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Swift v. Barker
Citations: 236 Ark. 805; 370 S.W.2d 71; 1963 Ark. LEXIS 704Docket: 5-3016
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; June 3, 1963; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
The case involves a collision between a pickup truck driven by appellant Swift and a car driven by appellee Barker at the intersection of Eighth and Maple Streets in North Little Rock. Swift sued Barker for personal injuries and property damage but lost at trial, prompting this appeal. Swift argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict for Barker, who claimed contributory negligence as a defense. The jury could have determined that Barker entered the intersection first and that Swift failed to maintain a lookout and did not attempt to stop, resulting in the collision. Evidence indicated Swift's pickup struck the side of Barker's car, with no damage to the front of Barker's vehicle. The court noted that it is rare for a directed verdict to favor a plaintiff due to the burden of proof resting on them. Swift also challenges the latter part of Barker's jury instruction, which discusses the duty of both drivers to exercise ordinary care and maintain control of their vehicles. The court found the general objection to the instruction insufficient to highlight specific errors, particularly regarding the statement that a failure to keep a lookout or control is not negligence in itself. While the court did not approve that specific part, it noted that Swift's failure to make a specific objection precluded him from successfully contesting it. The first part of the instruction was deemed acceptable, and no specific objections were raised against the three-paragraph instruction provided by Barker. Two clauses in the case are recognized as correct statements of law, while a third is conceded to be incorrect; however, as the instruction was not wholly erroneous, any defect should have been raised by a specific objection rather than a general one. The court did not err in providing the instruction. Notably, the appellant had requested an instruction that closely mirrored the language objected to in the appellee's instruction No. 1, which underscores the necessity of a specific objection. The appellant's instruction No. 5, which quoted certain statutes, stated that a violation of those statutes, if proven, does not constitute negligence by itself but serves as evidence of negligence. While the appellant argues that there may be valid reasons for distinguishing between the instructions requested by the parties, this distinction should have been explicitly brought to the court's attention. Additionally, the court's instruction No. 5 regarding James Barker's right to proceed through an intersection—even if he failed to stop—was not inherently erroneous, and the lack of a specific objection further supports the court's decision. The ruling is affirmed.