Zunamon v. Stevenson

Citations: 247 Ark. 248; 445 S.W.2d 102; 1969 Ark. LEXIS 1093Docket: 5-4966

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; September 29, 1969; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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Frank Holt, Justice, presided over a legal dispute wherein the appellant sought an injunction against the appellees to prevent trespassing on lands he claimed. In response, appellee Stevenson also sought an injunction against the appellant, aiming to quiet title to the disputed lands, which were formerly owned by Hazel Townsend in specific sections of Chicot County, Arkansas. The lands are located between a levee and the Mississippi River, and in 1961, Mrs. Townsend sold her lands east of the levee to Chicago Mill and Lumber Company, reserving a five-acre tract. In 1962, Stevenson and a partner purchased the remaining Townsend lands, but the deed explicitly excluded lands east of the Mississippi River levee.

Stevenson entered into a lease with Chicago Mill and Lumber Company, allowing cattle grazing and requiring the erection of a fence along the timber line, although he never built this fence. A hunting club later constructed a fence in the agreed location. The controversy escalated when Coleman, Stevenson's partner, began clearing land west of the eastern boundary of the levee district, damaging the appellant’s property, prompting the injunction request from the appellant.

During the trial, the court admitted evidence showing that significant acreage east of the levee belonged to the Southeast Arkansas Levee District, not the appellant. The court ruled in favor of the appellant for a permanent injunction against the appellees regarding the disputed lands, except for those owned by the levee district, dismissed Stevenson’s petition for an injunction and quiet title, and refused to bar the appellees from lands owned by the levee district. The appellant contended that he was entitled to an injunction for the lands up to the center line of the levee, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the appellees to challenge Townsend’s title, as both parties claimed under her title.

In cases of ejectment or quiet title actions where both parties derive title from a common source, each party is prevented from disputing the validity of that title, and the party with the superior title from the common source prevails. Cited cases, such as Rhodes et al v. Earl Gill Enterprises, Inc. and Collins v. Heitman, support this principle. The appellant claims superior title based on a deed from Chicago Mill and Lumber Company recorded over a year before the appellee’s deed. However, the trial court found that the land in question, owned by the Southeast Arkansas Levee District, is public land, and thus the district holds possession against all individuals. When the district does not exercise possession, the public retains the right to use the land, with no exclusive rights granted to any individual, including the appellant. 

For an injunction to be issued, the party seeking it must demonstrate sufficient interest or title in the property, and the right or title must be clear. The appellant’s claim lacks equitable grounds for exclusion from public use of the lands. Additionally, there are deficiencies in the evidence regarding the title’s extension eastward beyond the levee district, but the findings of the chancellor are upheld. The appellant's argument that the appellees are estopped due to a 1962 lease agreement is rejected, as this is an injunction proceeding involving public agency land. The timeliness of the appellees' cross-appeal is also addressed, noting that it was filed within the appropriate timeframe following the appellant’s notice of appeal.

Appellant asserts that a Notice of Cross-Appeal must be filed within 10 days after service of the Notice of Appeal, referencing Ark. Stat. Ann. 27-2106.1 (Repl. 1962) and the case Robertson v. Phillips. However, the court clarified in Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co. that a 1957 amendment allows an additional 10 days for filing a second appeal after the first appeal's notice, but the minimum time for any appeal remains 30 days. Thus, appellant’s argument is deemed without merit.

On cross-appeal, appellee Stevenson argues that the chancellor erred in denying his claim to lands in Section 2 and restricting access to them. The conveyance from Mrs. Townsend to Stevenson in 1962 included all fractional parts and accretions in Section 2, while it was established that she had previously conveyed all lands east of the levee to appellant’s predecessor, Chicago Mill and Lumber Company, in 1961. The chancellor determined that Mrs. Townsend owned no lands in Section 2 except those conveyed to Chicago Mill, affirming that most of the lands there are accretions. It was noted that Mrs. Townsend had not acquired any property post-1961 and that all lands involved were inherited from her deceased husband’s estate.

The chancellor ruled that Mrs. Townsend owned lands in Sections 2 and 3 east of the levee due to a dower allotment and had conveyed all such lands to Chicago Mill under a deed with a detailed description. The subsequent transfer of lands from Mrs. Townsend to Stevenson did not convey any interest in Section 2 to him. The court agreed with the chancellor that Mrs. Townsend intended to convey all land east of the levee to Chicago Mill, supported by the exception in Stevenson’s deed and testimony from the attorney involved in both transactions. Citing Wood v. Haye, the court reaffirmed that intent governs conveyances when descriptions allow for identification. The findings of the chancellor were upheld, and the court affirmed both the direct and cross-appeals.