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Berry v. Gordon

Citation: 237 Ark. 865Docket: 5-3045

Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; January 20, 1964; Arkansas; State Supreme Court

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The petition for rehearing disputes the court's determination that Act 399's provisions are separable, arguing that the absence of a separability clause necessitates the invalidation of the entire act. The court reaffirms its stance, noting that a severability clause is not required for sections to be deemed separable; courts have historically separated statutes without such clauses. Sections 1 and 2 of Act 399 establish the legislative intent to reimburse state officers for incurred public relations expenses and provide the necessary appropriation, making them a functional law. Section 3, which improperly allowed reimbursement for unincurred expenses, is severable, as the General Assembly likely intended to reimburse only actual expenses. 

Additionally, the appellant contends the court erred in stating that the Attorney General’s opinion exempted the officers from accounting for received funds. The court clarifies that while the Attorney General's approval protects disbursing officers, it does not extend to recipients of unauthorized funds. Crucially, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof in claims against public officials regarding wrongful receipt of funds. In this case, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that the amounts received by the defendants were not legitimate expenses, as noted by the chancellor. The court implied that a proper evidentiary showing could allow for recovery of funds improperly received.

The appellant forfeited the opportunity to present his case and cannot demand a second chance. He argues that Act 399 constitutes a special act prohibited by Amendment 14 of the state constitution; however, this argument is raised for the first time during rehearing and is thus not properly before the court. Despite this, the court considers the argument due to its public interest significance. A special act is defined as one that arbitrarily separates certain entities from others that would otherwise be included. Classification is acceptable if it reasonably relates to the statute's purpose. The court refrains from judging the wisdom of the legislation and finds that the classification in Act 399 is not arbitrarily established. The General Assembly identified inadequate salaries for specific elected officials and could not increase their salaries directly due to constitutional limits. The legislature's decision to allow reimbursement for incurred expenses is deemed reasonable. The appellant claims discrimination due to the Governor's exclusion from benefits under the act, but the court counters that the Governor's needs are met by separate funding for the Governor's mansion, providing a valid reason for his omission. The petition for rehearing is denied.