Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; September 24, 1962; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
The appeal concerns the definition of an "employee" under Arkansas Workmen’s Compensation Law, specifically Ark. Stats. 81-1302, which mandates coverage for employers with five or more regularly employed workers. Aerial Crop Care, Inc., a corporation owned by Crandall Hagan, Ernest Boone, and George Tiefenback, engaged in agricultural flying, did not have workmen’s compensation insurance, believing it had fewer than five regular employees. In November 1958, the corporation hired Jack J. Landry for construction work, during which he was injured and subsequently filed a compensation claim. The claim was permitted through various legal levels, including the Referee, the full Commission, and the Circuit Court.
The appellant contends that the Commission lacked jurisdiction since it had fewer than five employees and that Landry was not "regularly employed." The court examined whether the three incorporators counted as employees. It is established that an employee is defined as any individual in the service of an employer under any contract of hire. The court referenced the Brooks v. Claywell case, affirming that corporate officers can be considered employees under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, a precedent the appellant sought to challenge. The appellant also referenced Brinkley Heavy Hauling Co. v. Youngman to argue that one cannot be an employee of oneself, as Youngman was the only active partner and thus had control over himself. The dissenting opinions in these cases highlighted differing views on whether partners can be employees of their partnerships, emphasizing the issue of control in defining employment status.
Control is the key determinant in establishing the employer-employee relationship, with a corporation being better positioned to control its officers than a partnership can control its members. The Commission concluded that the three officers in question performed work for the corporation, supported by evidence that they flew planes—central to the corporation’s operations—and that their compensation was linked to their flying activities. Additionally, the officers were involved in constructing a hangar for the corporation’s business.
The appellant's claim that the claimant was a casual employee not involved in the regular business lacks merit. The claimant had prior work experience with the appellant and was engaged in erecting the hangar at the time of his injury. Despite working on this project for only five days, there is no evidence suggesting he was hired temporarily. The Court referenced prior rulings indicating that "regularly employed" does not require constant employment and that businesses often hire workers on a periodic basis. It emphasized that an employer cannot fluctuate between coverage and exemption based on daily workforce size.
The Court also addressed the definition of "casual" employment, clarifying that to be exempt from coverage, employment must be both casual and outside the employer's usual business activities. The record supports the Commission's finding that the claimant was regularly employed, not casual. Finally, the Court affirmed that the Commission’s findings, akin to a jury's, are sustained by substantial evidence, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment.
