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Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Green
Citations: 237 Ark. 785; 376 S.W.2d 275; 1964 Ark. LEXIS 364Docket: 5-3209
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; March 9, 1964; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Litigation involves the interpretation of Miss Lela Owens' will, specifically two sections regarding the disposition of her property. Miss Owens owned a home at 1311 Izard Street, which she bequeathed to the Worthen Bank and Trust Company in trust for her nephews, James and Johnny Ryles, to be transferred to them when the younger turned 21. The will's fifth paragraph directed the conversion of all remaining estate assets into cash for the establishment of the Lela Owens Student Loan Fund at Philander Smith College. After executing the will, Miss Owens purchased a new property at 2200 Rice Street and sold the Izard Street home to the City Housing Authority, moving to Rice Street until her death on July 21, 1962. The will was probated shortly after her death. The executrix filed a petition for court guidance on whether the Rice Street property should be sold for the college fund or if it passed under the trust to the Worthen Bank. The trial court ruled that the Rice Street property passed to the college under the fifth paragraph of the will. The bank appealed, arguing that the term "my home place" in the third paragraph should apply to the Rice Street property, citing a precedent where similar language had been interpreted to convey property acquired after the will's execution. However, the court distinguished this case, noting that the terms used in Owens' will did not equally describe both properties, implying that the Rice Street property was not intended to be part of the trust for her nephews. Miss Owens' will specifies her property as "my home place at 1311 Izard Street in Little Rock," with a legal description that does not correspond to the property at 2200 Rice Street. This situation parallels the case of Dunlap v. Hart, which established that if a testatrix sells specific real estate before the will takes effect and acquires different property, the new property passes to her heirs. The court found this principle applicable, noting that Miss Owens had the opportunity to amend her will to include the Rice Street property but did not do so. The appellant argued against the application of the ademption rule, which involves the revocation of a devise when the specific property is no longer part of the testator's estate at death. The appellant contended that applying ademption would undermine the testatrix's intent to support her nephews with her home. However, the court found the appellant's cited cases unconvincing and relied on its decision in Mee v. Cusineau, which affirmed that if the bequeathed property no longer exists, the legacy is extinguished. The court reasoned that since Miss Owens sold the Izard Street property nearly a year before her death and did not modify her will, the specific legacy was adeemed. Thus, the trial court's order was affirmed.