Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; April 1, 1969; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Carleton Harris, Chief Justice, addressed the second appeal of Bill Stout, who was charged with first-degree murder for the killing of Winfred Lee Jones on March 27, 1967. Stout's first trial resulted in a manslaughter conviction and a two-year sentence, which was reversed by this court due to the trial court's failure to require the Prosecuting Attorney to present a written statement from Stout that conflicted with his testimony. Although the court ruled that Stout was not entitled to a self-defense instruction, it indicated he should have received an instruction on excusable homicide, referencing Curry v. State.
In the second trial, Stout was again convicted of manslaughter but received a five-year sentence. He appealed, raising five points for reversal, including an assertion of insufficient evidence supporting the verdict, which was deemed difficult to substantiate. The court referenced the facts detailed in the first appeal and noted that Stout shot Jones while claiming he intended only to frighten him. Stout did not testify at the second trial; the state's case relied on officers' testimonies about the scene and Stout's statements. The court emphasized that the jury could not selectively believe Stout’s claim of no intent to harm while recognizing he pulled the trigger. One officer testified that Stout mentioned jealousy as a motive for the shooting, leading the court to conclude that the jury could view Stout's claims as self-serving. Ultimately, the majority of the court favored reversing the judgment, but no consensus among four members on any specific ground for reversal prevents the opinion from serving as a legal precedent.
Error was identified regarding the jury instruction that allowed Stout to be sentenced to more than two years for voluntary manslaughter, which has a legal penalty range of two to seven years under Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-2229 (Repl. 1964). Stout received a two-year sentence in his first trial but was sentenced to five years in the second trial. The state argues that the latter sentence is valid as it falls within the permissible range. However, it is established that a defendant cannot be retried for a higher degree of homicide than what was initially charged.
The excerpt references differing opinions among state and federal courts regarding sentencing after retrials. In Patton v. State of North Carolina, a defendant's sentence was increased to twenty-five years after a retrial, with a deduction for time served. The Fourth Circuit Court deemed this fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process, as it effectively extended the defendant’s time before becoming eligible for parole.
The text emphasizes a necessary policy that a new sentence should not exceed the original to prevent abuses and the appearance of retaliatory sentencing for exercising the right to a fair trial. It underscores that allowing increased sentences or denying credit on retrial could violate double jeopardy protections, which consist of prohibiting reprosecution after acquittal or conviction and preventing multiple punishments for the same offense.
The Supreme Court, in Green v. United States, established that a defendant cannot be reprosecuted for an offense after acquittal, leading the Circuit Court to conclude that imposing a harsher penalty at a second trial constitutes double jeopardy. This decision is rooted in the 'implied acquittal' doctrine and the prohibition against multiple punishments, as supported by Ex Parte Lange. Conversely, in United States v. Russell, the Third Circuit ruled that a harsher sentence on retrial did not violate due process, stating that the sentencing judge had discretion within statutory limits. The First Circuit took the position that an increased sentence could be justified on retrial if warranted by a pre-sentencing report, yet emphasized that a trial court cannot increase a sentence post-appeal based on new evidence. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled similarly, allowing for increased sentences only if new circumstances arose post-first sentencing, requiring the court to articulate its rationale for such increases. A majority of jurisdictions, however, support that a trial court can impose a greater sentence upon reconviction, as defendants assume the risk of harsher penalties upon appeal. In the present case, the justices are not swayed by contrary opinions, referencing Sneed v. State, where the defendant faced the same initial sentence upon retrial despite previous references made about the first trial.
The appellant argued that the jury should have been instructed not to consider the previous verdict for any purpose, claiming an error in the court's instruction. The court, however, upheld the instruction as correct, emphasizing that references to the former trial were pervasive throughout the current trial. The instruction effectively informed the jury that they could not use the prior trial or verdict as evidence, addressing the appellant's concerns. It clarified that, although the appellant had previously been tried for first-degree murder with a life sentence, a guilty verdict in the current trial could not result in a death penalty. Additionally, the court explained the importance of guiding the jury on verdict forms to avoid mistrial due to double jeopardy, referencing Arkansas Constitution Article 2, Section 8, which prohibits being put in jeopardy for the same offense twice.
Three justices expressed that the appellant's requested instruction No. 2, which outlined conditions for excusable homicide, should have been given. This instruction detailed that if the jury found Jones was intoxicated and posed a threat, and Stout believed he was armed and acted to scare him, then Stout should be acquitted. However, a majority of the court believed that the omission of this instruction was remedied by another instruction given (No. 5), which stated that actions resulting from misfortune or accident without evil intent should not be criminal, allowing for Stout's acquittal if the jury deemed Jones's death accidental.
A concurring opinion from Justices Byrd and Holt identifies reversible error due to the state attorney's remarks suggesting the appellant's failure to testify implied guilt. The attorney's statements, which emphasized the absence of testimony from a deceased witness and questioned the defense's lack of evidence, were deemed to potentially bias the jury against the appellant. Citing Perry v. State, the opinion highlights that similar comments in past cases resulted in reversed convictions.
Additionally, a typographical error was noted where the jury was told the appellant was charged with involuntary manslaughter, but this error is not expected to recur. Concerns were raised about the prosecutor's opening statement, which mentioned witness statements that were not introduced into evidence, misleading the jury about the evidence to be presented. The opinion asserts that the prosecutor's comments regarding the deceased's lack of aggression and the defense's claims were inappropriate, emphasizing that an opening statement should only reference evidence intended to be presented. This case is remanded for a new trial, with the noted errors likely influencing its outcome.
The denial in question affected the competency of witnesses, making prior inconsistent statements admissible for impeachment purposes. The prosecutor improperly speculated about the defendant's testimony, which ultimately did not occur. An alleged error arose during the testimony of Jannie Medlock Chambers, the appellant's stepdaughter, concerning a conflicting written statement referenced by the prosecutor. While cross-examination of one's own witness is permitted in cases of surprise or hostility, any unqualified reference is considered an error. Additionally, an incident involving the deceased's son crying during the prosecutor's argument was addressed by the trial court, which instructed the jury to disregard it.
The court reversed and remanded the case, with a majority opinion emphasizing a reversible error due to the trial court's failure to provide the appellant’s requested instruction No. 2, which was aligned with established precedent allowing self-defense claims under certain circumstances. This instruction would have informed the jury that if the deceased attempted a violent entry, the defendant could justifiably use force to prevent it, potentially leading to an acquittal if an accidental shooting occurred during a struggle. Despite the absence of a self-defense claim, the principle remained applicable. The majority view that another instruction could remedy the error was deemed untenable. The concept of excusable homicide was noted, highlighting that lawful acts done without intent to kill can result in misadventure.
The court failed to instruct the jury that, if they accepted the appellant's theory of the case, he was acting lawfully. The appellant was entitled to such clarification. Prior rulings established that a party claiming accidental weapon discharge during self-defense was entitled to a justifiable homicide instruction, regardless of prior accident instructions given. This principle necessitates a reversal in the current case due to the lack of clear and correct application of the law to the facts, as prejudice cannot be dismissed given the deficiencies noted.
The case involved a notification of a shooting, which was deemed valid, and earlier appeals had established that certain procedural protections, such as those under Miranda v. Arizona, were not applicable. The context also included various defendants' plea situations and retrials, where it was determined that a greater sentence is not justified unless based on new evidence. The court underscored that double jeopardy does not apply when a defendant is retried following a conviction that is set aside at their request; rather, it is a judicial remedy to allow for a fair trial after a conviction.
