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Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Ligon Specialized Haulers, Inc.
Citations: 248 Ark. 1233; 455 S.W.2d 663; 1970 Ark. LEXIS 1360Docket: 5-5296
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; June 29, 1970; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
The Missouri Pacific Railroad Company appeals a judgment from the Saline County Circuit Court favoring Ligón Specialized Haulers, Inc. for $4,603.57 in damages to a flat-bed trailer. The incident occurred on November 25, 1968, when Ligón's driver, George Caster, attempted to cross the elevated Neeley Street railroad track with a 40-foot trailer loaded with masonite and plywood. The trailer became lodged on the crossing due to its length and low clearance, preventing the tractor from moving it. Approximately four minutes later, a train struck the stranded trailer. Ligón sued Missouri Pacific and its engineer, J.F. Rose, alleging negligence for failing to keep a proper lookout, not stopping in time, not giving a warning signal, and failing to take emergency precautions. Missouri Pacific counterclaimed for $5,796.84 in damages to its locomotive, citing Ligón's negligence for crossing with inadequate clearance and not warning the train of the trailer’s presence. The trial court granted a directed verdict for J.F. Rose, ruling no evidence supported independent liability for him. The jury then considered only the railroad's alleged negligence regarding train speed, leading to a verdict for Ligón. Missouri Pacific argues for reversal, claiming insufficient evidence linking the train's speed to the accident and asserting that a directed verdict should have been granted in its favor. The court erred in denying a directed verdict for the defendant, Missouri Pacific, due to a lack of causal connection between the train's speed and the accident. Consequently, the issue of the plaintiff's instruction No. 16 regarding speed is rendered moot. Mr. Richard Parnell, a truck driver for Ligón, Inc., testified that he crossed the Neeley Street railroad track shortly before George Caster, whose truck became stuck on the tracks. Parnell attempted to assist Caster but saw the train approaching and managed to move his truck about 10 feet before the train struck Caster's trailer. He noted that Ligón, Inc. trucks carried emergency devices like fuzees and flares, but none were deployed during this incident. Train engineer J. F. Rose testified that the train was traveling at 78 mph, within the permissible limit of 79 mph, and did not see any warning signals, flares, or attempts to signal from Caster. The train only became visible to him about 400 feet from the crossing, and he stated it would take approximately three-quarters of a mile to stop the train in an emergency. The visibility issue was compounded by the train emerging from a curve, which meant the crossing was only visible 700-800 feet away. The ruling emphasizes the rights of the railroad to operate within legal speed limits and highlights that requiring railroads to slow down for potential hazards created by the public could disrupt railroad operations and commerce. The Neeley Street crossing is identified as a frequently used intersection for motor vehicles. However, there is no evidence suggesting that the Ligón, Inc. tractor and trailer could not have safely crossed the railroad after the train's headlight and audible signals were noticeable. Additionally, there is no indication that the truck driver, Mr. Caster, would have attempted to cross if aware of the train's approach. The collision occurred because Caster's low, heavily loaded 40-foot trailer became stuck on the tracks. The railroad company had no reason to anticipate that a vehicle with such specifications would attempt to cross at that location. It was reasonable for the railroad to expect motorists to either wait safely for trains or to cross ahead of trains they could not see or hear. While train speed can sometimes be a factor in negligence cases, in this instance, the train was operating on schedule and at a normal speed, unlike the precedent case cited. The primary cause of the accident was attributed to the trailer's position on the track rather than the train's speed. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is reversed and the case dismissed, with a dissent from Judge Byrd.