Haygood v. Turner

Citations: 247 Ark. 724; 447 S.W.2d 316; 1969 Ark. LEXIS 1170Docket: 5-5083

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; December 1, 1969; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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In this workmen’s compensation case, John Willie Turner filed a claim for hernia against employer A. G. Haygood and insurance carrier Operators Casualty Company, under Arkansas Statute 81-1313 (e). The statute mandates that to establish a hernia claim, the following must be demonstrated: 1) the hernia resulted from sudden effort or strain; 2) severe pain in the hernial region; 3) immediate cessation of work; 4) notice to the employer within forty-eight hours; and 5) medical attention required within the same timeframe. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission denied Turner’s claim based on precedent from Miller Milling Co. v. Amyett, citing failure to satisfy these requirements.

Turner appealed to the Bradley County Circuit Court, which reversed the Commission's decision, referencing Prince Poultry Co. v. Stevens as controlling. Upon further appeal, the employer and insurance carrier argued that Turner was barred from compensation due to noncompliance with the statute. However, the court found that Turner did not meet the criteria, specifically failing to demonstrate immediate cessation of work and the necessity for medical attention within forty-eight hours. Turner, a log cutter, testified that after an incident with a power saw on February 8, 1968, he felt pain but continued to work for several days before seeking medical attention on August 7. He admitted to initially underestimating the severity of his injury and continued working despite increasing pain.

Mr. Haygood, Turner's foreman, confirmed that Turner reported an incident where he was hit in the side by a saw. After the incident, Haygood offered Turner the option to see a doctor or take time off, but Turner chose to continue working, resting only briefly. He worked regularly until he was hospitalized in August, missing only a day or two. Haygood noted that Turner made minimal complaints about his condition during this time, although he communicated the injury on the same day it occurred.

Dr. Dallas D. Miles examined Turner on August 7, 1968, diagnosing a right inguinal hernia linked to the saw incident. Turner stated that while he initially didn't seek medical advice, his symptoms worsened significantly by August 2, prompting him to see a physician. Over six months, from February 8 to August 7, Turner worked consistently despite his escalating condition, only consulting a doctor after the pain intensified, which contrasts with the statutory requirement of seeking medical attention within forty-eight hours.

The court referenced previous cases, notably Prince and Miller, to highlight the distinctions in facts. In Prince, the claimant worked after his injury and sought medical help shortly afterward, which was deemed reasonable under the circumstances. In Miller, the claimant delayed consultation after feeling pain but continued working until he had to see a doctor months later. The Commission awarded benefits in both cases, but the court emphasized that the Prince case could not be extended to the current situation due to differing circumstances.

The circuit court judgment was reversed based on the determination that the appellee's argument, which linked severe pain experienced on March 6 to a requirement for physician attendance within forty-eight hours, was flawed. The court noted that severe pain is inherently required for a compensable hernia, thus rendering the argument redundant. The statute requires the claimant to demonstrate not only severe pain in the hernial region but also that this pain led to an immediate cessation of work and necessitated medical attention within the specified timeframe. The court emphasized that the statute's language limits the consideration of subjective symptoms in hernia claims, indicating that the claimant must meet stringent criteria. The court acknowledged concerns that this could unfairly penalize diligent workers who endure pain, but clarified that it lacks the authority to reinterpret statutory provisions. Ultimately, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the Commission's order to dismiss the claim was reinstated.