degree murder, claiming the State failed to meet its burden of proof. Brewer's motions for dismissal highlighted these points, reiterating that the evidence did not support a first degree murder charge. Although he requested a bill of particulars, which was provided satisfactorily, he later argued that the trial court mistakenly instructed the jury on first degree murder. However, since he was acquitted of first degree murder and found guilty of second degree murder, he cannot claim that the trial court's actions constituted reversible error, as the jury's verdict aligned with his argument against the first degree charge.

In the case involving Brewer, the court found no prejudice to his substantial rights regarding the information and jury instructions provided. Brewer was charged with and found guilty of second-degree murder, and the court appropriately instructed the jury on all homicide degrees within the murder charge. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the second-degree murder conviction. Brewer's argument that he was entitled to an instruction on misfortune or accident under Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-116 (Repl. 1964) was rejected, as the evidence did not justify such an instruction. The court cited the case of McAdams v. State, which highlighted that if the jury believed a killing was accidental without willful intent, they must acquit; however, the court found no supporting testimony for this claim in Brewer's case. It stated that providing instructions not supported by evidence could mislead the jury. Brewer's testimony indicated that he had an argument with the deceased, feared him due to his size and possession of a knife, and only intended to scare him with a firearm, though this did not absolve him of culpable negligence. Thus, Brewer was not entitled to an instruction on homicide by misfortune or accident, as the evidence did not demonstrate a lack of evil intent or culpable negligence.

Brewer's third assignment of error pertains to his proposed jury instruction asserting that an attempt to commit an aggravated felony justifies homicide. He argued that if the jury had reasonable doubt about his justification for killing Pete Hadley, they should find him not guilty. However, the court identified a flaw in this instruction, noting that the only evidence supporting Brewer's claim of self-defense came from his and his brother's testimonies regarding a perceived threat from Hadley, who they believed might be armed. The court provided two instructions on justifiable homicide, defining it as a necessary act of self-defense against imminent harm. The court asserted that if the jury believed Brewer had reasonable cause to fear for his life and had attempted to avoid confrontation, they should acquit him. Brewer's claim that the jury was not adequately informed about justifiable homicide as a defense was countered by the second instruction, which directly addressed this issue. Additionally, the court rejected Brewer's argument that the instructions implied the necessity of actual danger for justifiable homicide. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment against Brewer.