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Cox v. Wentz
Citations: 231 Ark. 205; 329 S.W.2d 413; 1959 Ark. LEXIS 487Docket: 5-1966
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas; November 16, 1959; Arkansas; State Supreme Court
Keith Wentz filed a writ of mandamus in Washington Circuit Court on September 6, 1958, seeking certification as the elected central committeeman for Ward Two, Springdale, Arkansas, following the Republican Primary held on August 12, 1958. Wentz claimed he received a majority of the votes but was denied a certificate of election by R. B. Cox and U. A. Lovell, the chairman and secretary of the Republican Central Committee, respectively. The required notice was served to Cox and Lovell, who subsequently filed a motion to quash the service, which the court denied. They also filed a demurrer against Wentz's petition, which was overruled, reserving the parties' rights. In their answer, Cox and Lovell challenged Wentz's qualifications, alleging he was not a qualified elector, did not receive a majority of the votes, failed to file a corrupt practice pledge, improperly attempted to file for multiple positions, and submitted an unauthorized ballot form. They asserted that the committee, upon petition from a valid candidate, disregarded the election results in Ward Two. After a hearing on October 31, 1958, the trial court ruled in favor of Wentz, stating he was duly elected and entitled to a certificate of election. The court concluded that the election's procedures were substantially followed and that the respondents could not contest the validity of the substituted ballot they had accepted. On January 13, 1959, the court ordered Cox and the new secretary, E. A. Maestri, to issue Wentz a certificate of election within ten days. The appellants appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying their motion to quash service, claiming relevance to Section 27-306 of the Arkansas Statutes regarding summons, which the court found inapplicable in this mandamus context, citing Section 33-105 for proper notice procedures. Notice of hearing for mandamus and prohibition petitions must be served in writing to the officer or person against whom relief is sought, as prescribed by the court. The notice must include the court's style, docket number, hearing date and location, and the relief sought, with its sufficiency determined by the court. In this case, the court found that notices served to appellants, who are officers, were properly issued under Arkansas law. The trial court scheduled a hearing for the petition for Writ of Mandamus on October 31, 1958, at 9 A.M. and overruled the appellants' motion to quash the notice. The court also addressed the appellants' objections regarding the petition's legal sufficiency, stating that it does not constitute an election contest. The facts indicate that Wentz and Rose opposed each other in an election, with Wentz receiving 11 votes to Rose's 7. Rose did not contest the election, and Wentz seeks to compel the appellants, as officers of the Republican Central Committee, to fulfill their ministerial duty by issuing him a certificate of election. The court affirmed jurisdiction under Arkansas statutes, which grant circuit and chancery courts the authority to hear mandamus petitions and clarify that the chairmen and secretaries of county central committees are considered officers subject to such writs. County Central Committee members, along with the chairman and secretary of each committee, are classified as officers under section 7020 of Crawford and Moses’ Digest. In the case of Irby v. Barrett, the court ruled that a candidate for state senator was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the Democratic State Committee's chairman and secretary to certify him as a candidate, as required by Rule 58 of the Democratic Party. The court confirmed that since the candidate complied with the necessary rules, the chairman and secretary had a ministerial duty to certify his name without any discretion. Similarly, the appellee in this case has substantially complied with the Republican Party's rules, obligating the committee's chairman and secretary to certify the appellee's name. The court found that the appellants' cited authorities were not relevant, as they pertained to election contests rather than mandamus proceedings. Consequently, the judgment was affirmed with no errors found.