Garrison Furniture Co. v. Southern Enterprises, Inc.

Citations: 245 Ark. 927; 436 S.W.2d 278; 1969 Ark. LEXIS 1381Docket: 5-4694

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; January 13, 1969; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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Four appellants—Garrison Furniture Company, Ballman-Cummings Furniture Company, Ward Furniture Manufacturing Company, and W. H. Lillard—filed a suit to quiet title to approximately 91 acres of riparian land on the east bank of the Arkansas River, known as Morris Island. The principal defendant, Southern Enterprises, Inc., claims ownership through adverse possession and a series of conveyances starting from a 1920 deed from the State Land Commissioner to a 1964 deed from five individual codefendants. The chancellor ruled that Southern Enterprises and its predecessors had acquired the land by adverse possession for over seven years, which is the focal point of the appeal.

Morris Island is separated from the mainland by a slough and has undergone changes in river flow over time, leading to disputes over the land's ownership. The appellants assert that the land was originally part of the east bank of the river, which gradually shifted, causing the area to build up as accretion to their properties. Conversely, Southern Enterprises argues that the land began as two islands that became state property before the 1920 deed.

The case hinges on whether the area in question was formed as an island or as accretion to the mainland. This distinction is crucial as constructive possession is tied to true title, and it is acknowledged that large portions of Morris Island have remained unenclosed and unoccupied for years. The appellants claim actual possession of their lands, while Southern Enterprises points to sporadic timber cutting as evidence of possession over the northern and southern parts of the tract.

The appellants argue that, in cases of dual actual possession, the true owner maintains constructive possession of the unoccupied portion of the land. This principle, supported by Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., emphasizes that constructive possession aligns with true title. Appellants contend that their color of title and actual possession of parts of the land entitle them to claim the entire tract, citing precedents that support the notion that possession of any part under a deed grants possession of the whole tract. However, the application of this principle is not universal, as ownership may not be absolute if another party has adverse possession of a portion for at least seven years. 

Evidence suggests that Morris Island is an accretion to the mainland, based on expert testimony from a civil engineer who detailed the river's historical changes and provided maps and photographs to substantiate the claim. He argued that such formations typically involve avulsion, which does not alter land title. The appellee's evidence failed to sufficiently counter the appellants’ claims regarding the land's formation. Consequently, the appellants are deemed to have constructive possession of all their land that is not adversely occupied, while the appellee's claim is limited to areas it has occupied for the requisite seven years. The appellants reject the appellee's claims of having actual possession of the entire tract for that duration.

Activities on the tract were minimal and mainly involved extensive timber cutting in 1953 and 1955, followed by insignificant cuttings of locust posts. In 1959, J. B. Harwood constructed a fence near the cultivated area and allowed cattle to graze, but the fence was only maintained for about two years, and Harwood did not keep cattle on the property during hay growth in summer. Aerial photographs from 1952 to 1967 indicated no adverse occupancy of the entire tract for any seven-year period, revealing that most of the area remained woodland, with some cultivated land at the north end and a hay meadow at the southern end. Evidence showed that although there were patches of occupancy, the appellee could not prove exclusive, continuous, and hostile possession of the hay meadow for the required seven years, as harvesting was inconsistent and not documented for several key years. The appellee's claim of possession relied partly on work done by the Corps of Engineers, which was authorized by the grantors of the appellee but did not support a claim of possession over the hay meadow, as title to that area had been condemned by the United States. Consequently, the appellee only maintained a valid claim to the cultivated northern field. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings, with dissent from Harris, C.J. and Byrd, J., and Holt, J. not participating.